State v. ShoeState v. Shoe
The defendant, appellant herein, Edward L. Shoe, was charged with the crime of sodomy in an indictment which provides, in substance, that:
“he unlawfully did have carnal copulation with another human being in an opening of the body other than a sexual part, to wit: being a person of Charles Trisler contrary to Section 2905.44 of the Revised Code of Ohio.”
Shoe entered a plea of not guilty, waived a trial by jury, and was tried by the Court of Common Pleas of Miami County. The trial court found him not guilty of the charge of sodomy, but guilty of a violation of Section 2903.01, Revised Code, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“No person over the age of eighteen years shall assault a child under the age of sixteen years, and willfully take indecent and improper liberties with the person of such child, without committing or intending to commit the crime of rape upon such child, or willfully make improper exposures of his person in the presence of such child.
“Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault * # #.”
The defendant was thereafter sentenced to the Ohio State Penitentiary for a period of not less than one nor more than ten years for the crime of felonious assault.
The controlling issue in this appeal is whether the crime of felonious assault is a lesser included offense under an indictment for the crime of sodomy.
In the case of
State
v.
Hreno,
In
State
v.
Kuchmak,
The
Kuchmak case
was cited favorably in the case of
State
v.
Byrd,
Reverting to the present case, it is manifest that the elements of the crime of sodomy cannot be extended, even by inference or implication, to include all the essential elements of the crime of felonious assault. The statutory reference to age in Section 2903.01, Revised Code, is not within the scope of Section 2905.44, Revised Code, and age is an essential element of the crime of felonious assault. See
State
v.
Latham,
Sodomy and felonious assault are recognized in different chapters of the Revised Code and, in our opinion, are separate and distinct crimes. See
State
v.
Labus,
The loathesome nature of either offense causes some reluctance, but our judicial duty is nonetheless clear.
The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Miami County for further proceedings according to law.
Judgment reversed.