106 Wash. App. 586 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2001
Matthew Silva appeals his convictions of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, forgery, and hit and run. Silva was involved in an “accident” within the meaning of the felony hit and run statute when a police officer was injured while jumping free of Silva’s moving vehicle. Defense counsel’s decision to concede guilt during closing argument to charges of forgery and attempting to elude a police vehicle did not constitute an unauthorized guilty plea that effectively waived Silva’s right to a fair trial and his right to hold the State to its burden of proof. There being no other issues raised in this appeal that warrant relief, we affirm.
Silva went to an Albertson’s grocery store one morning and wrote a check for $50 over the amount of his purchase. Because the check was for a significant amount over the purchase price, and because Silva failed to produce a driver’s license, the cashier decided to telephone the bank issuing the check to verify that sufficient funds existed in the account. When she began the call, Silva took the check from her hand and told her that he would write another check. He then wrote a second check for the purchase amount. Both checks were on the account of a landscaping business. Because the cashier remained suspicious, she had a co-worker write down Silva’s license plate number as he left the store. Once the cashier spoke with the bank, she was unable to verify if the account had sufficient funds. She then reported the incident to the police.
Shortly after Silva left the store, Bothell police officer
As Officers Henkel and Hanna were examining a day planner Silva produced from the car, Officer Brooks approached them and said, “He’s a suspect in a . . .” or “He’s wanted for. . . ,”
Officer Henkel gave chase in her patrol car, with the emergency lights and sirens activated. While in pursuit, she saw Silva drive through a four-way stop, watched him weave in and out of traffic, and observed other cars “going off the road” to avoid his vehicle.
The State charged Silva with second degree assault, felony hit and run, attempting to elude a pursuing police
Silva appeals.
Accident
Silva argues that, because intentional acts by both parties caused Officer Hanna’s injuries, the State failed to prove that an “accident” occurred within the meaning of Washington’s hit and run statute. This argument is unpersuasive.
RCW 46.52.020, commonly known as the hit-and-run statute, provides in pertinent part that the “driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident. . . and in every event remain at, the scene of such accident until he . . . has” provided certain identifying information to the injured party.
Silva concedes that he drove a vehicle in the state of Washington, that Officer Hanna was injured, and that he did not stop to provide the information required by statute. Thus, the issue is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that his vehicle was involved in an “accident” within the meaning of the statute. Silva contends that “[tjhere was nothing accidental about the incident,” because it occurred as a result of intentional acts by both parties. Specifically, he asserts it was Officer “Hanna’s
Although Silva frames his challenge as one to the sufficiency of the evidence, the real question before this Court is one of statutory interpretation and the meaning of the word “accident” as it appears in the hit-and-run statute. When reading a statute, we will not construe language that is clear and unambiguous, but will instead give effect to the plain language without regard to rules of statutory construction.
Silva relies on the following dictionary definition to support his argument that an accident is limited to an event occurring by chance and without intent:
la: an event or condition occurring by chance or arising from unknown or remote causes . . .
[l]c: an unforeseen unplanned event or condition . . .
2a: a [usually] sudden event or change occurring without intent or volition through carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination of causes and producing an unfortunate result. . . .[9 ]
In determining the meaning of a word as it appears in a statute, this Court should not employ “[a] mechanistic use of statutory construction rules [that] would lead [it] astray from [its] paramount duty, which is ‘to ascertain and give expression to the intent of the Legislature.’ ”
The Legislature designed the statute “to punish
Several other states, under similar circumstances, have rejected the precise argument advanced by Silva and concluded that the word “accident” within the meaning of similar hit-and-run statutes includes incidents resulting from intentional conduct.
Similarly, in Wylie v. State,
The Supreme Court of Oregon has similarly concluded that, where intentional conduct on the part of the driver leads to a collision, an “accident” has occurred within the meaning of that state’s hit-and-run statute.
The clear weight of authority supports the State’s position that the word “accident” encompasses situations involving intentional conduct. Silva points to no cases that
To the extent that we need consider further the sufficiency argument, we reject it. “The State bears the burden of proving each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Constitutional Rights
Silva argues that his attorneys decision to concede guilt during closing argument to charges of forgery and attempting to elude a police vehicle constituted an unauthorized guilty plea that effectively waived his right to a fair trial and his right to hold the State to its burden of proof. This argument is also wholly unpersuasive.
By entering a “not guilty” plea, a defendant preserves both his right to a fair trial as well as his right to hold the State to its burden of proof.
But it is not an unauthorized guilty plea “if in closing argument counsel acknowledges what the course of the trial has made undeniable — that on a particular count the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.”
In Underwood v. Clark, a jury convicted the defendant of criminal confinement with a deadly weapon and of attempted rape.
Here, as in Underwood, defense counsel’s decision to admit her client’s guilt on charges of forgery and evading a police vehicle did not constitute an unauthorized guilty plea, but was instead a reasonable trial tactic. The State presented overwhelming evidence of Silva’s guilt on these charges. The evidence clearly demonstrated that Silva committed a forgery, in violation of RCW 9A.60.020(1), when he wrote the check to Albertson’s.
Silva relies on Wiley v. Sowders
Here, in contrast, Silva’s attorney did not concede her
We affirm the judgment and sentence.
The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value and will be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions.
Agid, C.J., and Appelwick, J., concur.
Review denied at 145 Wn.2d 1012 (2001).
Report of Proceedings (Mar. 16, 1998) at 64, 107.
Report of Proceedings (Mar. 16, 1998) at 65, 108.
Report of Proceedings (Mar. 16, 1998) at 68-72.
RCW 46.52.020(1) (emphasis added). RCW 46.52.020(3) requires the driver to “give his or her name, address, insurance company, insurance policy number, and vehicle license number” and to “exhibit his or her vehicle driver’s license.”
State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 200, 206, 697 P.2d 1025, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1009, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985).
Br. of Appellant at 13.
Allan v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 66 Wn. App. 415, 418, 832 P.2d 489 (1992).
State v. Standifer, 110 Wn.2d 90, 92, 750 P.2d 258 (1988). See also Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wn.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986) (in an unambiguous statute, the court will give words their plain and obvious meaning); Brenner v. Leake, 46 Wn. App. 852, 854-55, 732 P.2d 1031 (1987).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 11 (3d ed. 1993).
The Oxford English Dictionary (1971), quoted in State v. Rodgers, 184 Ariz. 378, 909 P.2d 445, 447 (1995).
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 693, 743 P.2d 793 (1987) (quoting Serv. Employees, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 104 Wn.2d 344, 348, 705 P.2d 776 (1985)).
Taxpayers of City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 693 (citing State v. Stockton, 97 Wn.2d 528, 533, 647 P.2d 21 (1982)).
City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d 492, 498, 909 P.2d 1294 (1996).
State v. Akin, 77 Wn. App. 575, 580, 892 P.2d 774 (1995).
State v. Vela, 100 Wn.2d 636, 640-41, 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (refusing to construe hit-and-run statute as requiring “knowledge of injury,” because such a construction “would practically destroy the purpose of the statute”); City of Seattle v. Stokes, 42 Wn. App. 498, 502, 712 P.2d 853 (1986) (observing that the Legislature enacted the hit-and-run statute to protect accident victims).
Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570, 573-74 (1998) (concluding that the word “accident” within the meaning of Georgia’s hit-and-run statute “does not require that the act causing the injury be mere negligence or mishap”).
Gutierrez, 510 S.E.2d at 573; State v. Sabetta, 672 A.2d 451 (R.I. 1996); State v. Rodgers, 184 Ariz. 378, 909 P.2d 445 (1995); McGee v. State, 815 P.2d 196 (Okla. 1991); Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); People v. Jimenez, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1611, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (1992); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983).
State v. Rodgers, 184 Ariz. 378, 909 P.2d 445, 446 (1995).
Rodgers, 909 P.2d at 447.
Rodgers, 909 P.2d at 447.
797 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
Wylie, 797 P.2d at 655.
Wylie, 797 P.2d at 655.
Wylie, 797 P.2d at 658.
Wylie, 797 P.2d at 658.
State v. Parker, 299 Or. 534, 704 P.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1985).
Parker, 704 P.2d at 1149 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Parker, 70 Or. App. 397, 689 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1984)). See also McGee, 815 P.2d at 198 (similarly concluding that an intentional act may be an accident within the meaning of Oklahoma’s hit-and-run statute).
State v. Billups, 62 Wn. App. 122, 126, 813 P.2d 149 (1991).
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
State v. Jones, 63 Wn. App. 703, 707-08, 821 P.2d 543, review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1028 (1992); Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091 (1981).
State v. Ford, 125 Wn.2d 919, 922, 891 P.2d 712 (1995) (quoting In re Adoption of Coggins, 13 Wn. App. 736, 739, 537 P.2d 287 (1975)).
Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983)).
Wiley, 647 F.2d at 648-49 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969)).
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474.
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474. See also United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 1991) (defense counsel’s admission to the jury that his client was guilty of gun possession charges “was a tactical decision, designed to lead the jury towards leniency on the other charges.”); United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941 (1999) (counsel’s concession of guilt on one of several counts was “a reasonable strategy,” to preserve “some credibility with the jury for use where it might help”); McClain v. Hill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (admission of guilt on burglary charges was not ineffective assistance, but rather “a tactical decision to challenge only the most serious charges against petitioner, thereby supporting petitioner’s credibility’).
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474 (citing United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Underwood, 939 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1991).
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474.
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474.
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474.
RCW 9A.60.020(1) states that
“[a] person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud:
“(a) He falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or;
“(b) He possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he knows to be forged.”
RCW 46.61.024, provides in part that:
“[a]ny driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.”
647 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1981).
943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991).
Wiley, 647 F.2d at 644-46.
Wiley, 647 F.2d at 644-46.
Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650.
Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1076.
Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1076.
Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074.
RCW 2.06.040.