STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant v. DELTA LOUISE SILAS, Appellee.
No. S-2019-577
In the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma
Decided: June 18, 2020
2020 OK CR 10
SUMMARY OPINION
LUMPKIN, JUDGE:
para 1 Appellee was charged with first-degree misdemeanor manslaughter,
para 2 The evidence presented by the State at preliminary hearing indicated that Silas and her husband, Ronnie Sheppard, spent the late afternoon hours of October 18, 2018, at their rural Pottawatomie County home drinking alcohol. They were later joined by their friend, Samuel Champlin. Champlin spent the еvening drinking with the couple. Shortly after he returned home, Champlin received a phone call from Silas. Champlin testified that Silas told him, “I hit Ron and killed him. I‘ve run over Ron. I‘m going to spend the rеst of my life in jail.” At Champlin‘s urging, Silas called 9-1-1. Responding deputies confirmed that Sheppard was deceased and testified that Silas appeared intoxicated. A test of her blоod indicated an alcohol concentration of .15.
para 3 Silas demurred. She argued that because the incident happened on her driveway she could not be convicted of the underlying misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, and therefore could not be guilty of first-degree (misdemeanor) manslaughter.
para 4 Thе argument was based on what was not included in the language of Section 11-902. Under this Section, it is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol to:
drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes, other public places or upon any private rоad, street, alley or lane
which provides access to one or more single or multi-family dwellings . . . .
para 5 Because in
para 6 Because the issue involves statutory interpretation, it is reviewed de novo. Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, para 40, 157 P.3d 1155, 1169. A fundamental principle оf statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Gerhart v. State, 2015 OK CR 12, para 14, 360 P.3d 1194, 1198. Legislative intent is first determined by the plain and ordinary language of the statute. Newlun v. State, 2015 OK CR 7, para 8, 348 P.3d 209, 211. “A statute shоuld be given a construction according to the fair import of its words taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the рrovision.” Jordan v. State, 1988 OK CR 227, para 4, 763 P.2d 130, 131.
para 7 We find nothing in the plain language of Section 11-902(A) suggesting an intent on the part of the Legislature to exclude “driveways” from the statute‘s reach. See State v. Farthing, 2014 OK CR 4, para 7, 328 P.3d 1208, 1210-11 (where there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “[u]se of canons of construction to fabricate a different result is improper“).
para 8 If the plain language of the statute were not еnough, we note that in
para 9 Appellee‘s reliance on State v. Haws, 1994 OK CR 11, 869 P.2d 849 does not support a different result. Haws, who was discovered asleep in someone else‘s driveway, was charged with actual physical control (APC). The APC statute (
para 10 The same result was reached almost ten years later in Fenimore v. State, 2003 OK CR 20, 78 P.3d 549 where we dismissed a conviction for driving under the influence because the prosecution failed to prove the conduct occurred on a highway, turnpike or public parking lot. Fenimore, 2003 OK CR 20, para 3, 78 P.3d at 550. We noted the narrow scope of the statute, and invited the Legislature to make a change: “If the language of Oklahoma‘s driving under the influence statute needs to be amended -- whether by broadening the language or by making it an all inclusive statute to prohibit driving under the influence anywhere in the State, it must be done by the Oklahoma Legislature.” Fenimore, 2003 OK CR. 20, para 7, 78 P.3d at 551.
para 11 The
para 12 If anything, Haws, which dismissed the prosecution of someone found on a private driveway, cuts against Appellee‘s position. “[W]e must prеsume that the Legislature was aware of our decisions and contemplated them in amending the statute.” State v. Iven, 2014 OK CR 8, para 14, 335 P.3d 264, 269. After Haws and Fenimore, the Legislature expanded the reach of the statute and by doing so made clear that private property was not off limits. What the Legislature did implicitly through statutory amendment, we now do explicitly and overrule Haws and Fenimore to the extent those cases are inconsistent with this opinion.
para 13 Based on the testimony of first responders, here we are faced with a pathway -- whether it is referred to as a private road or а driveway -- extending from a highway to a single-family residence. Under these circumstances, we have little difficulty finding Section 11-902(A) plainly applies.
DECISION
para 14 The decision granting Appellee‘s demurrer is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
OF POTTAWATOMIE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE SHEILA KIRK, ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE
|
APPEARANCES AT TRIAL ROBERT A. BUTLER CURTIS BUSSETT |
APPEARANCES ON APPEAL CURTIS BUSSETT ROBERT A. BUTLER |
OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, J.
LEWIS, P.J.: Dissent
KUEHN, V.P.J.: Specially Concur
HUDSON, J.: Specially Concur
ROWLAND, J.: Concur
LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE, DISSENTING:
para 1 I would affirm the court below. Statutory interpretation drives my view. The foundation of statutory construction is that when the language is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, the enactment will be accorded the meaning as expressed by the language employed. Smith v. State, 1994 OK CR 46, para 5, 878 P.2d 375, (citing Oklahoma Journal Publishing Company v. City of Oklahoma City, 1979 OK CIV APP 42, para 7, 620 P.2d 452, 454).
parа 2 The plain language clearly indicates that the legislature intended that persons not drive under the influence on public or private roadways. Nowhere in section 11-902(A) is drivewаy listed as one of the identified areas covered by the statute. Had the legislature
para 3 The majority‘s reаch to include driveway in this statute fails the common rules of statutory construction. As much as I believe that driving under the influence is detestable, my belief must be bound by the legislature‘s power tо enact laws, and the limits of the Court to interpret those laws. The Court‘s Opinion expanding the statute to include a common driveway is misplaced, therefore, I dissent.
HUDSON, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS
para 1 Title