STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUSTIN SAVAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No: 11CA7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MEIGS COUNTY
May 18, 2012
[Cite as State v. Savage, 2012-Ohio-2276.]
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Melissa M. Prendergast, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Colleen S. Williams, Meigs County Prosecutor, and Amanda Bizub-Franzmann, Meigs County Assistant Prosecutor, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Justin Savage (hereinafter “Savage“) appeals the judgment of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted Savage of theft and ordered him to pay $25,000 in restitution. On appeal, Savage raises various arguments about the restitution order and his trial counsel. But we will not address the various arguments raised by Savage. Instead, for the following reasons, we find that no final appealable order exists. First, the trial court‘s sentencing entry contemplates that further action must be taken. And second, we cannot create jurisdiction by combining the trial court‘s multiple entries. Accordingly, we dismiss Savage‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
{¶3} Savage appeals and asserts the following three assignments of error: I. “A contract may not be enforced if the consideration given for it is illegal. Mr. Savage‘s plea agreement was induced upon illegal consideration and as such, is unenforceable and invalid.” II. “Mr. Savage was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in an amount that exceeded both the actual economic loss suffered by the victim and the limit of restitution that could be imposed for a fifth-degree felony theft offense. The court‘s order imposing restitution was erroneous because the amount arrived at was not based upon credible evidence that established the value of the victim‘s actual economic loss to a reasonable degree of certainty.” And, III. “Mr. Savage‘s trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when counsel advised Mr. Savage to accept the State‘s plea offer, which required him to agree to be sentenced to more than what was statutorily allowed for a fifth-degree felony theft offense, and when counsel knew that Mr. Savage was indigent but did not object to the imposition of court costs.”
II.
{¶5} “‘A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a final appealable order.‘” State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 20, quoting Bell v. Horton, 142 Ohio App.3d 694, 696, 756 N.E.2d 1241 (4th Dist.2001). And here, the July 21, 2010 SENTENCING ENTRY states the following: “It is further ORDERED that execution of the Order of commitment to the SEPTA Correctional Facility in Nelsonville is stayed until August 23, 2010 to permit the Defendant to obtain full-time employment. This sentencing hearing shall be in recess until August 16, 2010 at 11:15 AM at which time the Court will review the Defendant‘s employment status to determine if the Defendant should be confined at the SEPTA Correctional Facility in Nelsonville.” Therefore, the July 21, 2010 SENTENCING ENTRY clearly contemplates that further action must be taken on the issue of Savage‘s SEPTA commitment.
{¶7} In conclusion, we find that no final appealable order exists in the present case. As a result, we must dismiss Savage‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Harsha, J.: Dissents.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.