State v. ScharffState v. Scharff
Santa Fe, NM
M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
University of New Mexico School of Law
Scott M. Davidson, Counsel of Record & Supervising Attorney
Albuquerque, NM
Bruce Rogoff, Adjunct Professor of Law
Santa Fe, NM
Robert Milder, Practicing Law Student
Brianne Bigej, Practicing Law Student
Shannon Crowley, Practicing Law Student
Nicholas Sitterly, Practicing Law Student
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
FRY, Judge.
{1} In this appeal, we consider the applicability of a stop-and-yield provision in New Mexico’s Motor Vehicle Code that requires a driver of a vehicle “emerging from an alley, driveway or building” to stop the vehicle “immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or driveway” and to yield to pedestrians and oncoming traffic before entering the roadway.
{2} Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of her pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the deputy committed a mistake of law because
I. BACKGROUND
{3} San Juan County Deputy James Roberts was on DUI (driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs) and traffic patrol duty in Farmington, New Mexico. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Deputy Roberts was driving westbound on Main Street when he observed a vehicle exiting a parking lot that serviced several businesses, including a bar and a liquor store. As the vehicle approached the sidewalk area next to the parking lot, Deputy Roberts saw the vehicle stop on the sidewalk before it entered Main Street and proceeded eastbound. Deputy Roberts determined that the vehicle’s stopping on the sidewalk, rather than before the sidewalk area, constituted a violation of New Mexico’s Motor Vehicle Code,
{4} Upon making contact with Defendant, who was the driver, Deputy Roberts noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, and he therefore proceeded to conduct a DUI investigation. After administering field sobriety tests, Deputy Roberts arrested Defendant for DUI. Defendant was charged by criminal information with DUI, contrary to
{5} Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop on the basis that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and further that Deputy Roberts had a pretextual reason for initiating the stop “based on the fact that [Defendant] was exiting . . . a drinking establishment” at the time of the alleged traffic violation. At the hearing, Defendant argued that Deputy Roberts made a mistake of law in determining that she had violated
{6} The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. In its written order, the district court entered the following findings:
II. DISCUSSION
{7} On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erroneously denied her motion to suppress on the following two grounds: (1) the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on a mistake of law regarding the applicability of
A. Standard of Review
{8} Because suppression of evidence is a mixed question of law and fact, we apply a two-part review to the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. We review any factual questions under a deferential substantial evidence standard, and we review the application of the law to the facts de novo. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57. In doing so, we “review the facts in the light most favorable to the . . . district court’s factual findings so long as substantial evidence exists to support those findings.” Id.
{9} “Before a police officer makes a traffic stop, he must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.” State v. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163. “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We analyze the reasonableness of a stop by considering “(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether continued detention was reasonably related in scope to the original circumstances justifying the stop.” Id. In this case, we examine only the first part of the test—whether the stop was justified at its inception—because Defendant has not alleged that Deputy Roberts exceeded the scope of the initial stop.
B. The Traffic Stop Was Not Based on a Mistake of Law
{10} Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because Deputy Roberts made a mistake of law when he concluded that Defendant violated
{11} We begin by analyzing
Applicability of Section 66-7-346
{12}
The driver of a vehicle within a business or residence district emerging from an alley, driveway or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or driveway, and shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on said roadway.
(Emphasis added.)
{13} The plain language of
{14} The Legislature has not expressly defined an alley, driveway, or building in
{15} Although Defendant is correct that the plain language of
{16} We agree with the State that the general purpose behind
C. Pretext
{17} Defendant also contends that the district court erred in denying her suppression motion because the traffic stop was pretextual. She argues that Deputy Roberts’ stated reason for stopping Defendant, a violation of
{18} In State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 25, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 143, we defined a pretextual stop as “a detention supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has occurred, but [which] is executed as a pretense to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative agenda for which there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” “In performing a pretextual traffic stop,” we stated, “a police officer is stopping the driver, not to enforce the traffic code, but to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We also identified the burdens the parties must carry when a defendant asserts pretext:
First, the trial court must determine whether there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop. As usual, the [s]tate has the burden of proof to justify the stop under an exception to the warrant requirement. If the stop can be justified objectively on its face and the defendant argues that the seizure was nevertheless unreasonable because it was pretextual under the New Mexico Constitution, then the district court must decide whether the officer’s motive for [the stop] was unrelated to the objective existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The defendant has the burden of proof to show pretext based on the totality of the circumstances.
Id. ¶ 40 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{19} We agree with the State that Defendant failed to meet her burden of proof to show pretext. Defendant initially raised the pretext argument in her written pleadings related to the suppression motion. However, Defendant later failed to raise the issue during the suppression hearing and did not invoke a ruling by the district court on the pretext issue. The focus of Defendant’s argument during the forty-five minute hearing was whether reasonable suspicion existed for the stop and, specifically, whether Deputy Roberts had initiated the traffic stop based on a mistake of law concerning the applicability of
CONCLUSION
{20} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
Topic Index for State v. Scharff, Docket No. 30,498
APPEAL AND ERROR
Standard of Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Suppression of Evidence
CRIMINAL LAW
Motor Vehicle Violations
Driving While Intoxicated
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Pretextual Stop
STATUTES
Interpretation
Legislative Intent