733 N.E.2d 653 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1999
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *255 OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY This is an appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which, after denying his motion to suppress, found appellant, Scott M., guilty of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. For the reasons stated herein, this court reverses the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant sets forth the following four assignments of error:
"1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT'S APARTMENT.
"2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE ALCO SENSOR III TEST, ADMINISTERED BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS AND THE TESTIMONY OF ANY WITNESSES IN THE APARTMENT, AFTER THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY OF MR. [M.'S] APARTMENT.
"3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD IN DETERMINING WHETHER EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED.
"4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THAT IT MISTAKENLY APPLIED A `GOOD FAITH' EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A HOME."
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In August 1998, appellant was charged with two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The charges stemmed from his arrest on August 5, 1998 at a party in his apartment. Police officers, responding to a complaint of loud music coming from his apartment, arrested appellant when they observed individuals they thought to be juveniles with alcohol. These individuals later tested positive for consumption of alcohol.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, one officer testified that an unidentified person opened the outside locked door to the apartment building and let the officers enter. He testified further that the door to appellant's apartment was "ajar" when he and the other officer approached. He knocked on the door and an unidentified female came to the doorway. The officer testified that she opened the door wide enough for the officers to step inside the doorway of the apartment. When the unidentified female responded that she did not live at the residence, the officer asked that she find the resident of the apartment. This officer testified that while he was waiting inside the doorway, he saw three subjects who appeared to be juveniles carrying beer cans. When appellant met the officers at the doorway, the officer questioned appellant about the loud music and ages of the suspected juveniles. When appellant asked the officers to step outside the apartment, the officers refused. This officer testified that appellant requested that he be arrested and the others left alone. Ultimately appellant was arrested. Portable breath analysis tests were administered to the suspected juveniles. *257
Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry into his apartment, including the results of the portable breath analysis tests. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, stating that "there were exigent circumstances existing at the time that-to allow the police to gain entry without a warrant and those circumstances being the commission of a crime, that the officers were there in good faith." Appellant was convicted and sentenced. This appeal was timely filed.1
In all four assignments of error, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of the warrantless entry of his apartment. This court finds merit in these assignments of error.
Appellate review of a denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Smith (1997),
Freedom from indiscriminate searches and seizures is protected by the
Warrantless searches of residences are considered "* * *per se unreasonable under the
The four exceptions to the warrant requirement justifying a warrantless search of a home are: (1) an emergency situation, (2) search incident to an arrest, (3) "hot pursuit" and (4) easily destroyed or removed evidence. State v. Cheers (1992),
The issue of what constitutes exigent circumstances was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Welsh v. Wisconsin
(1984),
"* * * Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. (Citation omitted.) When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, (Footnote omitted) that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate."
The Welsh case has generally been construed to mean that the exigent circumstances exception applies only to felony offenses, not misdemeanors. See State v. Davis (Aug. 6, 1999), Wood App. No. WD-98-051, No. WD-98-055, No. WD-98-060, No. WD-98-062, unreported; Cleveland v. Shields (1995),
In State v. Bowe (1988),
It is well-settled that a warrantless search or seizure does not violate the
There was no testimony that the officers were invited inside the apartment. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, one officer testified that he knocked on the door and an unidentified female came to the doorway; that she opened the door "wide enough for the officers to step inside the doorway" of the apartment; and that the unidentified female told the officers that she did not live at the residence. Once the officers knew that she did not live at the apartment and, therefore, that she did not possess common authority over the apartment, the officers knew that she could not give consent to their entry. Illinois v.Rodriguez (1990),
Furthermore, once appellant came to the doorway, he asked that the officers step outside of his apartment. The
Having found neither exigent circumstances nor consent, this court must address the final reason given by the trial court for denying appellant's motion to suppress: "good faith." Within limited parameters, courts have allowed exceptions to the exclusionary rule based on the "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement. The "good faith" exception was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.Leon (1984),
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force." United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. at 919 . (Citation omitted.)
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted this exception in State v. Wilmoth
(1986),
In the case sub judice, no warrant was issued and, thus, the "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement is inapplicable. Therefore, this court concludes that the warrantless entry was unreasonable and in violation of the
The warrantless seizure by a law enforcement officer of an object in plain view does not violate the
Having concluded that the officers' entry into appellant's apartment, the place from which the juveniles were plainly viewed, violated his
Accordingly, appellant's assignments of error are found well-taken.
On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is ordered that appellee pay the court costs of this appeal.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Peter M. Handwork, P.J. James R. Sherck, J. Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
CONCUR.
"(1) the offense involved is a crime of violence;
"(2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
"(3) a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved;
"(4) a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered;
"(5) the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and
"(6) the entry, though not consented, is made peaceably."
52 Ohio App.3d at 114 .
In contrast, in the case sub judice, there was no testimony that the police were invited inside. The testimony was that the officers entered, without invitation, when the door was opened.
*262"1. The exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress evidence obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. (United States v. Leon [1984],
468 U.S. 897 ,82 L.Ed.2d 677 , followed.)"2. Where the officer's conduct in the course of a search and seizure is objectively reasonable and executed in good faith, excluding the evidence because the search warrant is found to be constitutionally invalid will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way."