STATE OF OHIO, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. BRYAN K. SHAFFER, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 14CA15
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
RELEASED: 11/4/2014
[Cite as State v. Shaffer, 2014-Ohio-4976.]
Harsha, J.
Bryan K. Shaffer, Caldwell, Ohio, pro se appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and C. Michael Gleichauf, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Bryan K. Shaffer, who was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft and receivеd a prison sentence of twelve months. Instead of filing a timely appeal Shaffer filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief based on a claimed violation of his constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the petition absent an order to do so by a reviewing court.
{¶2} On appeal Shaffer claims that the trial court erred in denying his petition. In his first assignment of error Shaffer asserts that he was deprived of his right to the speedy disposition of his Ohio criminal case under
{¶3} Although we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address Shaffer‘s petition in the absence of a specific order to do so by a reviewing court, the trial court‘s ultimate judgment—denying the petition—was correct. First, res judicata barred Shaffer from raising his postconviction claims when he could have raised them during his criminal proceeding and on direct appeal. Second, he waived his postconviction claims by pleading guilty to the grand-theft charge, and he does not contend that his plea wаs not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Finally, Shaffer did not set forth sufficient operative facts to show that he substantially complied with the requirements of the IAD to commence the 180-day period to try his Ohio charges. Therefore, we overrule Shaffer‘s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. FACTS
{¶4} In July 2009, the Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney filed complaints in the Lawrence County Municipal Court charging Shaffer with various crimes, including tampering with evidence and theft of a motor vehicle, which occurred during that month. Because Shaffer was in the custody of West Virginia law enforcement officials for other crimes, prosecution did not proceed on the Ohio charges until after he was released from prison in West Virginia. In 2013, Shaffer waived a preliminary hearing, and the matter was bound over to the grand jury.
{¶6} Instead of appealing his conviction and sentence, Shaffer filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief; he claimed that he was deprived of his rights guaranteed under the IAD and his constitutional speedy-trial rights when Ohio officials were aware that he was incarcerated in West Virginia, but failed to timely try him on his Ohio charges. He contended that two Lawrence County Sheriff‘s Office detectives knew he was available for disposition of his Ohio charges but circumvented his rights under the IAD.
{¶7} Before the state had the opportunity to respond to Shaffer‘s petition, the trial court denied the motion because it believed that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits absent an order to do so from a reviewing court:
At this point in time, this Court does not possess the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the motion or release sought by Bryan K. Shaffer. The only way this matter could be reviewed by this Court, is if оrdered to do so by a
higher court. Accordingly, the petition to vacate or set aside the judgment of conviction or sentence is overruled.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶8} On appeal, Shaffer assigns the following errors for our review:
- Appellant was deprived of his statutory right to speedy disposition of criminal matters pursuant tо
R.C. 2963.30 . - Appellant was deprived of his rights as guaranteed him in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to speedy public trial, also Article I Sections 10, 14 and 16, Ohio Constitution.
- The State of Ohio through it‘s [sic] officers/agents knowingly and capriciously withheld warrant information in retaliation for appellant‘s refusal to cooperate with Lawrence County Detectives Arron Bollinger and Andy Sissler through some clande[s]tine policy, practice custom, or habbit [sic] of retribution in order to maximize penalty, thus; violating appellant[‘]s rights to due process and equal protection of law.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶9} The postconvictiоn relief process is a collateral civil attack on a criminal judgment rather than an appeal of the judgment. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). Postconviction relief is not a constitutional right; instead, it is a narrow remedy that gives the petitioner no more rights than those granted by statute. Id. It is a means to resolve constitutional claims that cannot be addressed on direct appeal because the evidence supporting the claims is not contained in the record. State v. Knauff, 4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA976, 2014-Ohio-308, ¶ 18.
{¶10} “[A] trial court‘s decision granting or denying a postconviction relief petition filed pursuant to
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶11} In his first assignment of error Shaffer asserts that he was deprived оf his right to the speedy disposition of his Ohio criminal case under
A. Jurisdiction
{¶12} First, we address the trial court‘s error in basing its denial of Shaffer‘s рetition for postconviction relief on its belief that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of the motion absent an order from a superior court. In denying the petition it appears that the trial court relied on the axiom that “[a]n appeal from a judgment divests trial courts of jurisdiction to consider
{¶13} This axiom does not apply for two reasons. First, there was no pending appeal at the time Shaffer filed his pro se petition for postconviction relief or at the time the trial court denied the petition. Second, and more importantly, ”
{¶14} However, we will not reverse a correct judgment merely because it is based on an erroneous rationale. See Today & Tomorrow Heating & Cooling v. Greenfield, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA14, 2014-Ohio-239, ¶ 16, quoting Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 231, 2013-Ohio-3019, 994 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 51 (” ‘a reviewing court should not reverse a correct judgment merely because it is based on erroneous reasons’ “). Courts of apрeals have applied this well-established principle to postconviction proceedings, including petitions for postconviction relief.
{¶15} For the following reasons, Shaffer‘s postconviction clаims lacked merit and were properly denied.
B. Res Judicata
{¶16} First, res judicata barred Shaffer from raising those claims that he could have raised in his criminal case and on direct appeal. “[R]es judicata applies to proceedings involving postconviction relief.” State v. Burton, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 13CA12, 2014-Ohio-2549, ¶ 17, citing State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996). “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant аt the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus; see also State v. Davis, 139 Ohio St.3d 122, 2014-Ohio-1615, 9 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 28.
C. Guilty Plea
{¶18} Second, by pleading guilty to the grand-theft charge Shaffer forfeited his right to raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights that occurred before he entered the plea. See State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 105, citing State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (“a plea of guilty ‘effectively waives all appealable errors’ at trial unrelated to the entry of the plea“); State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78 ( a defendant who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel may not thereafter raise independent claims related to the deprivation оf constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea).
D. Substantial Compliance with IAD Requirements
{¶20} Finally, Shaffer did not set forth any operative facts to demonstrate that he substantially complied with the statutory requirements of the IAD to start the 180-day time period to try his Ohio charges. The IAD, which is codified in
{¶21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has construed these provisions to require that a prisoner must substantially comply with the requirements to cause the 180-day period to commence. State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 597 N.E.2d 101 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. “A prisoner substantially complies with the requirements of Article III(a) and (b) of
{¶22} Because his claims are meritless, we overrule Shaffer‘s first, second, and third assignments of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶23} The trial court did not err in denying Shaffer‘s petition for postconviction relief. Therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court dirеcting the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Abele, P.J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.