STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. PAWEL SIENKIEWICZ
(AC 36536)
Beach, Alvord and Pellegrino, Js.
Argued October 7, 2015—officially released January 12, 2016
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, geographical area number fifteen, Baldini, J. [judgment]; Strackbein, J. [guilty plea].)
******************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the
All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the
Jodi Zills Gagne, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Charles F. Willson, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Jacob L. McChesney, special deputy assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state‘s attorney, and Elizabeth M. Moseley, assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The defendant, Pawel Sienkiewicz, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, in violation of
On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of April 3, 2011, Officer Bruce Moro was on patrol in New Britain and observed a Camaro automobile stopped partially on a sidewalk, at a diagonal angle. Upon getting out of his vehicle, Moro heard the Camaro‘s engine “cranking over . . . but it wasn‘t starting.” Moro approached the Camaro and observed the defendant seated on the driver‘s side, behind the steering wheel. The defendant had “glossy eyes . . . [and] a little bit of [a] confused look on his face.” Moro leaned in as he asked for the defendant‘s license, registration, and insurance and noticed that the defendant‘s speech was “a little slurred.” Moro asked the defendant to exit the Camaro. The defendant opened the door and almost fell as he tried to exit. Moro grabbed the defendant and steadied him; as he did so, he smelled the “distinct odor of alcohol.” Moro testified that he then walked to the front of the Camaro and touched the hood of the vehicle. The hood was warm. A second officer who had arrived at the
The jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and the court, Baldini, J., sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment for three years, suspended after twenty-two months, and a three year period of probation. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review is well settled. “First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 138 Conn. App. 420, 433, 52 A.3d 736 (2012); see State v. Jones, 173 Conn. 91, 94, 376 A.2d 1077 (1977).
To prove that the defendant was guilty, the state had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “operate[d] a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both.”
The record supports the conclusion that the state proved the element of operation of the motor vehicle. When Moro came upon the Camaro, it was parked partially on the sidewalk. The defendant was in the driver‘s seat, attempting to start the vehicle. Moro did not observe anyone else in the vicinity. Finally, the hood was warm to the touch, which indicated to Moro that the vehicle recently had been running. From these facts, the jury reasonably could infer that the defendant drove the Camaro onto the sidewalk before Moro arrived. In that event, it would not matter whether, as the defendant claims, the vehicle was incapable of movement at the time of his arrest.
Our conclusion is consistent with previous cases in which the cumulative force of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to satisfy the element of operation. See State v. Teti, 50 Conn. App. 34, 40, 716 A.2d 931 (rejecting defendant‘s claim that state failed to prove that defendant operated vehicle for purposes of
The judgment is affirmed.