State v. SheffieldState v. Sheffield
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael Sheffield, appeals from the trial court‘s judgment finding him in violation of community control sanctions and sentencing him to eight years incarceration. Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse.
I
{¶ 2} In March 2006, Sheffield pleaded guilty to one count of misuse of credit cards, a felony of the third degree; three third-degree felony theft
{¶ 3} On April 10, 2006, the trial court sentenced Sheffield. Defense counsel explained that Sheffield‘s conduct “occurred because of an overwhelming cycle of drug use [and] drug addiction” and asked the court to impose community control sanctions with inpatient drug treatment. The trial court sentenced Sheffield to five years of community control sanctions with conditions and ordered him to pay $25,000 in restitution. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the judge warned Sheffield that if he violated the community control sanctions, the judge would send him to prison. Specifically, the judge told him: “Let me spell that out for you. You have four F3‘s. Five years on each F3. Eighteen months on 15 F4‘s. You have two F5‘s, 12 months for each of those. I‘ll run them consecutive. I‘ll lock you up, throw away the key, because we have to protect your family and the rest of society.”
{¶ 4} The subsequent journal entry stated:
{¶ 5} “Violation of the terms and conditions may result in more restrictive sanctions, or a prison term of 5 years as approved by law. (5 years each F-3, 18 months each F-4 and 12 months each F-5, counts to run concurrent to each other).”
{¶ 7} On August 16, 2006, at a violation hearing, Sheffield admitted that he had violated the terms of his community control. The trial judge sentenced him to eight years incarceration.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, on September 19, 2006, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry regarding the original sentencing entry to reflect that “violation of the terms and conditions may result in more restrictive sanctions, or a prison term of 44 years, 6 months as approved by law. (Counts to run consecutive to each other).”
II
{¶ 9} Sheffield contends that his eight-year sentence is invalid because: (1) he lacked adequate notice that failing a single drug test could result in the termination of community control; and (2) the trial court‘s original sentencing entry stated that violation of community control would result in a prison term of five years.
{¶ 10} Sheffield contends that he did not have notice that a single failed drug test would result in the revocation of his probation because the trial judge told him at sentencing:
{¶ 12} Sheffield argues that in light of this advisement, he did not have adequate notice that using illegal drugs while on community control sanctions would result in revocation of community control. He further contends that because he did just what the judge had told him to do, i.e., admit his relapse and “fess up,” the trial court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by finding that he violated community control. We find no merit to these arguments.
{¶ 13} First, Sheffield did not raise any lack-of-notice argument at the violation hearing; he argued only that the trial judge should continue community control because this was his first failed drug test, he immediately admitted his mistake, and he had otherwise been successful at Fresh Start. Because he did not raise the argument below, he has waived it for purposes of appeal. State ex rel. Zollner v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 611 N.E.2d 830.
{¶ 14} Furthermore, a defendant‘s own admissions are sufficient to prove a violation of community control conditions. State v. Hayes, Cuyahoga App. No. 87642, 2006-Ohio-5924, ¶16, citing Stae v. Willis, Fairfield App. No. 05 CA 42, 2005-Ohio-6947. Sheffield admitted at the violation hearing that he had violated the terms of his community control. Sheffield‘s admission proves not only that he violated the terms of his community control, but also indicates that he was aware that using illegal drugs while on community control was a violation of the conditions.
{¶ 15} Finally, contrary to Sheffield‘s argument, the trial court did not advise him that it would not revoke his community control if he “fess[ed] up” upon a relapse. Rather, the trial court told him that there would be consequences for a violation, but they would not be as severe as they would be if he failed to show up.
{¶ 16} A trial court‘s decision finding a violation of community control will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. McCord, Cuyahoga App. No. 92268, 2009-Ohio-2493, ¶5, citing Hayes, supra. “Abuse of discretion” connotes more than an error in law or judgment; it implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 253, 473 N.E.2d 768. In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sheffield had violated the terms of his community control.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} Sheffield first contends that the trial court could not impose a prison term because it did not notify him at the original sentencing hearing of the specific prison term that it would impose if he violated community control. We disagree. The trial judge told him, “[y]ou have four F3‘s. Five years on each F3. Eighteen months on 15 F4‘s. You have two F5‘s, 12 months for each of those. I‘ll run them consecutive.” Although it would
{¶ 20} In Brooks, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that to comply with
{¶ 22} Sheffield next contends that even if the language at sentencing were sufficient to impose a prison term, the length of the term was limited to five years because the original journal entry of sentencing indicated that violation of community control sanctions “may result in more restrictive sanctions, or a prison term of 5 years as approved by law. (5 years on each F-3, 18 months each F-4 and 12 months each F-5, counts to run concurrent to each other).” He argues that the trial court could not avoid the five-year limit by issuing a nunc pro tunc entry changing five years to 44 years, 6 months after it had already revoked his probation and imposed an eight-year sentence.
{¶ 23} In Brooks, the Ohio Supreme Court found that “the purpose behind
{¶ 24} This court has held that under
{¶ 25} Appellant‘s assignment of error is sustained in part. Case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing with instructions that the maximum prison term that may be imposed is five years.
Reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR