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State v. Shaffer
725 P.2d 1301
Utah
1986
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*1 Utah, STATE of Plaintiff and

Respondent, SHAFFER,

Daniel Edward Defendant Appellant.

No. 18556.

Supreme Court Utah. 25, 1986.

June *2 Nesset, City, Salt Lake for de-

Curtis appellant. fendant Wilkinson, Gen., Atty. L. John P. David Soltis, Deputy Atty., City, Lake for Co. Salt plaintiff respondent.

DURHAM, Justice: Shaffer, defendant, Daniel Edward jury trial of first was convicted after a murder, degree capital offense in viola- 76-5-202; U.C.A., 1953, aggrava- tion of § degree felony in robbery, a first viola- ted 76-6-302; theft, U.C.A., 1953, tion of § felony in degree violation a second U.C.A., 1953, penalty 76-6-404. After a de- hearing, judge the trial sentenced the imprisonment life on to a term of fendant conviction, years a term of five the murder aggravated robbery, and a term to life for years of one to fifteen for theft. assigns errors for review: seven (1) cremation of the victim’s vio- process rights; the defendant’s due lated (2) of first circumstance personal gain” “other murder titled vagueness and therefore that is void charge have portion of the murder should dismissed; (3) trial court failed to been evidence of the defendant’s other exclude (4) acts; questioning bad The defendant August testified that on 15, 1980, he and Mr. Croasdale qualification” deprived venire for “death drove east 1-80 Croasdale’s van and arrived in jury; impartial the defendant of a fair City evening. Salt Lake After drink- (5) give the trial court failed a “reason- ing bar, several beers in a local they went hypothesis” able alternative instruction sleep in the back of Croasdale’s van. jury; improperly trial sen- court *3 The defendant testified that early the next degree tenced both the defendant for first morning he was awakened a homosexu- murder the included offenses of and lesser al attack Croasdale. The defendant theft; aggravated robbery and and the claims he stated he that wished to leave was for con- insufficient a murder picked up backpack, and then clothing, viction. We affirm conviction sen- the and sleeping bag. events, and In the course tence first murder and vacate over, backpack the fell and the defendant’s the of theft and convictions gun slipped loaded out of pack the and robbery. partially According out of the holster. to 23, 1980, naked, August partially the On defendant, the picked up Croasdale then decomposed body of was Jack Croasdale gun the and threatened the defendant. ensuing a brushy struggle, gun found in area 20-30 feet off the the the fired and the just right bullet struck Croasdale Canyon County. road in East in Salt Lake above the eyebrow. Although the defendant was un- autop- performed The medical examiner an the gun sure of exact distance between the sy body and concluded that the forehead, and the victim’s a courtroom single death to cause of was a bullet wound suggested demonstration that the defend- Approximately the forehead. four months required ant’s version of the events the later, on December the defendant to distance be about twelve inches. Portland, Oregon. was At the arrested arrest, driving defendant dumped time of the defendant was The admitted that he body Canyon Croasdale’s in East that using Mr. Croasdale’s van and was the night; took van Croasdale's and identifica- name of the and identification victim. tion; spent money Croasdale’s Lake Salt The defendant testified at trial he City; Vegas, to drove the van Las where Reno, met Mr. Mr. Croasdale Nevada. name, the iden- defendant used Croasdale’s stopped way Croasdale had in Reno on his card, checks; tity, later credit and and from San Francisco to his home in Ke- Portland, drove the as- to where defendant nosha, had Wisconsin. defendant Throughout identity. sumed Croasdale’s days hitchhiked Reno several earlier trial, the the insisted Croas- defendant Omaha, defendant, from Nebraska. The dale died of an and that the de- accident cents, only eighty arranged who had fendant made the decision to take Croas- drive the victim back to Omaha van dale’s after his death. search of better work to collect several presented testimony The State from sev- met, they minor At the debts. the time theory eral a witnesses substantiate using was defendant the identification per- murder. state medical examiner Lucero, Joseph a St. former roommate at autopsy carefully an examined formed Denver, Abbey in Andrews Colorado. The photographed the determine took defendant Lucero’s identification perpеndi- on cause death. Based abbey when left because entry trajectory cular downward police stop he feared him and wound, bullet, entry the clean ab- probation discover a an violation related to stippling deposits other sooty sence of or August Arizona conviction. On wound, around the medical examiner the defendant had Lucero’s identifica- used Jack was concluded death of Croasdale gun tion a permit, to obtain a .38 caliber a homicide as bullet fired the fatal was Omaha, handgun, and ammunition Ne- eighteen from a distance at least inches point braska. head from the and from outside the judge fin- previous trials. After the trial opinion victim. That was cor- reach of the by officers from the Salt questioning potential jurors, at trial ished he roborated office, County who com- Sheriff's Lake them not to discuss the admonished voir patterns from .38 test fire pared standard of the venire. At dire with other members police special with wound of caliber dire, of voir re- the conclusion that since The оfficers concluded victim. prospective jurors be ex- quested that two stippling scorching, powder no there was U.C.A., 1953, pursuant for cause cused gun fired not caused the wound was 77-35-18(e)(10) inability upon their based § range. at close request impose penalty. the death That proposed denied. The defendant was decomposition and the fact Because of prospective jurors excused for for one seven body remained unclaimed months, U.C.A., 1953, pursuant 77-35- it was released to the cause and one-half 18(e)(14) Medical for dis- University of Utah Center because of their inclination to au- 1, 1980, and subse- penalty. posal tomatically impose October the death *4 releasing Prior to quently cremated. persons pur- were excused for that Four examiner did not body, the state medical pose. hands of the victim to

perform tests on the chemical com- presence of determine the I. the hands of a commonly found on pounds argues first that the de- The defendant pistol. According fired a person who has prior body of the victim’s to the struction examiner, presence to the medical discovery violated defendant’s motion for affect- would not have gunpowder residue right a fair trial mandated the due caused opinion that the death was ed his fourteenth process clause of the fifth and light of all the circumstances homicide Constitu- amendments to United States testimony of Mr. Donald case. The tion, I, article section 7 of the Utah and Havekost, employee, supported the an FBI argues Constitution. opinion. He examiner’s noted medical (A) preserve failed to the State in this exposure decomposition and after exculpatory; have been which could case, powder “highly unlikely” is it (B) adequate failed to conduct an State have been found on the vic- residue would investigation proved to which could have testi- hands. Mr. Havekost further tim’s to the defendant. favorable positive finding would not be fied that a rendering opinion significant in an as to the victim’s hands were on whether A. gun it was fired. when de The defendant contends thаt the pretrial motion for The defendant made a body prior to his struction of the victim’s individual, sequestered death-qualification opportuni discovery request denied him the request of the venire. This voir dire pres hands for the ty to test the victim’s course of granted. Over the two gunpowder residue. The defendant ence of of the days, each member one-half exculpatory that such evidence was asserts brought judge’s cham- into the venire was material to his defense that Mr. Croas- the trial questioning. Typically, bers shooting. died in an accidental dale juror approxi-

judge prospective asked the of this and the Unit- The decisions Court covering about five mately questions ten Supreme Court have established ed States transcript; ques- typewritten pages applied the standards to be to determine tioning apparently lasted about five to ten disclosed evidence should be whether questioning by per person. After minutes gener- prosecution upon request. As a court, counsel for the defendant and rule, prosecutiоn a defend- al violates opportunity poten- to ask the State had the right to a fair trial ant’s constitutional things, such as own- jurors tial about other where, prosecution sup- request, the relationship after handguns, ership and use of to the defend- victims, presses evidence favorable experience other criminal

13Q5 guilt punish ‘materiality’ material to or to establish ant that is the constitution- 83, 373 Brady Maryland, ment. U.S. al sense.” 87, 215 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d (quoting Id. at 106 Agurs, United States v. Jarell, 218, (1963); 224 608 P.2d 97, 109-10, 2392, 2400-01, U.S. 96 S.Ct. (Utah 1980). purpose The intent or (1976), adding 49 L.Ed.2d 342 emphasis prosecution destroying the evidence is thereto; omitted). other citations 224; irrelevant. id. at accord See United body The destruction of the in this case 97, 104-05, 427 U.S. Agurs, States v. analogous to the finger destruction of 2397-98, (1976). 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 S.Ct. prints State, in Adkinson v. Agurs, States v. the murder United (Alaska), denied, 533-34 cert. 449 U.S. criminal record was held not to be victim’s (1980). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 97 In that material, prosecution’s and therefore the case, Supreme the Alaska Court held that a deprive disclose failure to it did not police handling officer’s unintentional defendant of a fair trial. weapon, murder in a manner whiсh Stewart, In State v. 544 P.2d 477 destroyed fingerprints of the victim that 1975), tape recording this Court held that a might gun, have been on the did not de destroyed by police trial officer before prive the defendant of a fair trial. The process did not violate the defendant’s due court found that while the evidence rights tape where the statements on story, have corroborated the defendant’s it not shown to be to the issue of were “vital” exculpatory. would not have been the defendant’s or innocence. Id. at destroyed fingerprints Like the in Ad Morris, 660 479. See also Codianna v. kinson, the destruction of the victim’s (Utah 1983)(withholding of *5 in this case meant the defendant could by prose exculpatory testimonial evidence story not corroborate his of with evidence process cution did not violate due where gunpowder on the residue hands of the tangential such evidence was or cumula However, victim. that evidence is not nec tive); Nebeker, 1359, 1363 657 P.2d essarily exculpatory is nor it material (Utah 1983) (failure preserve to of State The the constitutionаl sense. state medical photo array shown to victim before defend and Mr. Havekost of the FBI examiner lineup ant was identified and at trial agreed gunpowder depos of that evidence process). not of due In v. violative State “insig its victim’s hands would be ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‍Nebeker, explained we further the defini light nificant” in this case of the decom said, “materiality” tion of “The materi body, exposure the position of the the ality required to reverse a criminal convic insects, body the con to the elements and suppression tion for or destruction of evi hands, and character tamination of the the process as a denial of due is more dence indicated homi istics of the wound which evidentiary materiality.” at 1363. than Id. Furthermore, Mr. Havekost testified cide. must be material in the con evidence “highly unlikely” Lovato, that it would be that one stitutional sense. v. Id. State (Utah 1985), gunpowder find explained would residue the 702 P.2d 101 we body dragged of a had been hands which materiality requires that [c]onstitutional exposed through brushy area and then showing suppressed thеre be a that the during the elements for a week the sum destroyed vital to the is or evidence is agreement testimony mer. This was in guilty sues of the defendant is whether that of the medical examiner. Mr. charge of the and whether there gunpowder if Havekost also testified that requires unfairness that the fundamental found, only indicate residue was it the defendant’s convic Court to set aside near, not is, the defendant’s hands were corollary proposition A of this tion. on, necessarily gun the at the time it dis “The that an item of possibility mere Thus, charged. gunshot resi evidence of might have undisclosed information defense, possibility” offered a “mere of evi helped might or have affect due does not dence favorable to the defendant. While ed the outcome of the trial difficulty prosecution noted the the Court evidence would have corroborated trying second-guess faces a defense story, not “vital” to the defendant’s it was attorney concerning evidence that innocence. The defend- question potentially relevant to a crime. Id. at 225. therefore, ant, entitled to reversal is not difficulty pronounced This is even more body. the victim’s the destruction of suspect before a has been arrested and the prosecution possi- has been informed of the B. defenses of ble the accused. Evidence be- also contends that The defendant legal only comes relevant after the theories equivalent body is destruction in the case have been identified. To re- because of the suppression of evidence quire prosecution gather all “rele- adequate in to conduct an State’s failure exculpatory evidence a sus- vant” before regard, the defendant vestigation. In this pect has identified and before the been deprived argues that the lack of defenses, possible is to State is notified of trial, fair as well as his right him of his to a require impossible. counsel, rights to effective assistance agree Washington We with the State of process, confrontation of evi compulsory appropriate requires the stаndard dence, The defend equal protection. prosecution preserve that “to [evidence] recognize duty urges ant this Court prosecutor’s] posses- comes into which [the gather all relevant evi prosecution tangible object either as a or sense sion impact on the suc regardless of its dence apparent impression, reasonably if it is prosecution. cess of impression potentially object or sense con- in a criminal case is prosecution stitute material evidence.” State v. [sic] professional law and ethics to bound Hall, Wash.App. 593 P.2d at 558. receives a fair assure that the defendant “tangible object” body is the Where the Williams, trial. See State victim, required is not a homicide the State 1982). (Utah Although prosecution keep for an indeterminate in investigators preserve should all of time. A concern for human amount criminating exculpatory evidence mate preventing spread of dis- decency and case, Stewart, rial to a requires ease that unclaimed bodies be bur- 1975) (dictum), prosecu (1984).1 U.C.A., 26-4-25 ied. See *6 exculpa required “to search for tion is not appears death to be caused Where the evidence, tests, tory or exhaustive conduct accident, violence, gunshot, suicide or every angle ly pursue on a case.” State v. duty medical examiner has the state 867, 554, Hall, 862, Wash.App. 22 body, custody of the determine the take State, (1979); 251 see also Dalton v. 558 death, complete written re- cause 641, 641, 835, 836 Ga. S.E.2d 1953, 26-4-7, -9, U.C.A., ports. See §§ (failure preserve to search for or standards, these we cannot -11. Under shotgun fingerprints on barrel of victim’s the destruction of the vic- conclude error); Rhodes, 112 Ariz. not was body in this case denied the defendant tim’s (1975)(failure 500, 504, 1129, 1133 equal protection of law. process due or fingerprints in certain areas to search performed autop- The medical examiner an error). of crime scene was not measured, sy weighed, in he which standard, Appellant's proposed attempt which in photographed body an impose duty prosecution identify on the cause of it and determine the evidence, in the preserved for all relevant would re death. That evidence was search prosecution. photographs reports written quire Herculean efforts form Jarell, 218, subject P.2d at this and was to cross-examination policy statutory requirements public duties Medical Ex- concerns and described 1. The Act, -25, U.C.A., 1953, equal apply 26-4-1 to §§ aminer’s the statute force to this the State were not enacted until after case. Nonetheless, disposed body in this case. Although confrontation. the hands of the quacy of the personal gain” “other alterna- presence were not tested for the or tive. residue, gunpowder absence of the defend- The defendant also contends prej- he was ant not has shown that such evidence was udiced in penalty phase since the to the or material issue of innocence. vagueness personal of “other gain” results Therefore, there was no constitutional vio- arbitrary in an capricious imposition lation in the body. destruction of the рenalty, death eighth violation of the

and fourteenth amendments. We reject argument this as well since the defendant II. did not receive the See penalty. death argues The defendant next that the Bumper Carolina, v. North 391 U.S. denying trial court erred his motion to 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 797 part dismiss that of the information which (1968). charged the committing defendant with personal gain” homicide for “other ground language is unconstitu III. tionally vague, in eighth violation of the argues defendant next that the and fourteenth amendments to the United trial court erred when it denied the defend Constitution, I, States and article sections 7 pretrial ant’s motion in limine to exclude

and 9 of the Utah Constitution. acts, evidence of the defendant’s other bad

There are aggravat- several alternative specifically, prior convictions, criminal for ing may geries, circumstances which be elements cards, unauthorized use of credit degree U.C.A., 1953, of first murder under appeal, and theft. On the defendant chal 76-5-202. aggravating lenges Those circum- pertaining admission of evidence stances include murder in thе course of possible prior three crimes: violation of aggravated robbery, pecuniary probation Arizona; murder for Joseph theft of Luce gain, and murder “for personal Denver, other ro’s wallet and identification in gain.” jury Colorado; in this case was instructed and theft of services for failure aggravated on robbery separate as a pay Omaha, of- for a hotel room Nebrask fense and found the guilty. a.2 jury’s R.Evid.,

Because of the aggrava- 9B, U.C.A., verdict on Rule Utah Vol. robbery, found, (1977), ted we know that the which was in effect at the time unanimously, trial, that the provides defendant committed that other crimes or bad that crime. Since that crime was one of acts be admitted “when relevant to prove circumstances on which the including some other material fact regarding murder, instructed accident, motive, first op- absence of mistake or intent, we know also jury properly portunity, relied preparation, plan, knowl- robbery convicting edge identity.” While evidence of other *7 defendant of first murder. This is gener- bad aсts is inadmissible to the show general defendant, not a case a disposition where verdict is chal- al such evi- lenged dence, in any the absence of competent, indication of when relevant and is ad- which of by prove several alternatives was used to missible a material fact. Tanner, support 539, the 1983). the verdict. Because 675 P.2d the aggra- convicted the defendant of The defendant in this case was tried on offense, murder, robbery separate charges: vated as a we three rob- uphold may jury’s the bery, prior verdict on first de- If and theft. evidence of bad gree alternative, robbery crimes, murder under the any acts was material to of these addressing without the constitutional ade- there was no error. challenges

2. The defendant’s motion in limine covered a doned to evidence of bad acts that range broader of bad acts than the three acts are not his mentioned in brief. argued appeal. on We assume that he has aban- proba the the victim. The defendant contends that The evidence of defendant’s trial, in Arizona identity during tion was relevant issue the violation was never at possible ag of a motive for the proof the stipulated identity. but he never With- gravated robbery and murder of Jack stipulation, out such the State a must af- Croasdale and for the theft of his van. firmatively proof carry its burden of trial, During the the defendant admitted provide connecting the chain of evidence identity Joseph the of Lucero that he used weapon the murder with the defendant. because the defendant feared he would be to jail and returned if he were apprehended possible The evidence of a theft of recognized police. the stopped and services from an Omaha hotel came out Likewise, defendant testified on direct the during testimony manager. the of the hotel kept he obtained and the examination that the manager testified that defendant to avoid identification Jack Croasdale registered signed and his name “Joe problems pulled if the defendant were over stayed during Lucero” the hotel the Thus, driving one while Croasdale’s van. period weapon was pur that the murder aggrava the murder logical motive for shop. The pawn chased at an Omaha man robbery is that the ted defendant wanted ager per did not state whether or not the prevent that would obtain identification registered paid son who as “Joe Lucero” prosecution by authori apprehension and Rather, manager for the hotel room. probation ties for the Arizona violation. person August stated that on motive is consistent with the defend This registered who as “Joe Lucero” “was unidentified, disposal of Croasdale’s ant’s gone,” keys left on the and the were desk body in remote it nude a location where in the room. pro readily not be discovered. The While the trial court have erred in was therefore material to bation violation permitting statement the isolated from murder, ag defendant’s motive for the might possible of services which theft gravated robbery, and theft. Accord State inferred, alleged we cannot review еr- Neal, 100-02, 123 Utah in ror since defendant’s motion limine (1953), denied, 1056-58 cert. 348 U.S. adequately not describe the criminal act (evi did 75 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed. 765 about, he was and he failed to jurisdiction worried dence of crimes another ma police objection make a at trial and there- timely terial to murder of officer where provided prevent preserve potential such evidence motive to did error fore not apprehension). motion li- The defendant’s review. sought certain mine to exclude evidence Evidence that took acts defendant. One of the bad bad Joseph Lucero’s wallet and identification acts mentioned in the motion “theft.” establishing Denver was relevant court the describing to the trial bad acts identity person of the defendant as motion, the defendant covered men- gun possession ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‍of the killed Jack Joseph Lucero’s tioned wallet theft defendant, posing as Jo Croasdale. identification, but failed mention Lucero, gun permit received a seph theft of We hold that where a services. purchased gun killеd ten Croasdale adequately motion limine does not de- days later. The theft Lucero’s identifi complained ap- scribe the evidence link provided the first in the chain of cation provide not peal, that motion does the trial that connected the .38 caliber to make judge opportunity with an a rul- purchased in Omaha with the de weapon objection ing, contemporaneous the death of Jack Croasdale. fendant and *8 necessary. Lesley, 672 v. P.2d See State use of identifica The defendant’s Lucero’s 79, (Utah 1983) (objection 82 n. 1 must be explained the fact the defend tion also that judge so that or made known to the trial he using in Reno name at a ant was Lucero’s she can an informed decision admit op and had the make plasma blood center thus McCardell, evidence); City or exclude v. portunity to drive to Salt Lake State

1309 942, 1982) (Utah fendant, (contempora- questions P.2d 947 the regarding 652 the death objection requires timely penalty ability impose neous rule and and that sanction specific objection required prospective jurors admission the a assume question admissibility guilty in order for the they verdict before express could appeal). timely be considered on Without a their penalty views of the death and there- defendant, by objection predisposed the this Court can- fore them to find at trial. alleged not review the error the trial purpose questioning jury a venire court. on attitudes death penalty toward the is to identify persons those who would un be suggests The defendant also that willing to follow law and impose the vote to if even the evidence of other crimes was regardless the penalty, death of the facts. admissible, it should been excluded have Norton, See State v. 577, 589 R.Evid., 45, 9B, Rule Vol. under Utah (Utah 1983), denied, cert. 492, 466 U.S. 104 U.C.A., (1977). 45, 1953 Rule Under 1923, (1984). S.Ct. 80 470 See also L.Ed.2d court has to exclude trial discretion evi U.C.A., 1953, 77-35-18(e)(10). 1968, In probative dence if the court finds that the Supreme United States held that Court “substantially of the evidence value out venireperson capital in case weighed by the risk its that admission excluded for if he or unwilling cause she is time, unnecessary consume would cause consider “to penalties provided all the unfairly prejudice, surprise or par undue Illinois, Witherspoon the state law.” Tanner, ty.” 539, 675 547 21, 510, 1770, 391 U.S. n. S.Ct. 1983). say We cannot trial 21, (1968) (emphasis n. 20 L.Ed.2d 776 court abused in this its discretion case. Texas, original). Adams U.S. probation The evidence of the defendant’s (1980), 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d 581 violation and the theft of Lucero’s wallet Supreme Court the Witherspoon examined established the defendant’s motive and standard and noted states retained a identity. These were critical facts a case “legitimate obtaining jurors interest who primarily that was built on circumstantial could follow instructions obey their highly proba evidence. evidence was their oath.” 448 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. at outweighed prej tive and the risk of undue Supreme 2526. The Court then concluded Therefore, no udice. we find abuse of the Witherspoon the line of cases trial court’s discretion.

which followed general proposition IV. that a [establish] juror may challenged for not be cause The next issue we address is wheth capital based punish- on his views about trial deprived er the court the defendant of ment prevent unless those views would impartial questioning a fair substantially impair performance or venire on its views toward the death juror of his duties as a accordance penalty, violation of defendant’s with his and his oath. The instructions sixth, rights eighth, under the and four however, may insist, jurors teenth amendments to the United States impar- will consider and decide facts Constitution, I, and article sections tially conscientiously apply the law 12 of the Utah Constitution. We do charged by court. treat, raised, not because it was not Id. question of whether the exclusion of veni- at 2526. The S.Ct. Court repersons for an venirepersons cause creates unfair and went to hold that certain jury. Instead, partial focus on the had been improperly we de excluded because of possible imposition fendant’s contention that the voir dire statements that the questioning .may jurors penalty might itself death bias who “affect” eventually case, more, thereby violating hear the Without their deliberations. such a right the defendant’s sixth amendment statement did not “an demonstrate unwill- impartial According ingness inability jury. part an to the de- or an

1310 argues many The social court’s instructions and jurors to follow the 50, Witherspoon at 100 at since demon- obey their oaths.” Id. S.Ct. science studies death-qualified jurors 2529. strate that are more likely to convict a defendant and more in- Witt, 412, 105 Wainwright v. 469 U.S. In impose penalty. clined to the death Ac- (1985), 844, 841 the Su 83 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. defendant, cording death-qualified to the the sixth preme explained that Court right impar- to a fair and jury violates guarantee impartial jury of an amendment representative from a tial selected to a selection does not entitle the defendant community. cross-section of the likely result the seat standard that will ing jurors in the defendant’s favor: of argument flatly reject- Defendant’s nothing juror talismanic about is [T]here Supreme Court in ed the United States merely — Witherspoon under be exclusion -, McCree, U.S. 106 Lockhart v. sentencing capital ju cause it involves (1986). 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 S.Ct. grounded in Witherspoon ries. is not Lockhart, assuming the social sci- Court Eighth prohibition Amendment’s subject adequate, ence studies on the punishment, against cruel and unusual pro- held that the exclusion for cause of Here, as in the Sixth Amendment. but scruples spective jurors because of toward elsewhere, quest jurors who is penalty does not violate the de- the death conscientiously apply the law and will rights. 106 fendant's sixth amendment Id. “impar That is what an find the facts. Supreme stated: S.Ct. at 1764. Court of, do not tial” consists and we The essence of a “fair cross-section” think, simply the defendant is because of “a systematic claim is the exclusion crime, is being capital tried for a that he community.” group ‘distinctive’ in the legal presumption or stan entitled to a Missouri, 357, 364, 99 v. 439 U.S. [Duren jurors to be seated who dard that allows (1979).] In 58 L.Ed.2d 579 S.Ct. in his quite likely will be biased favor. view, groups solely in terms our defined at -, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at Id. S.Ct. prevent of shared attitudes 851. impair members of the substantially permissible exclusion un The standard performing one of their group from progeny re Witherspoon and its is der jurors not “distinctive ... are duties 1953, 77-35-18(e)(10), U.C.A., flected purposes. groups” for fair cross-section challenge permits a for cause which attempted precisely never We have charged following ground: “If the offense group,” and the term “distinctive define death, entertaining punishable today. to do so But we do not undertake opinions of such conscientious about concept think it obvious we preclude juror penalty death as would must be linked to the “distinctiveness” penalty voting impose the death from re purposes of the fair cross-section regardless following conviction Louisiana, 419 quirement. [Taylor v. interpreted have that sec facts....” We 692, 522, 95 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. at the to authorize removal for cause tion (1975) ], purposes as we identified those prospective juror if has guilt phase (1) against “guard[ing] the exercise prevent him or her scruples that would ensuring arbitrary power” and imposing penalty. See from death judgment of the commu “common sense (Utah 1985); Moore, 697 P.2d 233 v. State hedge against nity” “a will act as Norton, 675 P.2d 588-89 State prosecutor,” or mistaken overzealous denied, (Utah 1983), 466 U.S. cert. fair “public confidence preserving (1984); 80 L.Ed.2d 470 S.Ct. сf. justice system,” and ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‍ness of the criminal 379, 496 P.2d 884 Bedford, 27 Utah 2d “sharing (3) implementing our belief that Belwood, (1972); 27 Utah phase justice is a (1972). in the administration P.2d 519 *10 1311 responsibility.” 1301, 1350-54, of civic Id. at 530-31 Cal.Rptr. 168 [95 178- S.Ct. at (1980). 81 698]. In the Haney study, sixty-seven subjects randomly were Lockhart, assigned to two 106 at S.Ct. 1765. groups. different Both groups were told Supreme The Court concluded that they to assume prospective were jurors United States Constitution participating in a real voir group dire. One presupposes jury that a selected from a tape viewed a video of a two-hour voir dire fair community cross-section of the is prospective jurors in capital a murder impartial, regardless of the mix of indi- case that included one-half hour of the viewpoints actually represented vidual on death-qualification questions. The second long so jurors as the can consci- group tape viewed a video identical to the entiously properly carry and out first except that the death-qualification por- duty apply sworn to the law to the facts tion was eliminated. At the cоnclusion of particular case. tapes, subjects the video were asked Thus, Id. at 1770. the exclusion of certain questions. certain jurors following qualification death did not Dr. Haney concluded that voir dire itself violate the defendant’s sixth amendment communicates attitudes pro- to ideas right impartial jury. to a fair and spective jurors may prevent that them Moreover, the questioning voir dire of a . deciding from impartial a case in an man- penalty about their views on the death ner. The results of study were summa- does not reach proportions. constitutional by rized the district in Grigsby: court Moore, In State v. 697 P.2d 233 Haney results of the study 1979 1983),this qualifica- Court found that death jurors exposed showed that pro- to the appropriate tion voir dire is an method to cess of qualification during death voir identify and jurors eliminate who would dire, simply by exposure, virtue of that refuse to the law. follow Id. at 238. Sim- compared subjects exposed to not ilarly, McCree, in Lockhart v. the United (1) process, that predisposed are more Supreme rejectеd States Court the conten- defendant, (2) convict the likely more tion that questioning voir dire on death begins assume before the trial that the qualification is unconstitutional. Accord- defendant will be convicted and will be ing Court, Supreme to the the State must death, (3) sentenced to likely and more given identify prospective the chance to disapproves per- assume law jurors whose penalty scruples death oppose sons who penalty the death prevent them impartially determining from (4) likely judge, more to assume capital guilt defendant’s or innocence. prosecutor and the attorney Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1763 n. 7. defense all believe the guilty defendant to be opinions While the in State v. Moore and that he will be sentenced to die and controlling, Lockhart v. McCree are we likely are themselves far more to believe helpful consider it only major to discuss the the defendant deserves the death study that examines the effects of the penalty. death-qualification questioning jurors on F.Supp. (emphasis original). 569 at 1303 go who on capital juries. to sit on That Despite by Haney study conclusion study was conducted in 1979 Professor that unfairness and bias result from the Craig Haney length and was discussed at death-qualification process, there is limited the Arkansas district court in Grigsby v. single empirical value to study. Mabey, F.Supp. 569 1302-05 (E.D.Ark.1983), (8th Grigsby acknowledged point court aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 Cir. — 1985), reversed, McCree, when it stated: “Since the results of Lockhart v. [the -, U.S. Haney] study appear ‘gut’ S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 137 confirm the (1985); Supreme opinions daily operate of those who California in the in Hovey Superior environment[,] Court courtroom important Court it is 1, 75-81, County, Alameda though Cal.3d 616 review it even no one contends that problem on V. social science research infancy.” F.Supp. other than its The defendant next contends that Grigsby district court in 1302. While the largely because his conviction was based two-jury system necessary considered evidence, circumstantial he was entitled to impartial jury a fair at the obtain hypothesis” in a “reasonable alternative *11 phase, Supreme Court in Ho the California opinion in struction. Our recent State v. reached a different vey Superior Hansen, (Utah 1985), Court 710 P.2d 182 is con Supreme The California Court trolling conclusion. There on this issue. we affirmed noted: our rule that such an instruction is unnec essary the is instructed that “where prejudicial al- Haney testified that the prove guilt the State must a defendant’s in attitudes which resulted from

teration beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 183. juror’s death-quali- the observations of explained Instruction No. 10 in this case venireper- fication of his or her fellow proof placed the burden of on the State and exactly of how exten- sons is “a function explained meaning the of “reasonable questioning the becomes. The more sive Therefore, doubt.” there was no error. you questioning, extensive the the more expect important find differ- jurors ences the state of mind of between VI. through process who have been one pred The next issue is whether the compared to those who have been underlying felony felony of murder icate or through proposition This im- other.” barring thereby is a lesser included offense plies corollary: “the extent to which degree conviction of both first murder and are minimal a func- will be [these effects] predicate felony. The defendant con question- tion of the extent to which the separate felony tends that sentences for ing is minimized.” “underlying offenses” of murder and 79-80, aggravated robbery at 616 P.2d at 168 and theft both Cal.3d violate jeopardy clause of the fifth Cal.Rptr. analysis, Based on this the double 180-81. amendment the United States Constitu Supreme concluded the California Court tion, applicable through made to the states death-qualification of that the side effects amendment, fourteenth and section 76- voir dire could be minimized individual agree 1-402 of the Utah Code. Because we 80-81, dire. at sequestered voir Id. statutory interpreta with the defendant’s 1354, 168Cal.Rptr. P.2d at at 181. Accord tion, do not address the constitutional we court, ing in the “Such reduction question. mini pretrial emphasis penalty should tendency death-qualified jury mize the of a argues that theft The defendant is a expect presume conviction.” aggravated included offense of rob- lesser Cal.Rptr. 616 P.2d at at Id. aggravated robbery bery and that is a less- (footnote omitted). agree. We degree offense of first murder. er included U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402(3) provides a stat- individual, We therefore hold utory for included definition lesser of- death-qualification sequestered voir dire fenses: jurors capital in a homicide prospective may A defendant be convicted of an not, itself, case does violate charged offense included the offense rights impartial to a fair and defendant’s of both but not be convicted prospective jurors in this jury. Since the charged included of- offense and the individually briefly questioned case were An offense is so included when: fense. chambers, judge, regarding their by the ability penalty and their (a) proof views on the death It is established of the same impartially, required decide this case the defend- or less than all the facts impartial a fair and the commission of the offense ant was not denied establish charged.... jury-

13|3 first, is two-fold: question attempt The threshold commission оf or an to commit flight committing or is a lesser included offense after or attempting whether theft and, second, aggravated robbery Aggravated Robbery commit Robbery wheth- or or robbery, predicate the homicide felony pecuniary er was committed for murder, personal degree gain.” prosecution is a other for first lesser included introduced evidence to find the degree murder. offense of first guilty 1983), of first murder Hill, under each of P.2d 96 Court possible the three aggravating circum- held under the facts that case that the stances charged aggravated robbery, pe- crime of lesser included theft is a offense — cuniary gain, personal gain. and other aggravated robbery of the crime verdict forms returned did not not that the defendant could be sentenced aggravating indicate which circumstance In defining included both offenses. they upon relied to find the defendant offenses, the Court stated that “where the *12 guilty. The fact that the also found greater two crimes ‘such that the can- are aggravated defendant guilty of rob- necessаrily not be committed without hav- however, bery, assume, us to allows lesser,’ ing Baker, committed the earlier, aggravated discussed robbery 1983), ([Utah] 671 P.2d ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‍then as a aggravating served as an circumstance. they relationship matter of in the law stand offenses, greater of and lesser punished convicted or defendant cannot be case, Under the therefore, facts of this Hill, for P.2d at 97. both.” Our hold- proof aggravated robbery of was a neces-

ing in dispositive Hill is this issue. sary element proof degree of first felony taking Since the same act of criminal that, murder. There can no doubt personal property Croasdale’s was neces- alone, standing aggravated the crimes of aggravated sary robbery to the theft and robbery degree sepa- and first murder are charges, theft is a lesser included offense rate offenses. The offenses are found in aggravated robbery. The lesser offense different sections of the code. First de- merges greater of theft into the therefore gree against per- murder is an offense thus, aggravatеd robbery; offense of son, aggravated robbery whereas is an of- improperly trial court convicted and sen- However, against fense property. under for tenced the defendant theft. separateness the test for found in section 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery becomes a determining aggrava In whether degree lesser of first included offense felo- robbery ted is a lesser included offense of where, ny murder in the situation such as murder, we degree analysis first follow the bar, predicate felony case at suggested Hill, opinion our State degree aggravated first robbery. murder is 674 P.2d at 97. a crime such as Where separate No additional facts or elements degree multiple first murder has varia required aggravated prove robbery are tions, comparison a theoretical of the ele degree after first murder based on the insufficient, ments is and it becomes neces predicate aggravated robbery offense of is sary actually proved examine what Thus, degree shown. murder first based predicate felony trial tо determine if predicate aggravated offense rob- is a Id. lesser included offense. bery greater relationship stands to the degree requires proof First murder of a aggravated lesser included offense rob- statutorily aggravating defined circum- bery. greater proven, If the crime then stance in addition to an intentional and merges the lesser crime into it. Conse- case, knowing U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402(3) killing. quently, the amended pre- § charged that being information vente the defendant from convicted knowingly “intentionally aggravated robbery caused the and sentenced for degree addition engaged death of Jack while to first murder where Croasdale aggravating aggravated aggravated robbery uphold circumstance is conviction conviction, degree ag- robbery.3 the first murder gravated robbery charge merges into the opinion in The State contends that our charge, murder and the rob- Baker, (Utah 1983), 671 P.2d 152 bery conviction must also be vacated.4 rejected considered and the defendant’s ar- gument. In Baker we stated: VII. 76-l-402(3)(a) applicatiоn will of § require the statu- Lastly,

thus some reference to the defendant contends tory involved in elements the offenses that the evidence was insufficient to con given facts order to determine whether vict him of criminal homicide. The defend “required to the commis- are establish prove contends ant that the State failed to charged.” This re- sion of the offense requisite that the defendant had the intent overlap quirement that there exist some necessary support a conviction for first allegedly statutory in the elements of degree murder. claim is entirely That prevent “included” offenses would requisite without merit. The mental state argument totally unrelated offenses degree “intentionally for first murder is simply could be deemed included because U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-202(1). knowingly.” necessary prove some of the evidence “may Intent be inferred from the actions of necessary prove crime one was also surrounding the defendant or from circum example, prov-. the other. For Murphy, stances.” State v. ing involving only trial theft (Utah 1983). charge of first homicidе would *13 Despite testimony the defendant’s that offense not make theft a lesser included shooting Croasdale died an accidental 76-l-402(3)(a) none of under because § during struggle, ample a there is evidence statutory the of theft and homi- elements support jury’s in the record to the verdict. overlap. cide presented by The evidence the State’s ex- (emphasis original). Id. 158-59 The pert regarding the of witnesses distance argues relationship that the between weapon the murder from the victim’s fore- degree theft and first murder discussed theory head substantiated the State’s that relationship is the same as the' Baker be- of gun the was outside the reach the vic- aggravated robbery degree tween and first addition, jury could in- tim. the have problem analysis, murder. The with this intentionally that the defendant however, theft, ferred is that unlike killed Croasdale based on the defendant’s robbery, aggravating is not an circum- area, disposing of the in a remote degree stance under the first murder stat- ute, U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-202(l)(d). property, taking Croasdale’s van and other Be- depend assuming identity in Las cause we are constrained to on the Croasdale’s murder, felony predicate holding carefully must be tions of based on the 3. We note that aggravating predi- felony aggravated kidnap- or kidnapping, read. If the circumstance of felony degree cate for first murder is different proof ping required since each crime of at least charged, there from an additional offense element). separate one distinct and independent grounds adequate to convict the though they of both offenses even defendant parenthetically pecu- 4. We note that under the single episode. For arise out of a example, criminal of theft liar circumstances this case and first special forms in this case if verdict degree totally murder are not unrelated offenses "pecu- jury indicated that the relied on the had niary” case, taking suggested by Baker. In this the personal gain" aggravating cir- or "other personal property Croasdale’s established the cumstances, the defendant cоuld have been con- provided ag- of theft and an element of crime degree aggrava- victed of both first murder and, gravated robbery aggra- extent that to the circumstance, aggrava- robbery. that ted Under robbery aggravating vated served as the circum- robbery included ted would not be a lesser stance, Thus, degree first murder. under the rely jury since the would not offense case, statutory taking facts of this the element of elements of each same facts to establish the personal property is common to both theft and Coleman, See, e.g., crime. 299, 310-13, 185 Mont. murder, degree making theft a lesser in- first (1979) (no 1008-10 offense of first murder. cluded degree statutory or violations for convic- constitutional guilt Similarly, Portland. the sciousness of Vegas and consciousness —but reasonably that the could have inferred any consistent of several other knowingly killed intentionally or degrees argue of homicide. To the that acquire and to property his Croasdale prove requisite State could intent of the avoiding the identity, thereby assume charged beyond crime a reasonable doubt being and re- possibility apprehended on this evidence and whatever other evi- probation Arizona to face revoca- turned to (which dence there is the record virtu- is proceedings. tion none) ally a mockery principle makes of the sentence The defendant’s conviction and that each of a element crime must be degree for first murder are affirmed. proved beyond a reasonable doubt. aggravated rob- for theft and convictions only shooting direct evidence of the bery set aside. are came from the defendant who testified that discharged gun while he and the victim C.J., HALL, and HOWE and ZIMMER- it struggled for after the victim attacked JJ., MAN, concur. course, the defendant. Of could STEWART, (dissenting). Justice part of testimony. believe all or that How- that a Clearly evidence establishes ever, part the defendant’s testimo- occurred, is not homicide but homicide ny simply most favorable to the verdict first murder unless the defendant gun beyond just established that was killing victim with the shot the intention grasp immediаte at the it victim’s time wholly I him. submit evidence discharged, fact consistent with testi- insufficient to establish that the defendant mony of the medical examiner. The medi- victim with that The Court shot the intent. was gun cal examiner testified that the de- against summarizes the evidence eighteen inches more from the defend- following paragraph: fendant in ant fired. To conclude when it presented by The evidence the State’s kill from defendant intended to the victim expert regarding witnesses distance Fur- speculation. is sheer weapon murder victim’s of the from the thermore, angle entry bullet’s theory substantiated the forehead State’s nonprobative inten- altogether of an *14 gun was of the that the outside the reach killing. tional addition, In infer jury victim. could argument jury could reach intentionally killed that the defendant killing of an an inference intentional based based on the dis- Croasdale defendant’s subsequent acts of the defendant’s area, in posing body of the a remote area, 1) in disposing body of the a remote proper- taking Croasdale’s van and other 2) рroper- victim’s and taking the van other assuming identity in ty, and Croasdale’s 3) Las ty, assuming identity his and Vegas on all Las and Portland. Based Portland, an Vegas and is not inference evidence, reason- could have logic speculation. One founded in but inten- ably inferred that the defendant manslaughter, well who has committed knowingly killed tionally Croasdale his acquire property his his as one who has violated the terms of and to assume thereby avoiding identity, possibility parole, highly likely to act in such being apprehended and returned person sim- manner. I submit reasonable probation pro- Arizona face revocation beyond find ply could not a reasonable ceedings. rather doubt that homicide was murder manslaughter. case, In such a our than evidence, only From this could finding mandates a criminal code speculate defendant intended U.C.A., 1953, 77-17-1. lesser offense. showing kill the victim. The evidence 121, Golladay, 78 Wash.2d See State disposed a remote defendant 129-30, (1970), area, overruled property, the van and and took other Arndt, 87 identity, grounds, assumed the viсtim’s shows con- on other 1330-31 Wash.2d

(1976). court

Finally, I the trial submit prior in the of some of the

erred admission and that that

criminal acts of the defendant may have

erroneously admitted evidence finding it did. jury make the

induced the view, proof requirement of my re- doubt has been

beyond a reasonable case. formality

duced to a mere committed first de-

Perhaps the defendant speculate. so But

gree murder —one requisite not meet the

the evidence does

legal prove it. standards Harmon, Utah, Nephi, for defendant Milton T. Plaintiff STATE Respondent, appellant. Wilkinson, Gen., Atty. Salt Lake David L. respondent. City, plaintiff WADE,

Johnny Defendant Owen Appellant. PER CURIAM: 860248. No. sexually defendant In November Supreme ‍​​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‍Court of Utah. acquaintance and at- a female assaulted her. Mo- intercourse with tempted sexual

Aug. 1986. blanket, earlier, draped only in a ments body to several exposed had Still dressed people at a local cafe. blanket, he then walked the victim’s home, aggravated assault oc- where the charged curred. Defendant *15 assault. sexual convicted 76-5-405, U.C.A., as amended § charged (Supp.1986). Defendant was also acquitted attempted first de- gree homicide. filed an appeal, defendant’s counsel

On that, in advising Anders brief this Court appealable no errors opinion, there were right of any affect substantial below that Clayton, defendant. See State 1981); U.C.A., 77-35-30 supple- (1982 ed.). brief was Defendant’s pro se brief and a letter mented with a

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Shaffer
Court Name: Utah Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 25, 1986
Citation: 725 P.2d 1301
Docket Number: 18556
Court Abbreviation: Utah
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