The defendant, William B. Schroff III, was found guilty, after a trial before a jury, of the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all the statements that he had made to law enforcement officials between May 30, 1983, and July 11, 1984. These statements, nine in number, were made on September 12, 1983, September 21, 1983, September 26,
On appeal, the sole issue raised by the defendant is that the trial court erred in not suppressing as involuntary that portion of his June 29, 1984 statement given to state police detectives Michael Graham and James Cavanaugh when they showed him photos of the grave site of the murder victim, Laura Hill. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling denying suppression. In resolving this appeal, we find it necessary to go into the circumstances of all the statements given because of the essential position of the parties on this question.
On July 10, 1982, Laura Hill disappeared from the Veterans’ Administration Hospital in West Haven, which she had entered in June, 1982. On June 27, 1984, her body was discovered by the state police buried under a pile of rocks in a wooded area off Mount Parnassus Road in East Haddam.
On May 30,1983, the defendant, while incarcerated at the New Haven Correctional Center on an unrelated charge, approached corrections officer Clifford Ewalt. He told Ewalt that he had been watching television every night and that he “was waiting for them to find the other body,” “that it was about time that they find the other body.” The defendant then proceeded to give Ewalt directions on where to find a body. While the defendant was giving these directions, Ewalt was drawing a map. He told Ewalt that he had buried a body
In June, 1983, the defendant, who was still being held in a pretrial status, had been transferred to the Hartford Correctional Center. On June 27, 1983, he asked to talk to deputy warden Frank Crose at that facility to discuss a transfer back to the New Haven Correctional Center. Dissatisfied with an apparent offer by the state of “fifty years” concerning the trial that was imminent,
On July 5, 1983, the defendant, while in the New Haven courthouse to answer other pending charges, escaped from the courthouse but was recaptured later that day by a New Haven police officer. When that officer apprehended him, the defendant said: “[I]f you give me five minutes head start I’ll take you where one of the bodies is buried.”
On September 9,1983, the defendant was sentenced in New Haven on unrelated charges. State police officers Paul Cusson and William Guida, Jr., were present in the court at the time of sentencing. Both officers went to the holding area to see the defendant who had asked to speak to them. After he asked the officers for their names and where he could contact them, they gave him their business cards. He told them that he was going to give them information on something. Nothing further took place at that time.
On September 12, 1983,
Guida and Cusson returned to Somers on September 26, 1983, to talk to the defendant. He signed another consent form to permit them to speak with him, as well as a written waiver of his Miranda rights. Unlike the prior interviews, however, this interview was tape recorded; the defendant was not “specifically” made aware that the conversation was being taped. The defendant was upset with the officers because they had not located the body from the information he had already given them. He indicated rather that he felt that they had located it and were not telling him but were more or less “stringing him along” to get more information from him. The officers told him that they had to obtain more information from him to give to their superiors, “something concrete,” to show what he was telling the officers “was in good faith.” The defendant indicated that if he were taken out, he did not want handcuffs or shackles and that he would like to have the “opportunity to escape or take off.” More
On December 6, 1983, Guida and Cusson again went to Somers to see the defendant; the latter again signed a consent form to be interviewed by them. Between September 26 and December 6, 1983, Guida testified, “we further attempted” to see if there was any way to get the defendant out even though it was beyond the deadline set by him. The December 6, 1983 interview was “preserved” by a cassette tape; the defendant, however, was not made aware that the conversation was being taped. Among other things, he was told that the police needed “a little bit more information to try to find these items [relating to the Hill homicide] or something new . . . something a little more concrete.” When mention was made of Laura Hill, the defendant said that he had told them “as much as he [could]” and that “[they were] going to have to wait again, until the summer time before he would be willing to go out and show [them] . . . . ” There was further discussion about taking the defendant out at a later time. There was an unrelated case concerning which the police wanted information from him and in which he was a possible suspect. It was again indicated to the defendant that if he were going to get out that the two officers could not do it themselves, that they would need the help of others and so he should give them information to assist in this. According to Guida, they “really concentrated a lot on trying to find [Laura Hill’s] location and the location of, at least, her clothing.” Cusson
On March 2, 1984, Graham received a message from Somers that the defendant wanted to have them contact him by March 9, 1984, or “all bets [were] off.” At that time, the defendant also requested that the police bring him his address book and watch, which had been seized earlier by the police, by March 9. Guida and Graham later visited the defendant at Somers and returned his watch and address book to him. They wanted the defendant, who had signed a consent to this interview, to continue to cooperate with them. There was discussion about an unrelated matter that also involved the discovery of the body of a female in early 1982. The defendant brought up the name of Laura Hill saying that he could take them to the location of her body and clothing. He also indicated that he wanted his van released from police custody. The van had been seized in connection with the investigation of another case.
On March 19, 1984, the defendant sent a message to the police concerning the release of his van. On March 21, 1984, Graham and Guida went to Somers to see the defendant, who signed the necessary forms in order to talk to the officers. The discussion included the unrelated crime referred to earlier, as well as the disappearance of Laura Hill. The defendant said that
On May 1, 1984, Graham went to Somers and saw the defendant, who again signed the necessary form to see the police. Graham had with him a court order that the defendant’s van be returned to him. The defendant signed it, acknowledging receipt of the van, and thereby he was permitted to dispose of that vehicle in any manner he wished. As to Laura Hill,
On June 27,1984, the state police located the skeletal remains of Laura Hill buried beneath a pile of rocks adjacent to a stone wall in a wooded area off Mount Parnassus Road in East Haddam. At that time, the police took some Polaroid photographs of the burial site; a part of the skeletal remains was visible in the photographs.
On June 29, 1984, Graham and Cavanaugh visited the defendant at Somers. Prior to the interview on that
On July 24, 1986, in a comprehensive oral opinion,
The trial court denied suppression of the defendant’s statements to the state police on September 9, 1983, and September 12, 1983. Essentially, the court found that these statements had been voluntary and that his Miranda rights had been validly waived. In doing so, it found that the police had made him no improper promises or inducements and that his will had not been overborne. As to the statement of September 21, 1983, the court found that the defendant had first articulated a proposed deal with the state police when he had agreed to lead them to the victim’s body and other evidence if he was taken out of prison for that purpose. It also found that there had been no “explicit bargaining” by the police with the defendant.
In refusing to suppress that portion of the June 29, 1984 statement, the trial court said that while showing the picture to the defendant was interrogation, the circumstances, which the trial court analyzed, demonstrated that he “knowingly, understanding^, voluntarily] and effectively waived his Miranda rights and [that] the state [had] met its heavy burden in showing that.” It also found that “the promises or attempts to strike a deal which necessitated the suppression of the statements after 9/21[/83] do not serve as a reason to suppress the Defendant’s reaction to the display of a picture.” In doing so, it indicated that in order “to find that a promise by the police requires an incriminatory statement to be held involuntary, it must be shown that the promise induced the statement.” The “recurrent offers to take the Defendant out on the writ,” could not be held, the trial court determined, to have induced the incriminatory responses that he allegedly made
In claiming that the trial court erred, the defendant argues that the nonsuppressed portion of the June 29, 1984 statement was involuntary and contends that there was no temporal attenuation between the police conduct from September 26, 1988, onward and the June 29, 1984 statement. He stresses that suppression was granted of all the statements between those dates and, indeed, also as to the balance of his June 29, 1984 statement and his later statement of July 11, 1984, because they were rendered involuntary by the conduct of the police from September 26, 1983, on. In addition, he argues that there was no “ ‘break in the stream of events . . .’ ” referring to Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 350-51, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 20 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1968), between all of the statements found involuntary and that portion of his June 29, 1984 statement found to be voluntary, that could support the challenged ruling. The state, on the other hand, argues that there was a meaningful temporal attenuation between the statement found voluntary and those that were not. It also claims that the record demonstrates significant intervening circumstances between the June 29, 1984
The use of an involuntary confession in a criminal trial is a denial of due process of law. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961); State v. Shifflett, 199 Conn. 718, 727, 508 A.2d 748 (1986). It is the burden of the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); State v. Chung, 202 Conn. 39, 48, 519 A.2d 1175 (1987); State v. Stankowski, 184 Conn. 121, 131, 439 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1052, 102 S. Ct. 596, 70 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1981). In State v. Shifflett, supra, 727-28, we pointed out: “ ‘We have stated that “ ‘ “the test of voluntariness is whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of ‘law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . .’ Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 [81 S. Ct. 735, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760] (1961).”’” State v. Staples, [175 Conn. 398, 408, 399 A.2d 1269 (1978)];
This determination of voluntariness and admissibility, in the first instance, is a question of fact for the trial court to resolve in the exercise of a legal discretion in accordance with constitutional standards of due process. State v. Derrico, supra, 162-63. This, of course, includes decisions on questions of credibility presented to the trial court. State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 247, 258, 496 A.2d 513 (1985). “Though the question is ultimately factual, our usual deference to factfinding by the trial court is qualified on the question of voluntariness by the necessity for an independent and scrupulous examination of the entire record to ascertain whether the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Smith, 200 Conn. 465, 478, 512 A.2d 189 (1986); State v. Chung, supra, 54.
Even under “the totality of circumstances test,” a confession may not be “obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. . . .” Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S. Ct. 202, 50 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1976), quot
Our analysis of the validity of the trial court’s finding of voluntariness begins with the concession of the defendant in his brief that “the remains of the victim [Laura Hill] were located by the police as a result of information independent of [his] statements of September 21, 1983—July 11, 1984.” We realize that in doing so, he also argues that this is not dispositive because, while conceding the source of the information leading to the discovery is important, he nevertheless maintains that the main concern is that he made a statement expressing recognition when shown photos of the grave site. The application to the challenged ruling of the three factors elucidated in such cases as Brown v. Illinois, supra, and State v. Shifflett, supra, in the totality of the circumstances in this case is thus helpful in our inquiry of the defendant’s challenge of the trial court’s ruling.
First, there was a significant temporal attenuation between the defendant’s other suppressed statements and that of June 29, 1984. There had not been any meeting or interview between the state police and the defendant for almost two months prior to June 29, 1984. It is true that the police themselves continued to try to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in order to get the defendant out of prison to help them to locate Laura Hill’s body and clothing as well as to lead them to the clothing of another homicide victim. The police, however, after the meeting of May 1, 1984, and prior to June 29, 1984, located the Hill grave site based on information wholly independent of any statements illegally obtained from the defendant. The passage of almost two months in this case is far longer than the approximate twenty-four hour period in Shifflett and the
The component of the “flagrancy” of police misconduct which finds sufficient support both in the evidence and on relevant legal principles for the trial court’s suppression of all of the other statements, was properly
The ultimate question of whether a defendant’s will has been overborne, thus resulting in an involuntary statement in a particular case, involves, as noted, an assessment of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused
The trial court’s ruling was not in error. It was supported by substantial evidence and grounded on principles of the applicable law.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-54a provides in pertinent part: “(a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception . . . .”
Crose also testified that the defendant indicated to him that “the state’s case was based primarily on the statement or on one witness and that if he did not appear at trial to testify against him, then the state would not have much of a case. He indicated that he was doing what he could to make sure that didn’t happen.”
Two other New Haven police officers, Arthur Granucci and Robert DeNuzzo, who had contact with the defendant after his apprehension on July 5, 1983, testified that the defendant told them that in exchange for getting a five minute start he would tell them about a murder and where the body was buried. One officer said that the defendant told them he had buried the body in East Haddam by “a wall area.”
This was the first of the meetings between the state police and the defendant.
At that time, the defendant also indicated that he would show Graham the location of the clothing from the body of a female found in Lyme in early 1982.
On direct examination of Graham, he was asked if, at the time the Polaroid photographs were taken by the police, “anything [had] been moved or rearranged in the area where the skeletal remains were found.” He answered, “Yes,” and when asked, “What?” Graham answered: “Several rocks had been removed by Detective David Bates who had made the initial discovery of the skeletal remains and the slight portion of the skull was visible within the pile of rocks.”
At the time Graham showed the photographs to the defendant, who examined them, Graham testified that the following transpired:
“Q. And you said you showed these Polaroid photographs to Mr. Sehroff?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. Did he look at them.
“A. Yes, he did.
“Q. And did he say anything upon looking at them?
“A. Yes, he did.
“Q. What did he say?
“A. He asked me what these were supposed to be.
“Q. And did you respond to that?
“A. I indicated to him that he ought to know what they were because he provided directions concerning the location of where the remains of Laura Hill [were] found and this in fact [was] where the remains had been found.
“Q. And did he respond to that explanation?
“A. Yes. His statement to me at that time I recall as being, well, someone has moved the rocks, or the rocks had been moved.
“Q. Were there any further discussions at that time about those photographs or the rocks or the remains?
“A. I don’t believe so.”
The trial court’s oral opinion comprises thirty-five pages in the trial transcript. The suppression hearing extended over a period of five days.
At this time, the trial court said: “In making this ruling the Court is assuming the body was located solely as a result of the direction given Ewalt at the New Haven Jail, or in the 9/12 or 9/21 conversations.”
On this branch of its claim, the state’s brief recognizes that it is challenging the trial court’s finding that all the defendant’s statements made between September 26, 1983, and May 1, 1984, were involuntary. It also acknowledges that it filed an untimely motion to file a statement under Practice Book § 4013 to “present this alternative theory” to this court. That motion was granted. Because we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on the June 29, 1984 statement, we need not discuss the state’s alternative theory.
In pressing his claim of error, the defendant contends that not only did his June 29, 1984 statement follow a series of statements found to have been obtained illegally, but also that the trial court suppressed the balance of his statement of June 29, 1984, as well as his later one of July 11, 1984. As to these last two statements, we note that the trial court did not undertake any specific analysis as to what statements were obtained on those two occasions as it had done at length as to the pre-June 29, 1984 statements it ordered suppressed. It is true that it did point out, as it did regarding the earlier suppressed statements, that on June 29, 1984, the police did not abandon the “tantalizing prospect” of obtaining a writ to take the defendant out to get further information. Even the defendant’s brief as to the June 29, 1984 interview can refer only to his “offer” to help the police locate Laura Hill’s clothing and help with information on other cases once he knew that the police had discovered Hill’s remains.
As to the July 11, 1984 statements ordered suppressed, the trial court did not refer to any specific incriminatory statement the defendant made. Again, the defendant’s brief refers only to a discussion of certain discrepancies claimed by the defendant as to the inventory of items in Ms van. It would appear, however, that from September 26, 1983, through July 11, 1984, the police had endeavored to keep the defendant cooperative to obtain information not only on the Laura Hill case but on other matters.
In any event, we cannot attach the significance claimed by the defendant to the suppression of the balance of his June 29, 1984 statement and that of July 11, 1984, both later in time, to his statement given at the very start of the interview of June 29, 1984.
There is no indication that the defendant ever showed the police where Laura Hill’s clothing was to be found or that the police ever, in fact, found her clothing.
Although the trial court did not explicitly refer to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), it appears that it implicitly determined that the “taint” of the suppressed statements had no unconstitutional nexus with the June 29, 1984 statement which it found voluntary and admissible.
In ordering suppression of the defendant’s post-September 21, 1983 statements for the reasons given, the trial court specifically observed that “this is not . . . Oregon v. Elstad, [470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985),] a situation where seriatim confessions may be held admissible after proper Miranda warnings where a prior confession was invalidated because of a technical failure to comply with the Miranda rules. Here the Court finds the statements after 9/21 were involuntary and the improper inducements . . . continue[d] from 9/26 onward . . . . ”
We agree with the trial court that this was not an Oregon v. Elstad situation. In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court said: “We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 318. In reaching that determination, it also said: “Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id., 309.
Although there is no such finding,.the court file indicates that the defendant was born in 1954.