State v. ScottState v. Scott
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Goolsby
Thе basic issue presented by Clifton David Scott in this appeal from his conviction for cocaine trafficking аnd unlawfully transporting drugs in a motor vehicle is whether the trial court erred in allowing in evidence a box of glassine or plastic
I.
Scott argues the affidavit, which supported the search warrant and which, the magistrate considerеd in issuing the warrant to search Scott’s home for cocaine and related paraphernalia, “fails to articulate sufficient probable cause for the search.” He complains “the evidentiary link .. . was too weak.”
The affidavit, which the affiant based on his personal knowledge, reads:
Affiant states that on 9-30-88, investigators of Greenville County Special Operations Units were in a position of surveillance on the above described residence. Clifton David Scott whom investigators were holding an arrest warrant for distribution of cocaine was observed leaving the residence, subsequent stop of the suspect revealed him to be in possession of in excess of 20 grams of white powder substance which field tested positive as cocaine. Investigators hаd visual contact with the Scott subject from the time he left his residence until the time of the stop.
Based on the tоtality of the circumstances outlined in the affidavit and considering the nature of the evidence sought and the tyрe of offense involved, the magistrate, we think, made a practical, common sense decision that a fair probability existed that additional evidence regarding Scott’s drug activities could be found in Scott’s home.
See State v.
Clifton,_S.C.
II.
Scott also argues the plastic bags and marijuana seeds were irrelevant to the charge of trafficking in cocaine.
Officers charged Scott with possession of twenty grams of cocaine after they аrrested him on an outstanding warrant for distribution of cocaine, placed him in the backseat of a police car, saw him moving around in the backseat, removed him from the car, and found in his hand a ball of aluminum foil containing a white powder, later identified as cocaine.
At trial, evidence given by two of the State’s witnesses indicated plastic bags of the kind found when officers searched Scott’s home are used in the sale of cocaine. Marijuana, including marijuana seeds, is, of course, a controlled substance.
Scott denied throughout the trial he had any cocaine at all, either for sale or for other purposes.’
Before a person may be convicted of the offense of trafficking, the State must prove the person knowingly possessed ten or more grams of cocaine. State v. Kimbrell, 294 S.C. 51, 362 S.E. (2d) 630 (1987). A person’s “ ‘mere presence, where the drugs are present, wоuld not be sufficient to convict, without more.’ ” Id. at 56, 362 S.E. (2d) at 632. Here, the plastic bags with their corners cut off and the marijuana sеeds tended to prove Scott was more than “mere[ly] present” where cocaine was found. The evidence tended to prove that Scott knowingly possessed the cocaine that the officers.testified they found in his hand. .
The trial court, therefore, properly allowed the “corner baggies” and marijuana seeds in evidence. Ample authority supports its decision.
See State v. Hammond,
270 S.C. 347, 242 S.E. (2d) 411 (1978) (the possession of marijuana is logically relevant to thе defendant’s possession of an intent to distribute cocaine);
State v. Kimbrell,
294 S.C. 51, 362 S.E. (2d) 630 (1987) (because a jury could infer that a defendant was
Affirmed.
Sanders, C.J., and Gardner, J., concur.
Notes
Scott does not argue anywhere in his brief, as he purports to do under Question No. 1, his second exception. This exception, which challenges the admission of the marijuana seeds and bags on the ground that their prejudicial nature outweighed their probative value, is deemed abandoned. Sartor v. Ward, 262 S.C. 398, 205 S.E. (2d) 1 (1974); McGann v. Mungo, 287 S.C. 561, 340 S.E. (2d) 154 (Ct. App. 1986).