State v. SimpsonState v. Simpson
Cal Parish, Dist. Atty., Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellee.
Elmo Lear, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Le BLANC, Judge.
Defendant, Frank Ray Simpson, was charged by grand jury indictment with the second degree murder of Marlene Simpson, his wife, in violation of
PRESCRIPTION
In his sole assignment of error, defendant аrgues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash based on the ground that more than two years had elаpsed between the institution of prosecution and the commencement of trial.
The rather tedious facts of this case are as follows. Prosecution was instituted by indictment on July 27, 1983. On October 19, 1983, the arraignment was passed by thе court and reassigned for November 18, 1983. However, on November 7, 1983, on motion by the defense, the arraignment was passed to December 20, 1983. On December 20, 1983, the defense once again motioned to pass the arraignment and the court reassigned the matter for January 9, 1984. Defendant pled not guilty at the arraignment on January 9, 1984, and trial wаs set for May 14, 1984. On the day of trial, May 14, defendant made an oral motion to appoint a sanity commission, to whiсh the state objected. The trial court overruled the state‘s objection and assigned the sanity hearing for Junе 18, 1984.
When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case shall the state have less than оne year after the ruling to commence the trial.
When the time limitation of Article 578 has apparently accrued, the burden shifts to the state to show an interruption or suspension of the prescriptive period. State v. Guidry, 395 So.2d 764 (La.1981); State v. Haney, 442 So.2d 696 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983).
In State v. Elfert, 247 La. 1047, 175 So.2d 826 (1965), decided under former
The record clearly reveals that the two-yеar period for commencement of trial was not exceeded. The prosecution instituted on July 27, 1983, would hаve prescribed on July 27, 1985, had there been no suspension of the prescriptive period. However, defеndant filed numerous preliminary pleas during the two-year period which suspended the running of prescription. The jоint motion on May 6, 1985, suspended the time period for one year because at that time less than one year was left on the original prescriptive period. On September 10, 1985, the defendant filed a motion for continuаnce which is a preliminary plea that also suspended the running of prescription. State v. Fabacher, 362 So.2d 555 (La.1978). Under
For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit. Defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.