26 Kan. 288 | Kan. | 1881
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The appellant in this case was convicted in the district court of Montgomery county of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentenced to hard labor in the state penitentiary for a term of twenty years, and from this conviction and sentence has brought this appeal to this court. As a preliminary question the state challenges the record presented by defendant, and this challenge must be sustained.
It appears that the defendant was tried at the September term, 1880; that a bill of exceptions was signed on the 23d day of September, 1880, but never presented to or filed with the clerk till July 5th, 1881. This was more than nine months after it was allowed and signed, and after two regular terms of the district court of that county had intervened. Such a bill of exceptions never became a part of the record, and presents nothing calling for our examination. This is a matter settled by one of the early decisions of this court, (Brown v. Rhodes, 1 Kas. 364,) a decision in harmony with the rulings elsewhere, and one repeatedly followed by this court in many cases thereafter. (The State v. Montgomery, 8 Kas. 351; Lownsberry v. Rakestraw, 14 Kas. 151; Jackson v. Stoner, 17 Kas. 605; The State v. Bohan, 19 Kas. 28.) In the case cited from 1 Kas. the second paragraph in the syllabus reads: “ The
This, it is true, was a civil case, but the statute provides that the same rule holds in.criminal as in civil cases, (Cr. Code, § 219,) and its validity has been recognized in several criminal cases as above cited. There is therefore no record before us, nothing which we can examine or upon which we can predicate a decision. It may further be noticed, that the original bill of exceptions was filed with us, and not a transcript; this, too, is unauthorized. (Jackson v. Stoner, 17 Kas. 605.) These are not mere technicalities or irregularities, which may be disregarded, but they are matters of substance, going to the rights of parties and essential to guard each against any wrong on the part of the other. The reason for this has been stated over and over again, and need not now be repeated; the rule is settled, and may not be disregarded. This compels us to dismiss the appeal. Notwithstanding this, we have examined the record, and are satisfied that while in one respect there may have been a technical disregard of the requirements of the statute, there was nothing on the whole of which the defendant and appellant can fairly complain. It is very evident to us that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against'him, and therefore ought to suffer his punishment as adjudged by the court.
Without going into details, we may notice a few of the points presented. We cannot see that the plea in abatement was im