25 Del. 491 | Delaware Court of Oyer and Terminer | 1911
We think the court in other cases, for instance, State v. Wiggins, supra, and State v. Lee, 1 Boyce 18, 74 Atl. 4, have gone far in admitting testimony respecting threats, and the deceased’s reputation for violence and quarrelsomeness. And while it may be difficult to distinguish this question, in principle, from one involving a threat, yet we think its admission would open the door wider than it has ever been in any previous case in this state.
The effect of the admission of such testimony would be to permit the defendant in every homicide case to prove communications made by the deceased to the prisoner, and of course it would be impossible for the state to disprove them. We think the court has gone quite as far as it should along this line, and our feeling is that the rule should not be further extended.
We sustain the objection.
The prisoner was then asked to step aside and one B. was called as a witness and testified, without objection, as follows:
“I know Isaac J. Short and I knew Charles Wilson in his lifetime. I told Isaac J. Short that I had known Charles Wilson for seven or eight years and that he was a bad man; that I knew what he did in Denton, that he was in a shooting scrap there and cut a man, beat his wife up and was sent up for two years for that. ’ ’
Short, the prisoner, was then recalled and on motion of the state the previous testimony of the prisoner as to what Wilson had told him was ordered stricken out. The prisoner then testified without objection, as follows:
“I know Mr. Bartlett who just testified. He told me that Wilson was a dangerous man; that he cut a man up down in Den-ton and beat his wife and was serving time for it.”
charging the jury:
Gentlemen of the jury: — Isaac J. Short, the prisoner at the bar, is charged in this indictment with the murder of Charles L. Wilson, in the Town of Lewes, in this county, on the eighteenth day of July, of the present year.
The prisoner does not deny that he shot and killed the deceased at the place and time alleged, but claims that he did the killing in the necessary and lawful defense of his life, or to escape great bodily harm, from an imminent assault upon him by the deceased with a razor.
Inasmuch as the prisoner is charged with murder of the first degree, it is necessary for the corut to define and explain to you as clearly as we can, the two degrees of murder as well as manslaughter.
Where the homicide is proved the law presumes that it was committed with malice, but it goes no further than to imply malice, and therefore the legal presumption goes no further in such case than that it was murder of the second degree.
We have been asked to charge you in respect to the law of self-defense, and we will do so in conformity with what we believe to be the meaning and intent of the decisions of the court upon that principle of the law.
Upon this phase of the defense the court follows the decisions recently made in the cases of State v. Wiggins and State v. Lee, (1 Boyce 18,) and charges you, that if you find from the evidence that an actual assault was first made by the deceased upon the prisoner, it is then proper and material to the issue raised by the plea of self-defense, for you to consider and determine whether
Reasonable doubt in the legal sense, therefore, does not mean a vague, speculative or whimsical doubt, nor a mere possible doubt, but a substantial doubt, and such a doubt as intelligent, reasonable and impartial men may honestly entertain after a careful examination, and conscientious consideration, of all the evidence. If, after carefully and conscientiously considering all the evidence in the case you believe that the guilt of the prisoner has been established beyond such a reasonable doubt, your verdict should be guilty. If you are not satisfied beyond such reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner, your verdict should be not guilty.
We may say further for your guidance, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the prisoner killed the deceased with express malice aforethought, that is, with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design to kill, and not in lawful self-defense, your verdict should be guilty in manner and form as he stands indicted, which is murder of the first degree.
If you are not satisfied that the prisoner is guilty of murder of the first degree, but are satisfied that he killed the deceased maliciously, without justification or excuse, your verdict should be guilty of murder of the second degree. If you are not satisfied that the prisoner is guilty of murder either of the first or second degree, but are satisfied that he killed the deceased unlawfully, in the heat of blood, or in a transport of passion, without time for reflection or for the passions to cool, your verdict should be guilty of manslaughter.
But, if you are satisfied from the evidence that the prisoner killed the deceased in necessary and lawful self-defense, your verdict should be not guilty.
Verdict, not guilty.