3 Stew. 123 | Ala. | 1830
Lead Opinion
The offence charged, and the form of the indictment, very materially suggest these questions for our examination.
1st. Can one who has committed a larceny in a sister State, and brought with him the property stolen into this, be punished under our laws?
2nd. If the facts supposed in the first question constitute an offence, is the indictment sufficient in point of law?
First. That an individual who has committed a Jar-
The same question came before the Supreme Court of New York in the case of the People v. Gardner, and in that of the People v. Schenck.
A doctrine the reverse of that held in North Carolina and New York is maintained in Massachusetts and Con-necticul, vide Commonwealth v. Cullins
it is manifest from the reading of this act, that it to embrace the offence with which the accused is charged, unless it be rendered nugatory by constitutional inhibition, or narrowed in its operation by the application of the rules by which legislative acts are interpreted.
The affirmative of the first branch of the qualification of the proposition, is predicated upon the hypothesis, that the offence which the statute proposes to punish, was legally punishable by the Courts of Georgia, and that to permit the accused to be punished here, would be to inflict punishment twice for the same offence, in contravention of tlie amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
With regard to the second branch of the qualification we will remark, if the offence of which the prisoner is found guilty was capitally punished, we should incline to the opinion that he could not receive the judgment of death. The statute it will bo observed expresses “horses and other goods and chattels.” For the larceny of horses in contravention of the act. it would be competent, to inflict any punishment authorised by law, however exorbitant, but for “other goods and chattels,” ih favorem vita;,
2nd We are induced to question the legal sufficiency of the countin the indictment, on which the prisoner is found guilty. It charges substantially, that the prisoner did feloniously steal, take and carry away at the city of Augusta, in the county of Richmond, in the State of Georgia, and out of the State of Alabama, one carriage, &c.? and that on the thirteenth of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty, he had the same in the possession of him the said Aquilla Seay, to wit: on the clay and year last aforesaid, to wit: in the county of Mobile and State of Alabama aforesaid, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided. Whether the possession of the prisoner in the county of Mobile was felonious, is a fact which the indictment does not allege. The asportation in Georgia may have been such as to render him liable to a conviction for a larceny there, and the possession in Mobile be rightful. The owner of the stolen property, before it was brought within the limits of this State, may have made a transfer of his right to the prisoner, or consented that he should carry it to Mobile. But regardless of fact, the Court must, in obedience to a well settled rule, make every presumption in favor of the prisoner, which the indictment will authorise, and this too even after verdict.
Indictments can not be aided by intendment, but must
Again, the statute must be considered as introducing a new offence into our criminal code, for we have already remarked that the offence did not exist anterior to its passage; this being true, it would very materially seem that the reined}'- which the statute prescribes for its punishment should be strictly pursued; the statute declares “that any person or persons” charged with an offence against it “may be indicted for horse stealing or other larceny, in whatever county be or they may be so found with such’ horse, or other goods and chattels as aforesaid.” Hence, it appears that the bringing of the stolen property here was, to be considered a new asportation, in whatever county the thief might be found with it in his possession, and that the indictment should be drawn for a larceny committed against the peace and dignity of this State, locating the ■ taking and asportation in the county where the indictment is found. The language of the act is too plain to authorise any other interpretation, and this conclusion gains strength from the fact, that when property is stolen in one county and the thief is found with it in his possession in another,
If however it appeared from tiie count on which the prisoner is found guilty, by positive allegation, that this possession in Mobile was felonious, wo should feel disinclined to arrest the judgment, because then it would have stated with sufficient precision an offence known to the laws of the State.
Having examined (lie questions of law referred for our decision, our conclusions arc, that the offence with which the prisoner is attempted to lie charged, is one for which punishment may be inflated. But because the indictment is insufficient, the judgment: of the Court below must be arrested, and the prisoner remain in custody to await another trial, unless he be otherwise discharged by due course of law.
1 Hayw. R, 100.
2 Johns. R. 477, 479,
3 Conn. R. 185.
5th article.
1 South 40.
Wilson's Ed. 3 Vol. 553, n.
1b. 554 Reynolds v. the State, 2 Not. and M. C. 365
3 Bacon Ab. 370.
Comm. v. Morse, 2 Mass. R. 127
Concurrence Opinion
In this case I concur with a majority of the Court in believing lhat the judgment ougiit to be arrested, on the ground that the offence is not sufficiently and legally charged in the indictment so as to bring it within the true meaning of the statute.
But I go further, and insist that the facts if they had been sufficiently and legally charged, do not constitute an indictable offence within this State.
I understand it to be conceded that from the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, from the nature of the State governments, and the spirit of our free institutions, a crime committed in another State cannot be tried and punished in our Courts.
This much being conceded, it is material to inquire whether the act of coming into this State with the stolen goods, can subject the party here to an indictment for larceny.
The language of the act of 1807 is, “that any person who shall steal or feloniously take any horse or other •goods and chattels from any person out of the territory, and shall afterwards have the same in his possession within the territory, may be indicted for horse stealing or other larceny, &c.”
To me it appears that this act substantially provides for the trial and punishment of an offence committed in the State of Georgia, or any other State. The felony was complete in the State of Georgia, and the fact of the te-I.on’s bringing the stolen property, into this State cannot
When the liberty and reputation of a freeman is in jeopardy, I think the distinction too refined to say we punish not for the larceny committed in Georgia, but for being found in possession of the stolen property here. The statute professes to provide for the indictment and punishment of larceny. The act of bringing the stolen property into the State cannot of itself constitute larceny, nor can the party be convicted, even under the statute, without proof of the commission of the crime in Georgia.
To view the subject in any light, the conclusion inevitably follows, that a man is tried and punished for a crime committed in another State, and that he may be twice tried and punished for the same offence.
Though .the Court will always lean in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, yet where the validity of an old law enacted before the adoption of the constitution is questionable, it is a settled doctrine that such question in criminal cases should be construed and extended to the benefit of the party accused. I am of opinion that the-section of the act under which the indictment was had, is not law, and that the conviction is illegal.
I am further of opinion, that in remanding the case for a new trial, the Court is departing at least from the principle adopted in the case of the State v. Plunket. Plunket was indicted and convicted of stealing a horse of a certain description; it came out in evidence that the prisoner had stolen a gelding and not a horse, for this the judgment was arrested in this Court and the prisoner discharged.
Judgment arrested, and prisoner to remain in custody to answer a new indictment.