State v. SilukState v. Siluk
No appearance for appellee.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
The State appeals the trial cоurt‘s order granting a Motion To Suppress. We reverse.
On January 31, 1987, defendant checked two bags prior to departure from Houston, Texas to Orlando, Florida via Transtar Airlines. During a routine investigation of checked luggage, а dog trained to detect the presence of narcotics “alerted” to the luggage. The Houston police officer who supervised the dog reported the alert to an officer in Houston‘s Narcotics Division, Roy Slay. Because the Houston police did not know who had cheсked the luggage, Slay decided to have his men allow the luggage on the flight. He then contacted James Aaron, a member of Orlando‘s Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation, specifically identifying the luggage and giving detailеd information about the qualifications of the narcotics dog.1
Officer Aаron made arrangements to meet the Transtar flight in Orlando, and asked Orange County‘s Canine Unit to respond to the call. When a number of bags from the Transtаr flight, including defendant‘s luggage, were placed before the Orange County dоg, the dog failed to alert to the presence of any drugs.
Officer Aarоn then proceeded to baggage claim to wait for the luggage. Aftеr defendant collected the bags, he was stopped by Aaron and аsked for permission to search the bags. When defendant refused permissiоn to search one of the bags, Aaron seized the suitcase and obtained a search warrant for it. The bag was found to contain 1784 grams of marijuana.
After his arrest, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on the ground that thе Orlando police had no probable cause “to stop the Defendant or seize his luggage or to obtain a search warrant of [Defеndant‘s] suitcase.” At the suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the probable cause that existed in Houston was vitiated by the
It is well established that an “alert” by a properly trained police dog will provide probable cause for a subsequent search. See Crosby v. State, 492 So.2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Vetter v. State, 395 So.2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We do not accept the argument that the failure of thе local narcotics dog to “alert” to the luggage neutralized the рrobable cause flowing from the alert in Houston, where, as here, it was improbable that anyone had access to the suitcase between the time it left police surveillance in Houston and came under surveillance in Orlando. Moreover, although the officer in Houston was not known tо the officer in Orlando, he provided such specific and detailed infоrmation that the Orlando officer was reasonable in his conclusion that the source of information about the defendant‘s luggage was a fellоw law enforcement officer whose information was truthful and reliable. See State v. Beney, 523 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). See also United States v. Asselin, 775 F.2d 445 (1st Cir. 1985).
REVERSED.
W. SHARP and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.