State v. SheriffState v. Sheriff
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Zarella
Opinion
Thе plaintiff in error, Flavio Bail Bonds, LLC (Flavio), claims that the trial court improperly denied its petition for compromise or release from its obligation on surety bail bonds, which the trial court had ordered forfeited after the principal on the bonds, David Sheriff, the criminal defendant, failed to appear for trial. The defendant in error, Kevin T. Kane, the chief state’s attorney, responds that the trial court properly denied Flavio’s petition for failure to demonstrate good
cause for release from its obligation on the bonds, as required by
The record reveals the following relevant facts. On September 21, 2006, Sheriff was arrested for various drug crimes, and the state’s attorney for the judicial district of New Britain subsequently filed informations charging Sheriff with several offenses. 1 The court set the amount of Sheriffs bonds at a total of $125,000 for all charges. Flavio executed a bail bond for Sheriff on each of the cases, and Sheriff subsequently was released from custody. At the time Flavio executed the bonds, Flavio’s agents were aware that Sheriff was a Jamaican national and considered Sheriffs risk of flight when making the decision to execute the bonds and when setting the amount of its fees. At no point did the chief state’s attorney make any promise to Flavio that he would seеk extradition of Sheriff in the event that Sheriff fled to another country.
Sheriff failed to appear for the trial of the three cases, which had been scheduled for February 13, 2008, and the court ordered the total amount of the bonds forfeited. Pursuant to
On July 28, 2008, Flavio filed a petition with the trial court for compromise or to release Flavio from its obligation on the bonds pursuant to
Flavio claims that the trial court improperly denied its petition because the court applied an incorrect legal standard for determining whether Flаvio had established good cause. Flavio further argues that, under the proper legal standard, its efforts to locate Sheriff in Jamaica, coupled with the fact that the chief state’s attorney, who is the only authority that may seek extradition of Sheriff;
We turn first to the issue of whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard.
The interpretation of a rule of practice is a question of law, subject to plenary review;
Maltas
v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 364, 360, 2 A.3d 902 (2010); and such an interpretation begins with the text of the provision at issue. See id.
Although
Although this court has not had occasion to apply the rule for some time; see State v. Pashall, 118 Conn. 645, 649, 174 A. 175 (1934) (applying Taylor rule); this passage of time does not render the rule any less applicable today than when it was announced. Cf. State v. Nugent, 199 Conn. 537, 544-45, 508 A.2d 728 (1986) (applying common-law rule in Taylor in determining surety’s power to apprehend principal without court order).
We are not persuaded that we should overturn our prior holdings on this issue. This court adheres to the
doctrine of stare decisis, which cautions us not to overturn our prior holdings unless “the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require us to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Potvin
v.
Lincoln Service & Equipment Co.,
298 Conn. 620, 650, 6 A.3d 60 (2010). In support of its argument, Flavio notes that several other jurisdictions employ a “multifaceted” approach that permits courts to examine a number of factors beyond those in
Taylor
when determining whether to release a surety.
5
Flavio, however, has not demonstrated
Moreover, we are persuaded that there are good reasons to maintain the
Taylor
rule. The purpose of thе bail system is to reduce the expense of the state in detaining the accused pending trial by permitting pretrial release, subject to certain conditions, such as the posting of bond, to ensure the appearance of the accused at trial. See generally P. Rice, “Bail and the Administration of Bail in the State of Connecticut,” 4 Conn. L. Rev. 1 (1971). By posting bond for the accused, the surety willingly takes custody of the accused in place of the state and insures the state against the risk of flight by accepting responsibility for the consequences thereof. See, e.g.,
Taylor
v.
Taintor,
supra, 83 U.S. 371-72. Because the surety has full knowledge of this risk and nevertheless insures against it, the law should not easily release the surety from its obligations when the very event that it insures against occurs. This principle is especially strong when, as in the present case, it is the wilful act of the accused that deprives the state of the accused’s appеarance at trial. These considerations lead us to conclude that the
Taylor
rule appropriately permits discharge of the surety only when appearance at trial is made impossible by an act of God, an act of the state, or pursuant to law. This rule is tempered by the mandatory sixth month stay of forfeiture, which permits a surety to make further attempts to return the accused to the custody of the state. See
Applying the
Taylor
rule to the facts of the present case,
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we are convinced that the trial court properly concluded that Flavio was not entitled to relief because none of the facts on which Flavio relies prevented Sheriff from appearing for trial; nor do they prevent Sheriff from returning to this jurisdiction. First, none of these facts implicates an act of God. Second, Sheriffs failure to appear at trial and his continued absence from the jurisdiction did not result from any act of the state.
The record demonstrates that Sheriff wilfully fled to Jamaica two days prior to his trial date and has not since returned. No act of the state compelled Sheriff to flee, and no act of the state is preventing Sheriff from returning to this state to stand trial. Thеre is absolutely no evidence to demonstrate that Sheriffs failure to appear or his continued absence from this state is the result of anything but his own will. Moreover, even if we assume that the chief state’s attorney could have extradited Sheriff from Jamaica, in the absence of any promise by the chief state’s attorney that he would seek extradition of Sheriff in the event that he fled, the chief state’s attorney had no obligation to Flavio to еxtradite Sheriff from Jamaica in order to fulfill the obligations that Flavio willingly undertook. As one court has observed, “[t]he state is not the surety’s surety.”
Umatilla County
v.
Resolute Ins. Co.,
8 Or. App. 318, 322, 493 P.2d 731 (1972). Finally, no law has prevented Sheriff from appearing for trial. Although it is true that the law prevents Flavio from apprehending Sheriff in Jamaica in the absence of an extradition order, nothing in the operation of the law has prevented Sheriff from appearing at trial or returning to this jurisdiction. The fact that Flavio cannot compel Sheriff to return to this state so that Flavio can fulfill its obligation is primarily the result of Sheriffs decision to flee to Jamaica, and Flavio must accept the consequences of that decision. See, e.g.,
Taylor
v.
Taintor,
supra, 83 U.S. 372 (“The sureties had the control of [their principal]; they were bound at their peril to keep him within their jurisdiction, and to have his person ready to surrender when demanded. . . . [T]he failure of the sureties to surrender their principal . . . was, in the viеw of the law, the result of their own negligence or connivance, in suffering their principal to go beyond the jurisdiction of the court and from under their control.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]);
Professional Bail Bonds,
Inc.
v.
State,
185 Md. App. 226, 244-45, 968 A.2d 1136 (2009) (“The danger that a defendant may flee the jurisdiction of the court is a known risk that the bail
We briefly address Flavio’s claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that there was no conflict of intеrest within the office of the chief state’s attorney that would support a showing of good cause. Flavio argues that the chief state’s attorney’s responsibility to collect on bond forfeitures on behalf of the state;
This claimed conflict of interest simply is not relevant to the court’s determination of good cause pursuant to
The writ of error is dismissed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
In Docket No. HHB-CR-06-0230311-T, Sheriff was сharged with possession of one kilogram or more of a cannabis-type substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-278 (b), conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of a cannabis-type substance by a person who is not drug-dependent, in violation of § 21a-278 (b) and
For ease of reference, we hereinafter refer to this rule as the Taylor rule or the rule in Taylor.
Because we conclude thаt the trial court properly concluded that Flavio had not shown good cause to be relieved of its obligation under the bonds, we do not address Flavio’s claim that the trial court could have compromised the amount of the bonds upon a showing of good cause pursuant to
The factors that Flavio urges us to adopt include, but are not limited to, an examination of the circumstances that caused the accused’s flight, the cost and prеjudice to the state, mitigating circumstances, the efforts of the surety to locate and apprehend the accused, and the public’s interest in the appearance of the accused at trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Frias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir.) (applying multifactor test applicable to release of sureties pursuant to earlier version of rule 46 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permited courts to set aside all or part of forfeiture if “justice [did] not require thе enforcement of the forfeiture” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied sub nom. Frias v. United States, 459 U.S. 842, 103 S. Ct. 94, 74 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1982); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 53, 910 P.2d 164 (App. 1994) (considering several factors when determining whether to release surety from obligation under rule of procedure allowing forfeiture of bond to be set aside when “justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Irwin v. State, 17 Md. App. 518, 523, 302 A.2d 688 (1973) (permitting courts to exercise liberal discretion in determining whether to release surety pursuant tо rule allowing release when there are “ ‘reasonable grounds for nonappearance’ ” of accused at trial). Even in those states that permit trial courts to exercise broad discretion in determining whether to compromise or release a surety’s obligation, the inability to recapture the accused after he has wilfully fled the country will not necessarily result in a release of the obligation. See State v. Shredeh, 909 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Term. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding trial court’s decision to excuse portion of bond when accused fled to foreign jurisdiction while noting that release would be permitted only “on account of death or some other condition of affairs, if any can exist, which make it equally impossible ... to surrender [the defendant]” [internal quotation marks omitted]), appeal denied, 1995 Term. LEXIS 515 (Term. September 5, 1995).
Because the release of a bail surety pursuant to
We note that Flavio, in making its arguments to this court that this alleged conflict of interest established good cause, cited two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in which that court concluded that a conflict of interest within the judicial authority denied criminal defendants their rights to due process of law. See
Ward
v.
Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 60-61, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1972);
Tumey
v.
Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927). Flavio did not raise this argument as a constitutional due process claim, however. Therefore, we consider this
argument in the context of Flavio’s claim regarding good cause pursuant to