THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SCHILLING, APPELLEE.
No. 2022-0782
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted April 5, 2023—Decided August 31, 2023.
[Cite as State v. Schilling, 172 Ohio St.3d 479, 2023-Ohio-3027.]
Sex-offender registration and reporting—A person‘s classification as a sexually oriented offender under Ohio‘s Megan‘s Law occurs by operation of law—State v. Henderson does not apply to a trial court‘s error in determining a person‘s sex-offender classification—A person convicted of a sexually oriented offense in Ohio is entitled to relief from his or her registration and reporting obligations under Megan‘s Law after reporting period has ended, even if person was living outside Ohio and reported in another state during registration and reporting period—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-210363, 2022-Ohio-1773.
{¶ 1} In this appeal from a judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, appellant, the state of Ohio, asks us to answer two questions regarding Ohio‘s sex-offender registration and reporting laws. The first question is whether our recent decision in State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776—in which we held that when a court has jurisdiction to act, any errors in the court‘s judgment are voidable and are subject to res judicata if they are not timely appealed, id. at ¶ 26-27—applies to a trial court‘s erroneous classification of a defendant as a Tier I sex offender subject to the registration and reporting requirements of Ohio‘s Adam Walsh Act (“AWA“),
{¶ 2} The answer to the first question is no. A person‘s obligation to register and report as a sex offender under either of Ohio‘s sex-offender registration and reporting schemes does not arise by judicial determination. It arises by operation of law based on the sex-offense conviction itself. Accordingly, Henderson does not apply here, because our holding in that сase applies only with respect to errors in a trial court‘s exercise of its judgment. The answer to the second question is also no. Ohio‘s sex-offender registration and reporting schemes contain no provision that tolls the period during which a person convicted of a sexually oriented offense in Ohio must register and report when the person resides in another state and registers and reports in the other state. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the First District in part, reverse it in part, and hold that appellee, Michael Schilling, has completed his Ohio sex-offender registration and reporting obligations.
I. Background
{¶ 3} Sex-offender-registration statutes have existed in Ohio since 1963. See
{¶ 4} Megan‘s Law established a comprehensive scheme whereby sex offenders are classified—based on their status as a first-time or a repeat offender and their likelihood of reoffending—as either a sexually oriented offender, a habitual sex offender, or a sexual predator. See State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 29-30 (O‘Donnell, J., dissenting). Although some of the registration and reporting requirements apply under all the Megan‘s Law classification categories, there are additional requirements under Megan‘s law for individuals classified as habitual offenders or sexual predators, and each classification category has a different duration of reporting—i.e., 10 years for sexually oriented offenders, 20 years for habitual offenders, and lifetime reporting for sexual predators. See
{¶ 5} Both the initial version of Megan‘s Law in 1997 and the 2003
{¶ 6} In 2007, the General Assembly passed the AWA. See generally
{¶ 7} Our decision in Williams had the effect of creating “separate statutory schemes governing sex offenders depending on when they committed their underlying offense.” State v. Howard, 134 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, ¶ 17. The AWA applies to sex offenses committed on or after January 1, 2008; Megan‘s Law applies to sex offenses committed prior to January 1, 2008, even if the defendant was convicted after the AWA‘s January 1, 2008 effective date. Id. We now turn to the facts of this case.
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 8} On June 11, 2008, Schilling, then a Kentucky resident, was convicted in the Hamilton County Municipal Court of attempted voyeurism, a second-degree misdemeanor that occurred on September 25, 2007. The trial court sentenced him to 90 days in jail, with 80 days suspended; a fine; and three years of community-control supervision. The court also ordered Schilling to pay costs.
{¶ 10} Notably, both the document informing Schilling of his registration and reporting duties and the court‘s entry noting that he had been informed of the duties incorrectly stated that Schilling‘s conviction subjected him to Tier I registration and reрorting under the AWA. Because Schilling committed the offense of attempted voyeurism on September 25, 2007, Megan‘s Law, not the AWA, applied to his conviction for that offense. See Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, at ¶ 22-23; see also In re Von, 146 Ohio St.3d 448, 2016-Ohio-3020, 57 N.E.3d 1158, ¶ 21. However, neither the state nor Schilling appealed the trial court‘s erroneous classification of Schilling.1
{¶ 12} On September 10, 2019, more than 11 years after his conviction in this case, Schilling filed a motion in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas seeking early termination of his sex-offender registration and reporting obligations under the AWA. Schilling filed the motion pursuant to
{¶ 13} Opposing the motion, the state argued that based on the date of the attempted-voyeurism offense, Megan‘s Law, not the AWA, applied, because the AWA could not constitutionally be applied retroactively to offenses committed prior to January 1, 2008. According to the state, Schilling was a sexually oriented offender subject to the
{¶ 14} On January 14, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Schilling‘s motion to terminate his sex-offender-registration status. The state maintained that Schilling was a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law, which subjected him to a 10-year reporting obligation; that Schilling could not seek early termination of his reporting requirements under
{¶ 15} Following discussion between the court and the parties, the trial court agreed with the state‘s position that Schilling was a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law. Believing that it did not have jurisdiction to address the credit-for-out-of-state-reporting issue, the court explained that it would issue a judgment declaring Schilling a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law and that the parties could “do with that what [they] choose.” On January 15, 2020, the court issued a judgment entry stating that Schilling was a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law and that he had been erroneously classified as a Tier I sex offender under the AWA at his June 11, 2008 sentencing.
{¶ 16} On March 3, 2021, Schilling filed in the trial court an amended motion to terminate his registration duties after unsuccessfully applying with the Hamilton County Sheriff‘s Office for credit toward his ten-year reporting obligation under Megan‘s Law for the period he spent reporting in Kentucky. As it did with Schilling‘s first motion to terminate, the state opposed the request.
{¶ 18} The trial court held a hearing on Schilling‘s amended motion to terminate and thereafter denied the motion. Schilling appealed, and the First District reversed the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶ 19} The First District held that Schilling had been classified as a Tier I sex offender under the AWA per the trial court‘s sentencing judgment in 2008 and that pursuant to this court‘s decision in Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, that judgment was final and could not bе revisited by the trial court, because neither party had appealed the judgment. 2022-Ohio-1773, 189 N.E.3d 405, ¶ 20-28. The court of appeals determined that as a Tier I offender under the AWA, Schilling was entitled to use
{¶ 20} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted the following propositions of law for review:
Does this Court‘s holding in State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, now supersede this Court‘s holding in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, where a convicted sex offender, whose offense occurred prior to the 01/01/2008 effective date of S.B. 10, and are they now subject to the sex offender registration requirements of S.B. 10 if a[n] S.B. 10 Tier classification is entered in the offender‘s sentencing entry. - A plain reading of
R.C. 2950.07(E) precludes any Ohio Sheriff from granting sex offender registration time credit toward their duty to register accrued in any other jurisdiction for a registered sex offender convicted in any Ohio court.2
See 167 Ohio St.3d 1511, 2022-Ohio-3135, 194 N.E.3d 386.
III. Analysis
A. Applicability of State v. Henderson
{¶ 21} On appeal to the First District, Schilling argued, citing our recent decision in Henderson, that the trial court could not correct the 2008 judgment classifying him as a Tier I sex offender under the AWA, because it had jurisdiction to enter that judgment and the state never appealed the judgment. The court of appeals аgreed with Schilling and remanded the matter to the trial court for further consideration of his request for early termination of his AWA obligations. 2022-Ohio-1773 at ¶ 27. On appeal to this court, the state argues that as a matter of law, Schilling‘s conviction rendered him a sexually oriented offender subject to a ten-year reporting obligation under Megan‘s Law, even though neither he nor the state
{¶ 22} In Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, at ¶ 1, this court returned to its traditional understanding of void and voidable judgments. The traditional view is that “[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 43. On the other hand, “[i]f thе court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, any error in the court‘s exercise of that jurisdiction is voidable” as opposed to void. Id. at ¶ 34. “The failure to timely—at the earliest available opportunity—assert an error in a voidable judgment, even if that error is constitutional in nature, amounts to the forfeiture of any objection.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 495, 159 N.E. 594 (1927).
{¶ 23} Our decision in Henderson does not apply to the trial court‘s erroneous classification of Schilling as a Tier I sex offender under the AWA instead of as a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law. Neither Schilling‘s sentencing entry nor any other judgment entered by the trial court in this case actually imposed, by judicial determination, the Tier I classification. The only such documents in the trial-court record that even mention Schilling‘s purported status as a Tier I sex offender are the document signed by Schilling and the trial-court judge that informed Schilling of his duty to register and report as a Tier I offender and the court‘s entry noting that he had been informed of those duties. Neither of these is a trial-court judgment such that our holding in Henderson might apply to any error that either of them may contain.
{¶ 24} That there is no court order or judgment in the record declaring that Schilling has been determined to be a Tier I sex offender under the AWA, but rather only an indication that he had received notice of his purported Tier I status and reporting requirements, is not surprising considering how Ohio‘s sex-offender registration and reporting law works. When Schilling was sentenced in June 2008,
{¶ 25} Likewise, classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law and the attendant registration and reporting obligations do not arise from a trial court‘s judgment. As this court explained in State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 15, 18 (”Hayden II“), a person‘s classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law arises automatically from the person‘s conviction for a sexually oriented offense as defined by
B. Effect of Out-of-State Reporting
{¶ 27} The state argues that Schilling‘s duty to comply with the provisions of Megan‘s Law for ten years did not begin until he moved to Ohio and registered here in December 2020. The state further argues that Schilling is not entitled to credit for his reporting as a sex offender in Kentucky, because, according to the state,
{¶ 28} The duties imposed under Megan‘s Law3 are found in
{¶ 29}
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31}
{¶ 32} For people convicted of sexually oriented offenses in Ohio, the duty to comply with the requirements of Megan‘s Law—i.e., to comply with
{¶ 33} Unlike people convicted of sexually oriented offenses in Ohio, people convicted of such offenses in other jurisdictions have no obligation to comply with Megan‘s Law unless and until they come to Ohio. See
{¶ 34} Indeed,
If the person is an offender * * * who has a duty to register in this state pursuant to [
R.C. 2950.04(A)(3) , i.e., a duty to register as a person convicted of an out-of-state offense upon entering this state], the offender * * * is presumed to have knowledge of the law and of the offender‘s * * * duties imposed under [R.C.] 2950.04 ,2950.041 ,2950.05 , and2950.06 .
{¶ 36} The state‘s contention that Schilling‘s obligation to register and report in Ohiо under Megan‘s Law for a period of ten years did not start until December 2020 when he moved to Ohio and registered here is not supported by the law‘s plain language. Under
The duty of an offender * * * to register under this chapter is tolled for any period during which the offender * * * is returned to confinement in a secure facility for any reason or imprisoned for an offense when the confinement in a secure facility or imprisonment occurs subsequent to the date [of commencement]. The offender‘s * * * duty to register under this chapter resumes upon the offender‘s * * * release from confinement in a secure facility or imprisonment.
{¶ 37} Additionally, the state‘s reliance on
An offender * * * who has been convicted or pleaded guilty * * * in a court in another state, in a federal court, military court,
or Indian tribal court, or in a court of any nation other than the United States for committing * * * a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense * * * may apply to the shеriff of the county in which the offender * * * resides or temporarily is domiciled, or in which the offender attends a school or institution of higher education or is employed, for credit against the duty to register for the time that the offender * * * has complied with the sex offender * * * registration requirements of another jurisdiction. The sheriff shall grant the offender * * * credit against the duty to register for time for which the offender * * * provides adequate proof that [he or she] has complied with the sex offender * * * registration requirements of another jurisdiction. If the offender * * * disagrees with the determination of the sheriff, the offender * * * may appeal the determination to the court of common pleas of the county in which the offender * * * resides or is temporarily domiciled, or in which the offender attends a school or institution of higher education or is employed.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 38} Under the plain language of
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 39} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a person‘s classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan‘s Law occurs by operation of law, and therefore, our recent decision in Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, does not apply to a trial court‘s error in determining a person‘s sex-offender classification. We additionally hold that a person convicted of a sexually oriented offense in Ohio is entitled to be relieved of his or her registration and reporting obligations under Megan‘s Law after the reporting period has ended, even if the person was living outside Ohio and reported in another state during the registration and reporting period. In applying these holdings, we determine that Schilling‘s June 11, 2008 conviction for attempted voyeurism, with the offense having occurred on September 25, 2007, rendered him, as a matter of law, a sexually oriented offender subject to a ten-year registration and reporting obligation under Megan‘s Law and that the obligation ended June 11, 2018. Accordingly, we reverse the First District‘s decision to the extent that it applied Henderson to the trial court‘s erroneous classification of Schilling as a Tier I offender subject to the
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, BRUNNER, and MILLER, JJ., concur.
MARK C. MILLER, J., of the Third District Court of Appeals, sitting for DETERS, J.
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ernest W. Lee Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.