263 Mo. 561 | Mo. | 1915
Prosecutrix was eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and the information charged the defendant with “forcibly ravishing” the prosecutrix. During the progress of the trial, the defendant made a motion that the State be required to elect whether the case should be tried upon the theory that the offense was committed by force or on the theory that the V prosecutrix did not have the mental capacity to con- ) sent. At the close of all the evidence, the State elected to submit the case to the jury on the theory that prosecutrix was incapable mentally of giving consent, and ,the case was, by the court, submitted to the jury on ' that theory.
The record embracing the testimony is very large. It will only he necessary to state such facts as shall have a bearing on the theory of the case upon which it was submitted to the jury.
The evidence on the part of the State tended to establish the following facts: Prosecutrix was eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. When she was a baby and during her “teething time” she began to have spasms and continued to have spasms
Dr. Simon testified that he attended her the day after the occurrence and that she was very nervous. Upon examination he found the hymen broken and thought that it was freshly torn but would not swear "‘that it was. He noticed an inflammation of the vagina, which, he said, might have been caused by two or three men having intercourse with her.
On the afternoon of February 5, 1913, the date of the alleged offense, prosecutrix was sent by her mother on an errand to the Westhus Carpet Company, on Broadway, in the city of St. Louis, to make a payment on a bill. Prosecutrix went to the store and paid the ■bill and was on Broadway, going toward her home, when she saw the defendant standing in front of a pool hall. On two former occasions, while prosecutrix and her mother were down town, the defendant had whistled at them when they passed. On the day in question, as prosecutrix passed the pool hall, defendant came out and said, ‘ ‘Little girl, ain’t you cold ? ’ ’ P'ros1 ecutrix said, “ Yes. ” Defendant told her that he would take her to his home where it was warm. She replied that she wanted to go home and defendant said, “What are you in a hurry to go home for?” Defendant then took prosecutrix by the arm and he and two other young men walked with her around the corner to the back part of Zang’s saloon and into a small room back of said saloon and connected therewith by a door. This back room also had a door leading out into the back yard. When they were inside the back room, two of the girl’s male companions went into the saloon and one remained in the room and had intercourse with her, and then he went into the saloon and one of the other young men came back into the back room and had intercourse with her, and then he went back into the saloon and then this defendant came into the back room and had intercourse with her and then went back
Prosecutrix and one or two young men went out the back door and down the street and some of the other men went out the front door and joined her later on the street. Prom there they went to a livery stable and prosecutrix and the defendant, accompanied by the other five or six men, went up into a hayloft of the stable. Here defendant and three other men again had intercourse with her and then the proprietor of the| livery stable upon hearing noise up in the hayloft called up to them and asked who was up there, and at that defendant and some of the other young men jumped out of the loft window. Prosecutrix attempted to jump out of the window, but the son of the proprietor of the livery stable went up in the loft to see what was going on and helped prosecutrix down the ladder and told her to go home. She started down the street and rejoined some of her male companions. The defendant and the other young men then took prosecutrix a distance of a block or two to a room occupied by one Grastroieh. She testified that in this room defendant and the same young men again had intercourse with her. That it was about dark when they arrived at the room and that she does not know how long they stayed there, but finally they all went away and left prosecutrix with Grastroieh and she stayed all night with him. Grastroieh was a workman in a nearby iron mill and before daylight the next morning she went
On cross-examination, prosecutrix admitted that about seven p. m., on the night in question, she was ¡standing’ on Broadway talking to a young man by the name of Bowe and while she was so engaged her aunt and cousin passed her on the street and that she made 1 no complaint to them. It appears from the transcript that the attorney who cross-examined prosecutrix had difficulty in getting her to look at him while he was cross-examining her and that she made no response to a great many questions asked her. ■ She testified that when her father found her on the street the next morn-j ing and asked her where she had been she told him [: that she had stayed all night with an old lady. The proprietor of the livery stable testified that after.he ran the young men away from the barn the prosecutrix came down the ladder from the loft and told him what , her name was and where she lived. She also told him she knew her way home and she then left the stable and walked to the corner where her male companions had collected. He noticed her clothing was wrinkled but stated that her condition was not bad. Prosecutrix did not make any complaint to the livery stable proprietor, but when he talked a little rough, to her she be-i gan to cry. The evidence shows that when the girl was taken' home the next morning her underclothing was torn and she was in a bad nervous condition.
The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to establish the following facts: When prosecutrix passed the pool hall, she looked at defendant and smiled
Defendant then went into the saloon proper and in a few minutes thereafter he saw the prosecutrix and
It appears that some of the young men were drinking and one or two of them were so much under the influence of liquor that they did not desire to go home at once but waited at different places two or three hours before going home. Gastroich testified that when he came home from work on the evening of February 5, he found the prosecutrix and three young mexx other than, defendant in his room. He went to get some beer and whiskey and a short time after his return he ordered them out and that defendant came.to his door just as he was putting the crowd out. This was early in the evening. About 2:15 a. m., prosecutrix and a young man by the name of Koenig knocked at his door and stated that they were cold and wanted in. The witness was then up, preparing his breakfast, prepara
According to defendant’s testimony, defendant and three or four other young men had intercourse with prosecutrix in the back room of the saloon but no one had intercourse with her either at Gastroich’s room or at the livery stable.
“Carnal intercourse with a woman incapable from mental infirmity of giving consent, is rape, unless the man is ignorant of her infirmity and its extent, believes he has her consent, and has no intention to have intercourse without her consent.
^ “Where the woman in point of fact yields an apparent assent to the act, the burden is on the State to prove that at the time of the act she was incapable, because of mental disease, of assenting to or dissenting from the act, -and that the defendant knew of such incapacity. ’ ’
And further:
\f‘It would not be enough to show merely that she was weak-minded, and that the defendant knew that she was so. ‘The mere fact that a woman is weak-minded does not disable her from consenting to the act. . . . So long as the woman is capable of consenting, and does consent, the act is not rape, and this is true though the man may know that she is of weak intellect.’ [State v. Cunningham, 100 Mo. l. c. 393.]”
But the more serious question arises as to the sufficiency of the proof concerning defendant’s knowledge of her mental condition. To him she was a stranger and he knew nothing concerning her prior history. The evidence shows that she had surrendered to the two other young men before defendant’s act. The father of prosecutrix testified that she would go along the street over a route to which she was accustomed “like any other lady.” One of the neighbors, testifying for the State, said she would “seem bright in company. ’ ’ Another neighbor said she seemed stupid in' conversation but seemed bright when she went on errands. The proprietor of the livery stable testified for the State. He said that after he ran the men away from the stable he talked with prosecutrix, scolded her and she began to cry. Hpon inquiry she told him her name and where she lived and he thereupon permitted
“The real question is, assuming that the prosecutrix was so mentally infirm as to he incapable of giving assent, did the defendant, at the time, know of such incapacity? In answering this question, we are confined to the facts as they were apparent to the defendant at the time the act was committed. The testimony showing the family history of the prosecutrix, her virtuous character, and her condition on Sunday, after nine o’clock, might well satisfy the jury that the prosecutrix did not at the time of the act comprehend its moral nature, and could not give her assent. None of the facts shown by such testimony were known to defendant when the act was committed. Tie could only judge from the manner and conversation of the prosecutrix at the time of the act. ”
After carefully considering the entire evidence we have reached the conclusion that there was a failure of I proof in this regard. It therefore follows that the J judgment cannot stand.
II. Instruction No. 4 was as follows:
instructions. “In order to convict in this case, it devolves upon the State to show and prove that the defendant, at some time, in the city of St. Louis and State of Missouri, had sexual intercourse with Della Amend, and that she, at such time, was a person of such weak and disordered mind*577 that she could not comprehend or understand the nature and consequence of such an act, and did not at such time know right from wrong, and unless the State has so shown, you will find the defendant not guilty.”
This instruction is clearly erroneous. It undertakes to state what is necessary “in order to convict,” and would therefore easily lead the jury to believe that if the facts therein required to be found were found then the defendant should be convicted. The instruc-. tion omits a very necessary requirement, to-wit, that! the defendant knew that prosecutrix was mentally in-l capable of consenting. [State v. Warren, supra.] It is true, as contended by the learned Attorney-General, that instruction No. 1 covered the entire case and did require the jury to find that defendant did have such knowledge, yet that did not cure the defect in this instruction which also apparently undertook to cover the case. The jury would not know which to follow. Inconsistent or conflicting instructions should not be given. [State v. Tatlow, 136 Mo. 678, l. c. 684.] Other points áre raised concerning instructions but upon careful examination we have reached the conclusion that the other instructions fairly and fully covered the law of the case and that the points urged are not of sufficient importance to merit further discussion.
We are of the opinion that the witnesses should have been permitted to testify as to points (1), (2) and (3). These facts disclosed her actions, appearance or demeanor while acting as a witness in the former case and if it could be shown that her demeanor as a witness on the former trial was different from her demeanor as a witness upon the present trial, it would no doubt supply facts of material aid to the jury in giving true weight or consideration to her demeanor in the present case.
The condition of prosecutrix’s mind was one of the important issues in the case and defendant should have been given the opportunity to show any of her actions and demeanor upon the former trial which would tend to contradict any of her present actions or
On the other hand, error was not committed in refusing the offer as to points (4), (5), (6) and (7). Points (4) and (5) are objectionable because they state mere conclusions and not facts. Point (6) is irrelevant unless it were shown that the questions to which answers were made in the one case were the same questions to which the answer “I don’t remember” was made in the other. Point (7) was objectionable because the evidence offered would invade the province of the jury and would therefore fall within the rule announced by the authorities cited in paragraph III of this opinion.
Other points are urged by appellant concerning the conduct of one of the jurors and the conduct of the State’s attorney in making his argument to the jury, but since these are not such matters as will likely occur upon a retrial of the case, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the same here.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
The foregoing opinion by Wjlltams, CL, is adopted as the opinion of the court.