The State seeks further review of the court of appeals opinion reversing the defendant, Victor Serrato’s, convictions for first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. The State claims the court of appeals erred in finding there was insufficient evidence establishing that any of the conduct constituting the defendant’s alleged offenses had occurred in Iowa, and thus the State had failed to establish territorial jurisdiction. Serrato resists the State’s claim and further argues that the State failed to prove he was even the individual who killed the victim, Mimi Carmona, and ended her pregnancy. After reviewing all the evidence, we find that, taken as a whole, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Iowa had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Serrato for first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. Serrato’s conviction is affirmed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On November 9, 2006, Victor Serrato was initially charged by trial information with the first-degree murder of Mimi Car-mona in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1, 707.2(1), and 707.2(2) (2005); kidnapping in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1 and 710.2; and nonconsensual termination of a human
Serrato filed a motion to dismiss the rеmaining charges claiming the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Carmona or that any of his alleged crimes occurred, in whole or in part, within the State of Iowa. The motion was denied.
A jury trial was held, and after the State rested its case, Serrato moved for a verdict of acquittal, arguing that the State provided insufficient evidence that Serrato caused the death of Carmona and, alternatively, that any part of the offenses charged took place in Iowa. The State resisted arguing there was sufficient evidence tying Serrato to the murder and that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that his intent to kill with premeditation and malice aforethought were formed in Iowa. The district court denied Serrato’s motion.
The jury found Serrato guilty of all counts. Serrato filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new trial, claiming the evidence was insufficient to prove the crimes took place in Iowa and insufficient to convict him of the crimes. The court denied his motions. He appealed.
The appeal was routed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded that the element of intent was sufficient to invoke the state’s territorial jurisdiction; however, the court found the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Serrato formed the intent to kill and malice aforethought necessary to invoke Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction while he was in Iowa. The court reversed the jury’s verdict and remanded for dismissal. The State then filed an application for further review with this court, which we granted.
II. Discussion and Analysis.
A. Scope of Review. The principles governing our review of a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal are well-established.
State v. Henderson,
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is that upon which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” In conducting our review, we consider all the evidence, that which detracts from the verdict, as well as that supporting the verdict.
State v. Hagedorn,
The jury found Serrato guilty of first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. The jury was presented with the following evidence. On October 21, sometime between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., friends Esmerelda Perales and Angelica Chavez went to the Escor-pión Bar in Muscatine, Iowa. At the bar, the women encountered Chavez’s former friend and roommate Carmona. Both Car-mona and Chavez were pregnant at the time. Carmona approached the women and tried to give Chavez a hug, but Chavez put up her hand blocking Carmona’s attempt. Carmona asked Chavez if she was mad at her, to which Chavez replied, “I have nothing to say to you.” A few minutes later, Carmona slapped Chavez, and a fight ensued. The fight was quickly broken up by the bartender and the owner of the establishment. Carmona was escorted outside by the bartender but ran back inside a few minutes later to continue the fight. Chavez and Perales left the bar soon afterwards. Carmona remained at the Escorpión Bar.
The two women were fighting over the paternity of their unborn babies. During the argument, Perales overheard Carmona say to Chavez, “We have the same baby” and “[o]ur babies have the same blood running through their veins.” To these comments Chavez replied, “Whose blood? Chutarro’s or Juan’s?” Chutarro is the nickname of Serrato, Chavez’s boyfriend at the time. Juan was the defendant’s brother.
On the drive home, Chavez and Perales decided to call Serrato to tell him about the fight with Carmona. After several failed attempts to contact Serrato on his cell phone, the women decided they were gоing to drive to West Liberty, Iowa, where Serrato was attending a dance. However, Serrato called Perales’s cell phone just as the women reached the outskirts of Muscatine. Phone records place this call at 12:47 a.m. on October 22. Pe-rales relayed the details of the physical altercation to Serrato. Serrato told the women to meet him at Chavez’s house in Muscatine. Perales and Chavez arrived at the house around 1:00 a.m.
Serrato arrived at Chavez’s house sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. Serrato was upset when he arrived at the residence. Neither Chavez nor Perales would tell him more about the altercation at the Escorpión Bar. Perales estimated that he was at the residence for about ten minutes; he then left without telling either woman where he was going.
At around 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., Marciela Garcia, a friend of Carmona, and four passengers in her ear, saw Carmona with Serrato in the parking lot of the Escorpión Bar. Serrato and Carmona were standing beside a little black truck. Serrato was on the driver’s side of the truck and Carmona on the passenger side. Garcia got out of her car and approached Carmona. When Carmona turned around, Garcia could see she had been crying. Garcia asked Car-mona why she was upset. Carmona replied, “Because this bastard is denying my baby” and pointed to Serrato. Serrato, who had been on the driver’s side of the truck, came around the vehicle. and approached Carmona at this point. He mumbled something in Spanish to the effect of, “Are you sure this is my baby?”
Fearing that the police would be called, Garcia told Dago to get back into her car. Before leaving, Garcia told Carmona not to move, that she would be right back. Garciа drove to a convenience store approximately a block away where Dago was supposed to meet a Mend to catch a ride to Iowa City. Garcia left Dago there and returned to the parking lot of the Escor-pión Bar, but Carmona, Serrato, and the little black truck were gone.
According to Perales, Serrato returned to Chavez’s home approximately twenty-five minutes after leaving or sometime around 2:00 or 2:15 a.m. Chavez also testified Serrato was gone for approximately thirty minutes. She stated that when he rеturned he had a scratch on his face and several scratches on his arms. Perales then left Chavez’s residence and returned home. Cell phone records show that Ser-rato received a call from Chavez at 2:04 a.m., and Chavez received a call from Ser-rato at 2:06 a.m. According to Chavez, Serrato spent the rest of the night at her house, and the couple slept in until about 1:00 p.m. the next day.
At around 6:80 p.m. the next evening, Carmona’s body was found by two motorists in a rural area in Illinois across the Mississippi River from Muscatine. Her body had been thrоwn in a ditch, her clothes were partially pulled off, and her body was badly bruised and scraped. A plastic bag was caught in her hair. Her shoes, a beer bottle with her DNA on it, and a postal receipt later connected to the defendant’s brother, Edgardo Serrato, were scattered near the body.
Forensic pathologist, Mark Peters, performed an autopsy on Carmona’s body and determined the cause of Carmona’s death to be asphyxia due to manual strangulation. He further opined that a “great deal of force” was used to kill Carmona, as the hyoid bone in her neck was broken. She had a crushing injury to her liver, a hemorrhage underneath her scalp, and several dark abrasions on her abdomen. She was approximately six months pregnant at the time of her death, and the fetus was dependent upon Carmona’s circulation and died as a result of her death. Based upon lividity, Peters testified that her death could have occurred anytime before 6:00 a.m. on October 22.
The police launched an investigation into Carmona’s death. Serrato was interviewed several times. At first, Serrato claimed he had not seen Carmona in the last three to four weeks, but eventually he confessed to investigators that he had argued with her in the parking lot of the Escorpión Bar on the night of her disappearance. However, he claimed he had left her in the parking lot with another Latino man. He also told police he had sex with her eight months prior to her murder.
The plastic bag found caught in Carmo-na’s hair was sent for DNA testing. No fingerprints were found, however, dried flakes of blood were found inside the bag. The flakes contained a mixture of DNA from two different sources. The DNA matched the profiles of both Carmona and Serrato. Testing also revealed that Serra-to was not the father of Carmona’s baby. The authorities located the little black truck Carmona was last seen standing be
The jury had the following evidence to support its conclusion that it was Serrato who killed Carmona. First, Serrato had ample motive. Carmona had just assaulted Serrato’s pregnant girlfriend and accused him of being the father of an unwanted child. Second, he had the opportunity to kill Carmona. Serrato was the last person seen with her alive. In addition, his whereabouts were unaccounted for during a period of time that coincides with her time of death, a gap of approximately twenty-five minutes. Finally, there was physical evidence linking Ser-rato to Carmona’s death. His DNA was comingled with Carmona’s blood in the plastic bag found tied to her hair. Ser-rato points out several inconsistencies in the evidence; however, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that substantial evidence exists upon which the jury could find that Serrato was the perpetrator of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Territorial Jurisdiction. Alternatively, Serrato argued, and the court of appeals found, that the evidence was insufficient to prove Serrato formed the intent to kill and malice aforethought necessary while in Iowa to invoke the state’s territorial jurisdiction. We disagree. Territorial jurisdiction to prosecute a criminal offense generally rests in the courts of the state where the offense was committed.
State v. Liggins,
1. A person is subject to prosecution in this stаte for an offense which the person commits within or outside this state, by the person’s own conduct or that of another for which the person is accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within this state.
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2. An offense may be committed partly within this state if conduct which is an element of the offense, or a result which constitutes an element of the offense, occurs within this state. If the body of a murder victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state....
Iowa Code § 803.1 (emphasis added). Carmona’s body was found in Illinois; therefore, the presumption in the second sentence of subsection (2) does not apply.
Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction statute expressly provides for prosecution of offenses committed partly within Iowa.
Id.) see also State v. Wedebrand,
In analyzing the issue of Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction, the court of appeals focused on the element of specific intent. While specific intent is a necessary element of first-degree murder, it is not the only state-of-mind element required by Iowa’s first-degree murder statute. To commit first-degree murder in Iowa one must not only have the specific intent to kill, but must also act with malice aforethought.
Id.
§ 707.1;
see also State v. Bentley,
“a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another existing prior to the act complained of; it need not be shown to have existed for any length of time before, but only requires such deliberation as makes a person appreciate and understand at the time the act is committed its nature and probable consequences as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion.... ”
State v. Gramenz,
Because it is a state of mind, malice aforethought often evades direct evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Casady,
We agree with the court of appeals, that under the language of Iowa Code section 803.1, conduct or actions occurring in Iowa
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Iowa’s Territorial Jurisdiction. To determine whether evidence is sufficient to prove an element of the crime, the question is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
Casady,
There were no eyewitnesses to Carmo-na’s death, her body was found in Illinois, and the State of Iowa did not produce any evidence documenting the exact location where Serrato allegedly strangled Carmo-na. A review of the evidence, however, reveals that a jury could find Serrato engaged in the following conduct on the evening of October 21 and the early morning оf October 22.
1. Serrato called Perales’s cell phone at 12:47 a.m. on October 22. Serrato told the women to meet him at Chavez’s house located at 514 Spring Street in Muscatine.
2. Serrato arrived at Chavez’s house sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m.
3. Serrato left Chavez’s house sometime between 1:10 and 1:40 a.m.
4. At around 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., Marcie-la Garcia, a friend of Carmona’s, and four passengers in her car, saw Car-mona and Serrato physically fighting in the parking lot of the Escorpión Bar.
5. At approximately 1:50 a.m. Garcia left the parking lot of the Escоrpión Bar. Serrato and Carmona were still in the Escorpión parking lot.
6. Cell phone records show that Serra-to received a call from Chavez at 2:04 a.m. and Chavez received a call from Serrato at 2:06 a.m.
7. Serrato returned to Chavez’s home approximately twenty-five minutes after leaving or sometime around 2:00 or 2:15 a.m.
From these facts, the jury could have inferred that from the time Serrato was informed of the physical altercation between Chavez and Carmona, sometime shortly before 1:00 a.m., he knew he had a problem that must be аddressed. The situation was only exacerbated when Serrato arrived at Chavez’s home to find an upset pregnant girlfriend and further escalated when Serrato confronted Carmona in the parking lot of the Escorpión Bar, culminating in a screaming match with Carmona that turned physical and had to be broken up by a third party. From the timeline, the jury could also find that Serrato’s presence was only unaccounted for from approximately 1:50 a.m. until approximately 2:15 a.m. It was within this twenty-five minute window that the State posits Serra-to formed the intent to murder Carmоna, murdered Carmona, made a call to Chavez at 2:04 a.m. and received a call from Chavez at 2:06 a.m., traveled to Illinois, and returned to Chavez’s home in Iowa.
At trial, Dr. Peters testified that death by strangulation takes approximately three to four minutes, a relatively short amount of time. While Carmona also had a crushing injury to her liver, a hemorrhage underneath her scalp, and several dark abrasions on her abdomen, it is un
We find there is sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that Serrato formed “ ‘a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to [Carmona]’ ” when he took her from the parking lot of thе Escorpión Bar sometime between 1:50 a.m. and 1:53 a.m.
Gramenz,
As in provocation cases, the issue is “whether ‘the blood has had time to cool.’ ”
Finn v. Stoddard,
Iowa’s jurisdiction statute “is satisfied if the defendant, with the requisite intent, does a preparatory act in [Iowa] that is more than a de minimus act toward the eventual completion of the offense.” Id. Serrato’s act of confronting Carmona, physically struggling with her, and then leaving the parking lot with her were not merely de minimus acts, but ultimately furthered thе completion of the charged offense, first-degree murder. See id. (finding preparatory acts sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a defendant’s crimes when the acts furthered the completion of the charged offense by removing the victims from the protection of others and providing the defendant with the opportunity to commit the crimes).
We find that, taken as a whole, the circumstantial evidence — Serrato’s motive to kill Carmona (an unwanted pregnancy), the physical altercation between Serrato and Carmona in Iowa immediately before her murder, the act of enticing or forcing her into his vehicle, and the short time-line — provide substantial evidence to support an inference that Serrato engaged in conduct which manifested malice aforethought to kill Carmona and terminate the pregnancy while in the State of Iowa. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, this constitutes substantial evidence to prove the jurisdictional element beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa therefore had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Serrаto for first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy.
III. Motion for New Trial.
Serrato also claims that the district court’s denial of his motion for new trial was in error because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The standard of review on a motion for a new trial is different than that required for a motion for judgment of acquittal.
State v. Ellis,
“On a motion for new trial, however, the power of the [trial] court is much broader. It may weigh the evidenсe and consider the credibility of witnesses. If the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.”
Id.
at 658-59 (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King
&
Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure § 553, at 245-48 (2d ed. 1982)). We review the district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Reeves,
The jury determined that Serrato was the perpetrator of the offenses charged and that Serrato engaged in conduct which manifested malice aforethought to kill Car-mona and terminate the pregnancy while in the State of Iowa. We find the trial court properly apрlied the law and determined that the jury’s guilty verdict was not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Id. We hold that it was within scope of the trial court’s discretion to deny Serrato’s motion for new trial.
IV. Disposition.
After reviewing all the evidence, we find that, taken as a whole, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict finding Serrato guilty of first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy. We conclude that under the language of Iowa Code section 803.1, conduct or actions occurring in Iowa which establish a mens rea element of the offense are sufficient to subject a defendant to Iowa’s territorial jurisdiction. We also conclude that sufficient evidence exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Iowa had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Serrato for first-degree murder and nonconsensual termination of a human pregnancy, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Serrato’s motion for a new trial. We, therefore, vacate the court of appeals’ contrary decision and affirm Serrato’s conviction.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The State later amended the trial information and dropped the kidnapping charge and the felony murder alternative of the first-degree murder charge.