State v. SearcyState v. Searcy
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- Habhab
Nova Eugene Searcy was charged with operating while intoxicated (first offense) on October 2, 1989. On October 9, following arraignment, the court set Searcy’s trial for November 11. However, on November 8, Searcy filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test he had taken shortly after his arrest.
The court then, on November 13, set the hearing on Searcy’s suppression motion for December 4 and continued Sеarcy’s trial until December 14. But the December 4 suppression hearing date was, on the State’s motion, first сontinued to January 3, 1990, and later to January 17, 1990.
On December 19, the State by motion asked for a hearing to dеtermine whether the illness of the State’s chief witness constituted good cause for extending the speedy trial deadline; in addition the state asked the court to set trial for December 28,1989 — within the speedy trial dеadline— if it found that there was not good cause to
The trial did not takе place on that date and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 5, 1990, claiming the State had viоlated his right to a speedy trial. The court denied this motion to dismiss, and trial was held on January 18. After a hearing, the court found Searcy guilty as charged.
Searcy contends the district court should have dismissed the charge on the ground the State denied his right to speedy trial. He notes that he was not tried within ninety days after the trial infоrmation was filed.
The State acknowledges that Searcy was not tried until 108 days after the trial information was filed. However, the State argues there was good cause for the delay. In this respect, the State asserts that the delay was attributable partly to Searcy’s own suppression motion and partly to thе illness of the State’s principal witness (the arresting officer).
Appellate review of the trial court’s determination of good cause is not de novo. The trial court’s findings of fact upon conflicting evidence are binding upon us if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(b) provides:
If a defendant indicted for a рublic offense has not waived his right to a speedy trial he must be brought to trial within ninety days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
In applying this rule, thе supreme court has held that if the State does not try the defendant within the prescribed ninety-day period, the court must dismiss the charge unless (1) the defendant has waived the right to a speedy trial, (2) the delay is attributablе to the defendant, or (3) there is good cause for the delay. State v. Mount, 422 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1988). In determining whether good causе has been shown, we focus solely on the reason for the delay; however, surrounding eircum-stances are relevant to the inquiry to the extent that a comparatively weak reason for delay may bе sufficient to constitute good cause if the delay is relatively short and it does not prejudice the defendant. State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 279.
In this case, it appears the delay was attributable to the defendant as well as to the сontinuation for good cause. As it relates to the delay attributable to the defendant, even though thе court as early as October 9 fixed the trial date for November 11, it was not until November 8, three days prior to trial and almost thirty days after the date the order was entered fixing the trial date, that Searcy filed his suppression motion. With this limited time prior to trial to hear the suppression motion, the court had little, if any, сhoice but to continue the trial date. In this respect, the supreme court has held that a defendant must accept a delay which is reasonably necessary for action on his own motions; such a dеlay constitutes good cause for continuing the trial beyond the speedy trial deadline. State v. Moehlis, 250 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Iowa 1977).
In this case thé dеlay was relatively short, only eighteen days after the speedy trial deadline expired. It is clear the defendant was partially responsible for the delay. He did not demand a speedy trial. He has not been prejudiced in any respect by this delay. Under these circumstances, we think there was good cаuse.
We believe there is one other factor that may be considered when determining good cаuse. Officer Harms was listed as a state witness. He was hospitalized for an emergency appendectomy shortly before December 19 and required a month to recuperate. The State moved for a continuance on this ground. The defendant did not resist. We believe this circumstance can be cоnsidered when determining the reason for delay.
AFFIRMED.