74 Mo. 390 | Mo. | 1881
The defendant was indicted for burglary and larceny, and on trial had, was convicted of both offenses. Evidence on.the part of the prosecution disclosed that on the night of February 2nd, 1880, the house of Louis Schlosstein, in the city of St. Louis, was burglariously entered and a considerable amount of jewelry, etc., taken therefrom. On February 4th, two days after the occurrence just mentioned, the defendant, in company with two' others, called upon one Levi Bonné, in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana, and sold him the stolen goods, which at the time were in defendant’s possession. There was testimony also of an alibi, the defendant claiming and testifying that he had not been in St. Louis for more than three years.
Among other merely formal instructions, the trial court gave the following : “ But, on the other hand, where property has been stolen, and recently thereafter the same property, or any part thereof, is found in the possession of another, such person is presumed to be the thief, and if he fails to account for his possession of such property, in a manner consistent with his innocence, this presumption becomes conclusive against him; and in such cases the law further presumes that the thief resorted to and made use of all the means necessary to gain access to and possession of such stolen property.”
In the recent case of State v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608, we had occasion to examine the doctrine relative to the possession of goods recently stolen, and the presumption arising from such possession. We still adhere to the doctrine announced in that case and hold it applicable here, so far as if goes, and were the element of the recent possession of s-olon property the only element in this case, we should not hesitate to approve the action of the trial court. In the case just cited, a similar instruction met with our approval, but there we distinctly said: “ If there really had been evidence of good character introduced, the instruction would not have been sufficiently comprehensive, because good character would neither account for nor explain the possession of the property recently stolen, though it would certainly have a very important bearing in rebutting the presumption of guilt consequent qq such possession.” In this case, as in that, there was no testimony as to good character, but there was testimony of equivalent force and
Thus, in State v. Gray, 37 Mo. 463, Wagner, J., says: “ The presumption,” (arising from recent possession of stolen property,) “ is raised, but is subject to be rebutted by character, habits and all the circumstances.” In State v. Robbins, 65 Mo. 443, Norton, J., refers to the case just cited, among others, with approval, and gives utterance to the same doctrine. In the State v. Williams, 54 Mo. 170, it was said: “ There was no error in the instructions, which told that the recent possession of stolen property is presumptive evidence of the guilt of the possessor. Such possession, unless explained, either by direct evidence or attending circumstances, or the character and habits of the party with whom the property is found, or by some other mode equally satisfactory as to the innocence of the accused, will be taken as conclusive.” In State v. Bruin, 34 Mo. 540, the trial court instructed as follows : “ The jury are instructed that recent possession of stolen property is presumptive evidence of guilt, and if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant had possession of the buggy recently after the taking, they are instructed that
For these reasons we will affirm the judgment of the St. Louis court of appeals, reversing the judgment of the -criminal court, though our reasons differ from those of 'the former court.