87 Neb. 84 | Neb. | 1910
Appeal from a decree of the district court for Douglas county entered in conformity to a mandate of this court in what is commonly called a “scavenger tax” foreclosure proceeding.
It appears that one William J. Connell was the owner of the real estate upon which the delinquent taxes in question were assessed and levied, and thereafter sold the same to the Omaha Country Club. In the foreclosure suit Connell and the Country Club filed a joint answer to the petition, and the state replied. Upon the issues thus joined the district court on the 26th day of October, 1907, entered a decree by which it was declared that the amount of taxes due and delinquent on the premises in question was $692.01, with interest thereon from July 1, 1907, at the rate of 1 per cent, a month; that on the 18th day of January, 1908, the state filed a transcript of the proceedings in this court, and in order to perfect its appeal from said decree caused a notice thereof to be served on defendant Connell, but no such notice was served upon the country club, and no notice of plaintiff’s intention to appeal was filed with the clerk of the district court as provided by section 3 of the act of 1907 (laws 1907, ch. 162), providing for appeals from judgments of the district court. The Country Club made no appearance in this court; but Connell, the former owner of the premises, who had conveyed the same to the Country Club with a. warranty against incumbrances, entered his appearance, and all of the matters of defense set forth in the joint
As above stated, the judgment appealed from was entered by the district court in strict conformity to the mandate of this court, and we think the rule is now settled beyond controversy that the district court had no discretion in the matter, and could not have rendered any other decree than the one in question herein. Oliver v. Lansing, 51 Neb. 818; State v. Dickinson, 63 Neb. 869; State
The case at bar falls squarely within the foregoing rule, which finally disposes of the matter of this appeal. Therefore, as above stated, we deem it neither necessary nor proper for us to determine the effect upon the Country Club of the state’s failure to-serve it with notice of the former appeal; and we reserve any decision upon that question until it shall be presented to us in some proper proceeding.
For the foregoing reason, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.