235 N.C. 612
N.C.
1952
Barnhill, J.

Whеn the judge of the municipal-county court adjudged that defendant had breached the conditions upon which execution was suspended, his remedy as now provided by G.S. 15-200.1, was by appeаl.

But he contends that his complaint is not directed to the order placing him in custody and henсe this statute is not applicable. He moved to vacate the conditions imposеd, and it is from the order denying this motion that he seeks relief. The only method available to him for sеeking a review of that order was by petition for writ of certiorari. So he asserts.

We may concede the correctness of his position in this respect. Even then, the record leaves ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍him in no position to challenge the correctness of the ruling of the court below.

A writ of certiorari as here used is an extraordinary remedial writ to correct errors of law. It issues from a Suрerior Court to an inferior court, and it lies only to review judicial or gw.si-judicial action. Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E. 2d 896, and cases cited. Hence the only function of the court below was to determine whether thе judge of the municipal-county court had committed error in denying defendant’s motion for a discharge on the grounds assigned in that court. The trial judge was without jurisdiction to hear new matter or сonsider an attack upon the conditions imposed on any grounds other than those set оut in defendant’s affidavit and motion.

In bis affidavit and motion; tbe defendant asserts as grounds for bis discharge that tbe judge, in suspending tbe judgment pronounced, did not follow tbe procedure prescribed when a prisoner is placed on probation, and that be was required to pay $60 on tbе day of bis trial or “go to jail, and was not free to exercise bis own judgment in tbe matter.” So far as ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍this record discloses, he did not assail tbe validity of tbe conditions on tbe ground that the judgment was in effect a sentence “to pay damages or go to jail,” and that bis imprisonment thereunder will amount to imprisonment for debt. Hence tbe question be seeks to debate here was nоt properly before tbe court below and is not presented to us for decision.

A court has tbe inherent power to suspend a judgment or stay execution of a sentence in a criminal ease. S. v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213, 34 S.E. 2d 143, and cases cited; S. v. Jackson, 226 N.C. 66, 36 S.E. 2d 706; S. v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E. 2d 495. Tbe probation statute, General Statutes, Ob. 15, Art; 20, adopted in 1937, did not withdraw this authority from tbe courts. That Act provides a procedure which is cumulative and concurrent rаther than exclusive.

While tbe court was without jurisdiction to compel defendant to pay tbe damages inflicted on penalty of imprisonment, this does not mean that it might not suspend tbe execution of the sentence of ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍imprisonment on condition tbe defendant compensаte those whom be bad injured. Such disposition of tbe case merely gave him tbe option tо serve bis sentence or accept tbe conditions imposed. S. v. Smith, supra. If be was not content’, be bad tbe right either to reject tbe conditions or to appeal. S. v. Miller, supra.

Not having apрealed, be was relegated to bis right to contest tbe execution of tbe sentence for that there was no evidence to support a finding that tbe conditions imposed havе been breached or tbe conditions are unreasonable and unenforceable or for an unreasonable length of time. S. v. Miller, supra. He elected to challenge tbe conditiоns on tbe grounds set forth in bis affidavit. He has not made good bis attack. Indeed be has ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍abandoned bis original foray and sought another “soft spot” as tbe point of assault. His change of taсtics came too late. Leggett v. College, 234 N.C. 595, and cases cited.

Myers v. Barnhardt, 202 N.C. 49, 161 S.E. 715, is clearly distinguishable. There it appeared that tbe judgment in a criminal case bad been suspended on condition tbe defendant give a bond guaranteeing tbe payment of damages to tbe injured party. Tbe plaintiff was suing to recover on tbe bond. Tbe court said — and rightly so — that tbe sentence could not be invoked to compel tbe payment of tbe bond. Tbe condition on which tbe sentence was suspended was tbe exеcution of tbe bond. When tbe bond was executed, approved, and filed, tbe condition imрosed was met and the power of the court in the criminal cause terminated. Thereafter plaintiff was relegated to his right to recover on the bond.

In the final analysis defendant stоod convicted of reckless driving. Apparently his unlawful use of an automobile inflicted injury upon a number of persons. The court afforded him an opportunity to 'escape the sеrvice of the sentence pronounced by observing the conditions imposed. He aсcepted. He now belatedly withdraws his acceptance and rejects the conditions. He thus furnishes the grounds for invoking the original sentence. When he is imprisoned, he will be imprisoned ‍‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‍for his breach of the criminal law and not for the failure to pay damages.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.