Thе State of Georgia appeals the grant of John Sheahan’s plea of former jeopardy in its prosecution for vehicular homicide, improper lane change and violation of the “Truck Restriction Law.” See OCGA § 40-6-52 (b);
Duke Trucking Co. v. Giles,
At the hearing in January 1993, the traffic court prosecutor moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide and improper lane change charges; as to the truck restriction charge, he said Sheahan “stipulate [d] a prima facie case.” The attorney fоr David Sotto, whose wife was killed in the collision, contended the investigation was mishandled and that Sotto was not interviewed because he suffered a brain injury; he “vehemently opposefd] any dismissal of the improper lane change [and] vehicular homicide charges [as to Sheahan]. We have substantial evidence . . . that not only did Mr. Sheahan illegally еnter the city of Atlanta inside 1-285 . . . but that he changed lanes . . . and caused the ultimate crash that killed [Mrs. Sotto].” To David Sotto, the traffic judge said: “I want you to have your day in court. ... I would not bе inclined because of your . . . feelings to dismiss it. I can nol-pros it where it can be brought back up ... so I’ll nol-pros it.” After more discussion, the court said: “[This] will be my decision, to nol-pros it. The рarties are excused.” Then the prosecutor said: “Excuse me, Your Honor, there is a plea in regard to the truck violation. They pled not guilty but stipulated a prima faciе case. We have stipulated a $500 fine. . . . [THE COURT:] That in no way has an effect on the nol-pros(Emphasis supplied.) To this Sheahan did not demur. The traffic court entered “nolle prossed” on the back of each traffic ticket, including the ticket citing Sheahan for violation of the Truck Restriction Law. There is no indication that *27 the State disagreed with this action or did not fully concur in it. The State’s position in this confused discussion was аmbiguous.
In December 1993, the Fulton County Solicitor General filed accusations against Sheahan for vehicular homicide, improper lane change, and violation of the Truсk Restriction Law. In granting Sheahan’s former jeopardy plea, the state court held: “At the end of the January 19, 1993, hearing, the traffic court granted the prosecutor’s motion to nolle prosequi the [charges]. . . . Upon being reminded by the prosecutor of the not guilty plea, the stipulated facts, and the stipulated fine with regard to the truck restriction charge, [the traffic judge imposed the fine], essentially, therefore, finding him guilty of that charge. . . . The State argues that this action was void [under
State v. Davis,
The trial court held, however, that imposition of the fine placed Sheahan in jeopardy on the truck restriction charge, thus barring his prosecution on the other charges. Held'.
1. The state court erred in its analysis. To determine thе effect of the fine, the traffic court’s actions must be analyzed on their own footing. The resolution lies not in measuring those inconsistent actions against the later plea in bаr, but in measuring them against each other.
Standing against the nolle prosequi of the same charge, the fine was void. If Sheahan had appealed the fine on grounds that it was void bеcause the charge was also nolle prossed,
without question
the nolle prosequi would stand and the punitive disposition would be declared void, under the ancient authority that if there is аny doubt as to a criminal sentence the defendant will be given the benefit of such doubt.
Grant v. State,
2. Further, the traffic hearing transcript shows clearly that the nolle prosequi was granted before the traffic court accepted a fine on the charge. When the traffic court enterеd “nolle prossed” on the truck restriction charge, it had no more jurisdiction to try the charge and impose a fine. “When the nolle prosequi was entered . . . the prosecution was at an end, and all the incidents to it came to an end [cit.], including most obviously the right of the State to try the de *28 fendant upon the indictment.” State v. Davis, supra at 786. The nolle prosequi was not nullified by imposition of a fine, fоr there was no charge once the nolle prosequi was entered. To say otherwise would render every nolle prosequi a “meaningless gesture” (id.) or a very uncertain gеsture, as the state court perceived it to be. A nolle prosequi is not a meaningless, uncertain gesture. The entry of the nolle prosequi rendered the charge dead. The State has no right to nolle prosequi a charge and try it nonetheless (id.); no rights accrued to Sheahan by this defective procedure, for he did not have a “right” both to have а charge nolle prossed and pay a fine on it. An appeal of that disposition would have resulted, as in State v. Davis, in the fine being declared void for lack of jurisdiction to imposе it when the charge was “nolle prossed.” The fine, being void, is not rendered valid at some later proceeding merely because the defendant seeks to use it as a plеa in bar. See Barrett, supra.
3. Further, even assuming arguendo that the fine had not been void, it was invoked by a manipulation of court process by Sheahan. The traffic court hearing transcript shоws it was the traffic court’s expressed intention to nolle prosequi the charges so they could be brought again without prejudice to any of them. The traffic court judge stated thаt the “stipulation” of a fine on one charge “in no way has an effect on the nol-pros,” by which he meant the fine had no effect on the State’s right to prosecute the other charges in the future. The traffic judge testified at the plea in bar hearing that this statement was a question to both parties, and neither party objected to it. Although Sheahan now insists the trial court was incorrect on that point, Sheahan acquiesced in the statement when it was made. If Sheahan had advised the traffic court that he intended to assert the fine as a plea in bar to proseсution of the other charges against him, it is clear the traffic court would not have accepted his “stipulated fine.”
The traffic court’s error was thus induced, at least in part, by Shеahan. Nor did this induced error occur in a vacuum. Sheahan’s inconsistent procedure of pleading not guilty while at the same time “stipulating a prima facie case” and agreeing to pay a fine was highly irregular. It seems intended to confuse things, and it did. It was even more irregular for Sheahan to agree to pay a fine on a charge which had beеn nolle prossed. The State was not at fault for
Sheahan’s
use of these strategical feints to bring about confused and ambiguous results. “[0]ne who misuses the system, through no fault of the state, should not be able to successfully raise a plea in bar which arises because of his manipulation.”
State v. McCrary,
We upheld a plea in bar in
McCrary v. State,
As the imposition of a fine is void, the state court erred in granting Sheahan’s plea of former jeopardy. The fine, being void, is no impediment to further prosecution of all the charges.
Judgment reversed.