State v. Shattuck

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STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Allen SHATTUCK, Appellant.

No. C6-03-362.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 16, 2004.

689 N.W.2d 785

of the essential terms of an offer of sale to trigger the lessee‘s obligation to timely respond. See

John D. Stump & Assocs., Inc. v. Cunningham Mem‘l Park, Inc., 187 W.Va. 438, 419 S.E.2d 699, 706 (1992). When, as here, the contract provides no deadline for accepting or rejecting the offer of sale, acceptance must be within a reasonable time.

Stone v. Harmon, 31 Minn. 512, 515, 19 N.W. 88, 89 (1884). We acknowledge that upon receiving notice, a lessee may have to clarify or investigate uncertainties and ambiguities of essential terms, but we also conclude that such an inquiry must be done within a reasonable time and that both the lessee, in making inquiry, and the lessor, in responding to the inquiry, must act timely, reasonably and in good faith. See

Stump, 419 S.E.2d at 706;

Koch Indus., Inc. v. Sun Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1203, 1212 n. 6 (5th Cir.1990);

Barkley-Cupit Enters., Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc‘y of the U.S., 157 Ga. App. 138, 276 S.E.2d 650, 654 (1981); see also 25 Lord, supra, § 67:85 at 503 (discussing example of “bad faith” attempt by owner to deprive lessee of right of first refusal).

Applying these standards to this case, we conclude that requiring Dyrdal to respond within 48 hours to oral notice of sale was not reasonable, but by asserting his right and by requesting and receiving legible copies of the purchase agreement, Dyrdal received reasonable notice of the essential sale terms. We also conclude that by failing to inquire further concerning the sale terms, and by failing to accept or reject the sale terms within the 45 days he maintains that he had to accept or reject the offer, Dyrdal forfeited his right of first refusal and summary judgment dismissing his claim was properly granted.⁴

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

This case was heard on the court‘s oral calendar on November 30, 2004. The court has decided the substantive issue but desires briefing on four specific questions relating to remedy.

Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein,

It is the determination of this court that, in accordance with the rule of

Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the district court‘s imposition of an upward durational departure under Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 4 (2002), from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ presumptive sentence violated appellant‘s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We note that because imposition of the presumptive sentence is mandatory absent additional judicial findings under the legislatively-created Guidelines regime, the presumptive sentence is the maximum penalty authorized solely by the jury‘s verdict for the purposes of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The test of Apprendi is one of functional effect rather than form.

Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Because the Guidelines regime permits the district court to durationally depart upward from a presumptive sentence after finding aggravating factors not considered by the jury, it unconstitutionally usurps the role and undermines the function of the jury. A full opinion will follow.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties shall, within 30 days of this order, file and serve supplemental briefs on the issue of remedy. Without foreclosing the possibility of imposing the presumptive sentence, at a minimum the briefs shall address the following questions:

1. Whether the portions of the Sentencing Guidelines that unconstitutionally allow the district court to impose an upward durational departure based on facts not reflected in the jury‘s verdict or admitted by the defendant are severable from the remainder of the Guidelines. See Minn. Stat. § 645.20 (2002);
   City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Minn.1979).
2. If the unconstitutional portions of the Guidelines properly may be severed, whether this court has the inherent authority to authorize the use of sentencing juries and a bifurcated trial process.
3. Whether a sentencing jury or a bifurcated trial process implicates double jeopardy concerns.
4. In the present case, what specific remedy is appropriate? In particular, does the fact that the district court denied appellant‘s request to place before the jury aggravating factors that would, if found, justify sentencing enhancement, affect the disposition of this matter?

PAGE, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the court‘s determination that the district court‘s imposition of an upward durational sentencing departure violated Shattuck‘s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). I respectfully dissent, however, from the order directing supplemental briefing on the issue of remedy. Supplemental briefing is neither necessary nor appropriate. “The presumptive sentence is the maximum penalty authorized solely by the jury‘s verdict.” Under the sentencing guidelines, “imposition of the presumptive sentence is mandatory absent additional judicial findings.” Because the judicial findings made here were void ab initio and of no legal effect, I would remand to the district court for imposition of the presumptive sentence. See generally

State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Minn.2003),

Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Minn.1985). Any responsibility for fixing the “Blakely problem” lies with the legislature and not this court.

Notes

4

In our discretion, we decline to address Dyrdal‘s argument, first raised before this court, that Golden Nuggets anticipatorily breached the lease. See

Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988) (stating that we generally review only issues presented to and considered by the trial court); see also Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04 (giving court discretion to address an issue not determined by the district court). In passing, we note that anticipatory breach is the “unconditional repudiation of a contract, either by words or acts, which is communicated to the other party prior to the time fixed for his performance[.]”

In re Haugen, 278 N.W.2d 75, 79 n. 6 (Minn. 1979). Here, Dyrdal asserted that he had 45 days to exercise his right and that Golden Nuggets responded to his request for a legible copy of the purchase agreement. In our view, this does not constitute an “unconditional repudiation” communicated by Golden Nuggets before the time fixed for performance of the contract.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Shattuck

Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date Published: Dec 16, 2004

Citation: 689 N.W.2d 785

Docket Number: C6-03-362

Court Abbreviation: Minn.