State v. ShafferState v. Shaffer
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Moore Judge., Hensal, Carr
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Penny J. Shaffer, appeals from the May 8, 2012 judgment entry of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} In 2012, Ms. Shaffer was indicted on one count of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, in violation of
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND IMPOSED A SENTENCE CONTRARY TO LAW IN VIOLATION OF
R.C. 2953.08 BY SENTENCING [MS. SHAFFER] TO A MANDATORY PRISON TERM OF FIVE YEARS FOR THE THIRD-DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY OR POSSESSION OF CHEMICALS FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF DRUGS IN VIOLATION OFR.C. 2925.041(A) , WHERE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AUTHORIZED UNDERR.C. 2929.14(A)(3) FOR THAT NON-VIOLENT THIRD-DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE WAS ONLY THIRTY-SIX MONTHS OR THREE YEARS.
{¶4} In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Shaffer argues that her sentence of five years’ mandatory imprisonment for illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, pursuant to
{¶5} The State responded that Ms. Shaffer‘s argument lacks merit because the trial court properly sentenced her under the “explicit terms of
{¶6} “When reviewing a trial court‘s sentence, we apply a two-step approach.” State v. Stoddard, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26663, 2013-Ohio-4896, ¶ 14, citing State v. Roper, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26631, 26632, 2013-Ohio-2176, ¶ 5. “The first step is to determine whether the sentence is contrary to law. The second step is to determine whether the court exercised proper discretion in imposing a term of imprisonment.” (Internal citation omitted.) State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA00115-M, 2012-Ohio-2558, ¶ 3, citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, ¶ 26.
{¶7} Further, “[s]tatutory interpretation involves a question of law; therefore, we review this matter de novo.” State v. McConville, 182 Ohio App.3d 99, 2009-Ohio-1713, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Myers, 9th Dist. Medina Nos. 3260-M, 3261-M, 2002-Ohio-3195, ¶ 14. “The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent in enacting the statute.” Wetterman v. B.C., 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0021-M, 2013-Ohio-57, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, ¶ 9. “In order to determine legislative intent, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a [C]ourt must first look to the language of the statute itself.” State v. Owen, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-102, 2013-Ohio-2824, ¶ 17, citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105 (1973). A court may interpret a statute only where the words of the statute are ambiguous. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 27 (1987). Ambiguity exists if the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513 (1996).
{¶8} In determining whether Ms. Shaffer‘s sentence falls within the permissible statutory range, this Court must examine Ohio‘s felony sentencing statute,
(3)(a) For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section 2903.06, 2903.08, 2907.03, 2907.04, or 2907.05 of the Revised Code or that is a violation of section 2911.02 or 2911.12 of the Revised Code if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty in two or more separate proceedings to two or more violations of section 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, or 2911.12 of the Revised Code, the prison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.
(b) For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months.
{¶10} Pursuant to
{¶11}
(A) No person shall knowingly assemble or possess one or more chemicals that may be used to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II in violation of section 2925.04 of the Revised Code.
* * *
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. Except as otherwise provided in this division, illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs is a felony of the third degree * * * [.]
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, there is a presumption for a prison term for the offense. * * * If the offender two or more times previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony drug abuse offense and if at least one of those previous convictions or guilty pleas was to a violation of division (A) of this section, a violation of division (B)(6) of section 2919.22 of the Revised Code, or a violation of division (A) of section 2925.04 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five years.
Pursuant to
{¶13} For guidance with this matter, we turn to our sister Court‘s decision in State v. Sturgill, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2013-01-002, CA2013-01-003, 2013-Ohio-4648. In Sturgill at ¶ 2, 12, the appellant was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment, including consecutive sentences of sixty-months each for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with a prior felony OVI conviction, and a specification for five or more prior OVI offenses in 20 years. See
{¶14} Here, similar to the facts in Sturgill, Ms. Shaffer‘s sentence for a felony of the third degree was increased from thirty-six months to five-years because
{¶15} Therefore, based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the General Assembly intended
{¶16} Accordingly, Ms. Shaffer‘s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶17} In overruling Ms. Shaffer‘s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.