31 Wash. 191 | Wash. | 1903
The opinion of the court was delivered by
— Appellant was convicted of practicing the occupation of a barber without having first obtained a certificate of registration entitling him to practice such occupation. The only questions raised which may be considered on this appeal are questions which go to the.constitutionality of the act of 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 349, ch. 172). It is claimed (1) that the act is repugnant to § 19* art. 2 of the Constitution of this state, which provides that “no bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title”; (2) that the act is repugnant to the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and especially to § 12, art. 1, of the Constitution of this state, which is as follows:
“Ho law shall be passed granting to any citizen, or class of citizens, or corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.”
1. The title of the act is as follows: “An act to regulate the practice of barbering, and licensing of persons to carry on such practice, and providing punishment for its violation.” The act defines the practice of barbering, and provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to follow the occupation in any incorporated city or town without first having obtained a license therefor. It then provides for the appointment of a board of examiners; defines their term of office, their headquarters, compensa
“But a title, to be sufficient, need not be an index to the provisions of the ordinance. It is sufficient if it gives such notice of its object as to reasonably lead to an inquiry into its body. ‘The purpose of the title is only to*194 call attention to the subject-matter of the act, and the act itself must be looked to for a full description of the powers conferred.’ Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9 (45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817).”
See, also, Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659 (68 Pac. 376). Under the rule therein announced, the title of the act in question here is sufficient.
2. It is next argued that the act is void because “local, class, special and discriminating legislation”; local, because it applies only to incorporated cities and towns, and special and discriminating, because it does not affect all barbers alike. The act provides as follows:
“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to follow the occupation of barber in any incorporated city or town in this state, unless he shall have first obtained a certificate of registration as provided in this act: Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall apply to or affect any person who is now engaged in such occupation except as hereinafter provided.”
“Sec. 9. Every person now engaged in the occupation of barber in cities of the first, second or third class in this state shall within ninety days after the approval of this act file with the secretary of said board an affidavit setting forth his name, residence and length of time during which and the places where he has practiced such occupation, and shall pay to the secretary of said board one dollar, and a certificate entitling him to practice said occupation for one year shall thereupon be issued to him.
“Sec. 10. To obtain a certificate of registration under this act, any person excepting those mentioned in section nine shall make application to said board, and shall pay to the secretary an examination fee of five dollars, and shall present himself at the meeting of the board for examination of applicants. The board shall examine such person, and being satisfied that he is above the age of eighteen years, of good moral character, free from contagious or infectious disease, has studied the trade for two years as*195 an apprentice under or as a qualified and practicing barber in this state, or other states, and is possessed of the requisite skill to properly perform all the duties, including his ability in the preparation of the tools used, shaving, cutting of the hair and beard and all the various services incident thereto, and has sufficient knowledge concerning the common diseases of the face and skin to avoid the aggravation and spreading thereof in the practice of his trade, his name shall be entered by the board in a register hereinafter provided for and a certificate of registration shall be issued to him authorizing him to practice said trade in this state, for one year. All certificates shall be renewed each year, for which renewal a fee of fifty cents shall be paid. All persons making application for examination under the provisions of this act shall be allowed to practice the occupation of barber until the next meeting as designated by said board.”
“Sec. 15. Any person practicing the occupation of barber in any city of the first, second or third class in -this state, without first having obtained a certificate of registration as provided in this act, or falsely pretending to he practicing such occupation under this act, or who uses, or allows towels to be used on more than one person before such towels have been laundered; or razors, lather, or hair brushes on more than one person before the same shall have been sterilized or in violation of any of the provisions of this act, and every proprietor of a barber shop who shall wilfully employ a barber who has not such a certificate shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con-victim thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than ninety days, or both.”
The right of the legislature to enact laws for the promotion of health is now universally sustained as a police regulation. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (6th ed.), p. 720; Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 297 (5 Pac. 603); State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424 (30 Pac. 729); Hathaway v.
It is also well settled in this state that when a law operates equally upon all who fall under its operation, even though they constitute a class, the law is upheld. Fox v. Territory, supra; State v. Carey, supra; Fitch v. Applegate, 24 Wash. 25 (64 Pac. 147); Redford v. Spokane Street Ry. Co., 15 Wash. 419 (46 Pac. 650); State v. Considine, 16 Wash. 358 (47 Pac. 755); McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549 (71 Pac. 37); State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628 (69 Pac. 372). Mr. Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (6th ed.), p. 480, says:
“The authority that legislates for the state at large must determine whether particular rules shall extend to the whole state and all its citizens, or, on the other hand, to a subdivision of the state or a single class of its citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the prevailing public sentiment in that section of the state, may require or make acceptable different police regulations from those demanded in another, or call for different-taxation, and a different application of the public moneys. The legislature may therefore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation in each distinct municipality, provided the state constitution does not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly; and the fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The legislature may also deem it desirable*197 to prescribe peculiar rules for the several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights, obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens.”
The act under consideration in effect classifies the state into three districts: (1) All cities of the first, second, and third classes; (2) all other incorporated cities and towns; (3) all towns or places not incorporated. All barbers conducting their occupation in the latter class are exempted from the provisions of the act. All barbers in the second class, except those engaged at the time the act took effect, must pass an examination and pay $5 for a certificate. All in the first class at the time the law took effect were entitled to a certificate authorizing them to continue the practice of their occupations upon filing an affidavit, and paying one dollar therefor. All thereafter within the first and second .classes, desiring to barber, must pass an examination and pay a fee of $5. All barbers in the first class are subject also to certain restrictions as follows: They must not use the same towel on two different persons without having the same laundered. They must sterilize their tools before using them the second time, etc. Barbers as a class throughout the state are undoubtedly subject to different rules and restrictions under this act, but these restrictions depend upon the district in which they carry on their occupation. All who carry on their occupation in the same district are subject to the same laws and are treated alike. TsTo privilege or immunity is granted to one which upon the same terms does not belong equally to all. Barbers as a class have no greater rights or privileges under the constitution than citizens as a class. If citizens may be classified into districts, and different regulations applied to citizens residing in one district from those residing in another, it certainly follows that a class of citizens such as barbers residing in one district may be governed by regulations different from
Two cases from the state of Hew Hamshire are cited and relied upon by appellant, viz.: State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113 (18 Atl. 878, 5 L. R. A. 709), and State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. 103 (18 Atl 194, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22). These two cases arose under the same act. One related to the practice of dentistry, and the other to the practice of medicine. The act under which the cases were prosecuted provided that physicians and dentists “who have resided and practiced their professions in the city or town of their present residence during all the time since January 1, 1875,” were not subject to the provisions of the act requiring a license. All others were required to take a license. Those having a diploma were required to pay one dollar; those taking an examination, five dollars. The act divided residents of the same town into two classes: “1. Those who have, and, 2, those who have not resided continuously in some one town of the state during the four years begun January 1, 1875. The latter class must, while the former need not, pay five dollars or one dollar as the case may be, for a license, in order to continue their business.” And it was held in those eases that this was a discrimination between physicians, and also between dentists residing in the same town and similarly situated at the time the act took effect. These cases are criticized in State v. Bair, supra, but if the Hew Hampshire eases are correct they are not authority for appellant in this case, because the act under consideration here makes no such discrimination as was made by the Hew Hampshire law. All barbers in the same districts in this state at the time Tire act took effect are treated exactly alike under the act. But the Hew Hampshire court, in State v. Pennoyer, said:
*200 “If all physicians alike, as well those who have as those who have not resided and practiced during the specified period in a single town, were required to procure and pay for a license, it may be that the statute would be open to no constitutional objection. State v. Green, 112 Ind. 462; State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1,”
thereby noting the distinction between those cases and the one at bar.
It is also argued that the act discriminates against appellant because it provides that all barbers carrying on their occupation in cities of the first, second, and third classes at the time the act took effect are not required to pass an examination; but each may instead file an affidavit within ninety days, setting forth his residence, occupation, and pay one dollar, when a certificate shall be issued to him; while those coming to such cities thereafter are required to pass an examination and pay five dollars for a certificate. This contention was decided against the position of appellant by the territorial court in Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 297 (5 Pac. 603). We are satisfied with the rule there announced.
It is also argued that the act applies only to cities of the state incorporated at the time of the passage of the act, and will not apply to those hereafter to be incorporated. We find no reason for this contention. The act clearly applies to all incorporated cities and towns, whether incorporated now or hereafter. Ex parte Lucas, supra.
Other questions, going more to the wisdom of the act, are presented by appellant, but these questions are for the legislature and not for the court. Por example, it is urged that the act is for the protection of the health of the people of the state; that the people outside of cities and incorporated towns are as much entitled to be treated by quali
“The protection against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity c?n correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency, with the law making power.”
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Fullerton, O. J., and Dunbar and Anders, JJ., concur.