A Hennepin County jury found appellant Alfunda Scruggs guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder arising out of the February 4, 2010, death of Michael Fonta by strangulation. The district court entered judgment of conviction on the first-degree murder charge and imposed a life sentence without the possibility of release. In this direct appeal, Scruggs argues that the court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress his statement to police on the basis that it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) refusing to instruct the jury that Scruggs’s girlfriend, H.J., was an accomplice as a matter of law; (3) failing to instruct the jury on the aiding- and-advising theory of accomplice liability; (4) admitting evidence of Scruggs’s prior assaults of H.J.; and (5) various other issues raised by Scruggs in his pro se brief. We affirm.
In the early morning of February 4, 2010, Minneapolis police responded to a 911 call reporting the discovery of a body near the rear door of a Minneapolis apartment building. The body was later identified as Michael Fonta, who was a resident of the apartment building. Initially, police interviewed several people who lived in the apartment building, including Fonta’s next-door neighbor. The police also knocked on Fonta’s door, but received no response. Several hours later, police knocked on Fonta’s door and, after again receiving no response, attempted to enter the apartment with a key. The door was secured with a chain, and Scruggs and H.J. were in the apartment. An officer asked Scruggs and H.J. to go to the police station for questioning as witnesses. Scruggs and H.J. both agreed to the officer’s request and were transported to the police station. Scruggs was.released following his interview, but H.J. was arrested on an outstanding warrant for a misdemeanor trespass charge. Scruggs paid H. J.’s bail later that night.
The police executed a search warrant on Fonta’s apartment and found Fonta’s blood between couch cushions and behind the couch. In a dumpster behind the building, police found a set of sheets covered in Fonta’s blood and a bloody sock containing Fonta’s wallet. Fonta’s DNA was found on an electrical cord located in the apartment.
An autopsy revealed that Fonta had been strangled, and had numerous injuries including several broken ribs and superficial stab wounds to his neck and chest. A single hair was found in Fonta’s left hand, but no DNA testing was performed on the hair. Fonta’s blood alcohol level was .419, and he tested positive for cocaine.
When police re-interviewed H.J. approximately one week after Fonta’s death, they tried to convince her to cooperate in the investigation. She continued to deny any knowledge about Fonta’s murder. The next day, however, H.J. called the police and admitted watching Scruggs kill Fonta and dispose of the evidence. She acknowledged holding the door open for Scruggs when he dragged Fonta’s body outside. Police later interviewed Matthew Preston, who told them he heard Scruggs say in jail that he had beaten, strangled, and stabbed a person who he thought was sleeping with his girlfriend.
Scruggs was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2010), and second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2010). Before trial, Scruggs moved to suppress the statement he made at the police station on the day of Fonta’s death because he was not given a Miranda warning. At the
The district court denied Scruggs’s motion to suppress, concluding that a reasonable person would not have believed he or she was in custody to'the degree associated with arrest. Specifically, the court concluded that the police told Scruggs before and during the interview that he would be returned to the apartment to retrieve his clothing.
Additionally, the State moved to admit evidence of prior assaults Scruggs committed against H.J., and threats Scruggs made to H.J. immediately after the murder and in the days that followed. The State argued that the evidence of the threats against H.J. was relevant to explain her delay in telling the police what had happened and that the prior assaults were relevant to proving that H.J. believed Scruggs’s threats. The district court allowed the State to introduce limited evidence of the threats consisting of responses to two leading questions that Scruggs “had assaulted her, and injured her in the past” and that “he was convicted of such an incident.”
At trial, the State presented testimony from police and residents of the apartment building, Scruggs’s statement to the police, and forensic evidence. H.J. testified that she, Scruggs, and Fonta were drinking and smoking crack together on the night of February 3, 2010. When Fonta insulted H.J. several times, Scruggs responded by punching Fonta repeatedly, kicking and kneeing Fonta in the ribs, and banging Fonta’s head into the floor. H.J. told Fon-ta to stop antagonizing Scruggs, but Fonta did not stop, and Scruggs attacked Fonta again. When Scruggs told H.J. that they would have to keep Fonta in the apartment, she objected, and then Scruggs strangled Fonta. H.J. said she did not intervene because she had cracked ribs. After Scruggs and H.J. noticed Fonta was still moving, Scruggs stabbed Fonta in the neck and the chest. Scruggs stated to H.J.: “[w]hen I do things, I do things by myself. I don’t leave no witnesses”; and the statement caused H.J. to be “scared.” Thereafter, Scruggs wrapped Fonta’s body in sheets and H.J. held the door open while Scruggs dragged the body outside. H.J. testified that Scruggs told her to tell the police that they last saw Fonta the previous day.
M.P., who is a convicted felon, testified that Scruggs talked to him about the murder while the two were incarcerated at the Hennepin County jail. Scruggs told M.P. that he discovered another man had been sleeping with his girlfriend, and when he confronted the man things got out of hand. Scruggs admitted to strangling the man and stabbing him in the chest and the neck, and cutting off one of his hair braids. Scruggs told M.P. he wrapped the body in sheets or towels and dragged it outside.
Scruggs testified that .Fonta was his best friend and that he did not kill Fonta. He testified that, on the night in question, he was at the apartment with H.J. and Fonta was not with them. Scruggs denied telling M.P. anything about the case.
Following the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The district court imposed a life sentence without
I.
Scruggs argues that his statement to police was obtained in violation of his Miranda, rights, that the district court erred in admitting it, and that the error was prejudicial. Specifically, Scruggs argues he was in custody at the time of his interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights and therefore the resulting statement should have been excluded.
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are admissible only if the suspect was informed of his Miranda rights. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
The United States Supreme Court describes custody as a term of art to specify circumstances that present a serious danger of coercion. Howes v. Fields, - U.S. -,
(1) the police interviewing the suspect[ ] at the police station; (2) the suspect being told he or she is a prime suspect in a crime; (3) the police restraining the suspect[’]s freedom of movement; (4) the suspect making a significantly incriminating statement; (5) the presence of multiple officers; and (6) a gun pointing at the suspect.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, factors that indicate a suspect is not in custody include:
(1) questioning the suspect in his or her home; (2) law enforcement expressly informing the suspect that he or she is not under arrest; (3) the suspect’s leaving the police station without hindrance; (4) the brevity of questioning; (5) the suspect’s ability to leave at any time; (6) the existence of a nonthreatening environment; and (7) the suspect’s ability to make phone calls.
Id. (citation omitted).
We review whether a defendant was in custody by applying the law to the facts found by the district court. State v. Wiemasz,
Scruggs does not challenge the district court’s factual findings. The district court
During Scruggs’s interview, one of the officers advised him that “[a] couple of things that [H.J.] tells us kinda don’t match up with what you’re telling us” and informed him of the aiding-and-abetting statute and its associated penalties. He was told that it was his best chance to tell his version of the events before charges were brought against him. One of the officers gave Scruggs his card and telephone number so that the officer could arrange to transport Scruggs to Fonta’s apartment to retrieve his clothing.
All the surrounding circumstances support the conclusion that Scruggs was not in custody when he gave his statement to the police. Specifically, Scruggs voluntarily agreed to go to the police station for an interview. The police initially told Scruggs he was a witness; the police never referred to him as a suspect. The police also stated that they would return Scruggs to Fonta’s apartment after the interview to collect his clothes. Scruggs had Fonta’s cell phone during the interview, including while he waited in the interview room. The police did not hinder his ability to use the cell phone while he waited for the interview. Moreover, although the interview-room door was locked for security reasons, the police promptly came to the door when Scruggs knocked on the door to ask a question. Scruggs did not, at any time, express a desire not to speak to the police or to terminate the interview. And Scruggs was allowed to leave the police station unhindered at the conclusion of the interview. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that the locked door indicated that he was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest. See Vue,
Scruggs focuses on several facts to support his argument that he was in custody during the interview, three of which are most significant to this case. First, Scruggs argues that the involvement of multiple officers weighs in favor of custody. See State v. Rosse,
Second, Scruggs argues that the interviewing officer’s implicit accusation that Scruggs was lying and his lecture on aiding-and-abetting liability would lead a reasonable person to believe he was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest. This argument lacks merit. The manner in which the police questioned Scruggs did not convert a noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. See Wiemasz,
Finally, Scruggs argues his admission during the interview that he was present at Fonta’s apartment on the night in question was “highly incriminating” and converted the interview into a custodial interrogation. But Scruggs’s statement is only “highly incriminating” in hindsight. At the time of the interview, the police did not know that the apartment was the scene of Fonta’s murder, and therefore the statement is not a “significantly incriminating statement” of the type that would weigh in favor of a finding of custody for the purposes of Miranda. See Vue,
We hold that under all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed he was in custody to the degree associated with formal arrest, and therefore Scruggs was not entitled to a Miranda warning. As a result, the district court properly admitted Scruggs’s statement into evidence.
II.
Scruggs next argues that the accomplice testimony jury instruction given by the district court was erroneous in two ways. Specifically, Scruggs argues that the court failed to instruct the jury that H.J. was an accomplice as a matter of law. Also, Scruggs argues that the instruction informing the jury that accomplice testimony needed to be corroborated failed to specifically instruct the jury on the aiding-and-advising theory of accomplice liability.
A.
First, Scruggs argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that H.J. was an accomplice as a matter of law because she aided-and-advised him in his commission of the crime. The district
Minnesota Statutes § 634.04 (2010) provides that “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense.” Generally, the test for whether a particular witness is an accomplice is “whether the witness could have been ‘indicted and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.’ ” State v. Barrientos-Quintana,
When imposing liability for aiding and advising, we distinguish between playing “a knowing role in the crime” and “mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence.” Palubicki,
Thus, we must determine whether the facts are undisputed and compel the single inference that H.J. played a knowing role in the crime. Scruggs argues that H.J.’s testimony established that she “was present during the crime, knew about it, and did nothing to prevent it,” and was therefore an accomplice as a matter of law. The State concedes that the evidence permits an inference that H.J. was an accomplice but contends that it also permits an inference that she was not an accomplice, and therefore her status as an accomplice was a question of fact properly left to the jury-
We conclude that H.J.’s presence during the entire incident is subject to differing interpretations, and therefore whether she is an accomplice is a fact question for the jury. For example, H.J.’s decision to draw Scruggs’s attention to Fonta’s insults by nudging him does not, as a matter of law, constitute aiding, advis
Scruggs relies on State v. Bar-rientos-Quintana,
B.
Second, Scruggs argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a witness could have been charged with the same crime as Scruggs if the witness aided or advised Scruggs’s commission of the offense. Thus, Scruggs argues that the instruction given on the need to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice only did “half the job” because the jury was not told how to determine if a witness could have been charged with Fon-ta’s murder. Scruggs did not object to the instruction on these grounds at trial and raises this issue for the first time on appeal.
“A district court errs when its instructions confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law,” but if the instructions read as a whole “correctly state[ ] the law in language that can be understood by the jury, there is no reversible error.” State v. Anderson,
Here, the district court gave the jury an instruction on the need to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony consistent with CRIMJIG 3.18. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 3.18 (5th ed. 2006). Scruggs contends that not only should the jury have been read CRIMJIG 3.18, but that the district court should also have given an instruction on aiding-and-advising liability, and liability for other crimes committed in pursuance of the intended crime that are reasonably foreseeable, as set forth in Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subds. 1-2.
We recognize that in instructing the jury on the need to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, it may be helpful to give the jury an instruction explaining aiding-and-advising liability, and liability for other crimes under the statute. But we have never held that it is error not to do so. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell,
We conclude that it is not necessary to resolve whether it was error not to instruct the jury on aiding-and-advising liability and liability for other crimes, as defined in Minn.Stat. § 609.05, and we decline to do so. Instead, assuming without deciding that the district court erred by failing to so instruct the jury, we conclude that such error was not plain. The court’s decision to give only the CRIM-JIG 3.18 instruction does not contravene “a rule, case law, or a standard of conduct,” and does not disregard “well-established” or “longstanding legal principles.” See Brown,
III.
Scruggs also argues that his conviction must be reversed because the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior convictions for assaulting H.J. A district court has broad discretion in evi-dentiary matters. See State v. Bolstad,
Spreigl evidence “is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Spreigl evidence, however, may be admitted to explain a witness’s prior inconsistent statements. See State v. Harris,
Moreover, Rule 404(b) sets forth the requirements for admissibility of Spreigl evidence. It provides that such evidence shall not be admitted unless:
1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the evidence ...; 2) the prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be offered to prove; 3) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence; 4) the evidence is relevant to the prosecutor’s case; and 5) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Loving,
It is undisputed that the State satisfied the first three factors — notice of its intent to use the evidence was given before trial; the prosecutor stated the evidence was offered to show H.J.’s fear of Scruggs and to explain why she made inconsistent statements to police; and the six prior convictions of assault were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, we examine the fourth and fifth factors.
The district court concluded that evidence of Scruggs’s prior assaults was admissible to explain why H.J. feared
Q Has the defendant assaulted and hurt you in the past?
A Yes.
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Q For some of that conduct has he been convicted?
A Yes.
The court then gave a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of H.J.’s testimony about Scruggs’s prior assault convictions.
Scruggs argues that the evidence is not relevant to explain H.J.’s inconsistent statements and therefore the fourth prong is not satisfied. This argument lacks merit. At trial, the State argued that H.J.’s initial false statements to the police were motivated by her fear of Scruggs. Conversely, defense counsel challenged the legitimacy of that fear through cross-examination of H.J. Scruggs’s prior assaults of H.J. unquestionably make the existence of H.J.’s fear — a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the case — more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 401. Thus, her testimony regarding Scruggs’s prior assaults is clearly relevant.
The fifth factor examines whether “the probative value of the evidence is ... outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Prior bad act evidence can be unfairly prejudicial if it is used by the jury for an improper purpose, such as proof of a defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offense or general propensity for violence. State v. Ness,
Scruggs argues that the evidence has little probative value because the legitimacy and existence of H.J.’s fear of him needed no confirmation. Specifically, Scruggs argues that because H.J. watched him brutally murder Fonta and Scruggs subsequently threatened H.J. after he bailed her out of jail, her fear of him “is utterly noncontroversial.” This argument is undercut by defense counsel’s attempt, on cross-examination, to attack the reasonableness of H.J.’s explanation that she told lies to the police because she was afraid of Scruggs. Although the violent nature of Fonta’s murder and Scruggs’s explicit threats may have diminished the probative value of H.J.’s testimony regarding his prior assaults, the testimony was relevant to establish that she had reason to fear that he would carry out those threats. Additionally, because Scruggs vigorously attacked H.J.’s account of the murder and his subsequent threats against her, the State had a clear need for objective evidence of Scruggs’s prior assaults of H.J. to strengthen H.J.’s credibility in light of her inconsistent statements to police.
Next, Scruggs argues that the probative value of H.J.’s testimony about the assaults was diminished because it was given on direct examination and, at that point, did not respond to any attacks by the defense on H.J.’s credibility. The crux of Scruggs’s argument is that the evidence offered is rehabilitative evidence that should only be introduced on re-direct examination, after the witness’s credibility has been attacked by the defense. We
Finally, Scruggs argues that the risk of prejudice was heightened in this case because the district court’s limiting instruction did not cure the potential that the jury would misuse the evidence. Following H.J.’s testimony, the court instructed the jury:
Members of the jury, so you’re clear, Mr. Scruggs is not charged with any offense against [H.J.]. He can’t be convicted of that, nor is he charged with any offense involving crack cocaine. There was evidence of that a little while ago here. This evidence is received not to convict him of any offense against [H.J.], or of any drug offense. It’s just received for whatever use it might be to you in evaluating the other evidence.
During final instructions, the court gave a slightly different instruction, which tracked CRIMJIG 3.16, a general cautionary instruction on other-crimes evidence. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 3.16 (5th ed. 2006). Previously, we have explained that Spreigl evidence does not always fit neatly into categories, and we have not mandated a specific limited purpose instruction for Spreigl evidence. See Ture v. State,
The cautionary instructions viewed as a whole reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. We do not believe there was any heightened risk of prejudice from the Spreigl evidence admitted in this case. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting H.J. to testify on direct examination that Scruggs had previously assaulted her and had been convicted for at least one such assault. The evidence was relevant to explain why she feared Scruggs, and to explain the discrepancies between her statements.
IV.
Scruggs also raises a number of arguments in his pro se brief. Scruggs alleges that H.J.’s testimony was false, and that the State knowingly offered this testimony in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Although Scruggs asserts that the State knowingly presented perjured testimony, he does not identify any evidence — either in the record or outside of it — to support this allegation. Instead, he argues that H.J. is not a credible witness and that her testimony was false and “full of improbabilities and inconsistencies.” H.J. testified and was vigorously cross-examined at trial. It was properly left to the jury to assess her credibility and determine the weight it believed her testimony deserved. See State v. Mems,
Additionally, Scruggs argues that “counsel did not provide [him] with reasonably competent advice”; that the district court erred by admitting “confessions” into evidence, improperly limiting access to H.J.’s medical records, improperly allowing the State to make “additional closing arguments,” and making several errors in the sentencing; and that the State committed prejudicial misconduct by telling the jury
Affirmed.
Notes
. Parker did not involve the issue of whether an accomplice corroboration instruction should have been given and instead involved a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a jury's determination that the defendant aided and advised another in a robbery. 282 Minn, at 355-56,
. Scruggs suggests a jury instruction that adds to the existing CRIMJIG 3.18 language from CRIMJIG 4.01, "Liability for Crimes of Another." See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 4.01 (5th ed. 2006).