State v. Sauls

percent per annum from June (b) paid,

until costs of action. LARSON, JJ., join

McCORMICK

this dissent. Iowa, Appellee,

STATE SAULS, Appellant.

Mark R.

No. 83-704.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 1984. Wills,

Mark J. Smith of McNally & Bow- man, Davenport, appellant. Miller, Gen., J. Atty. Joseph Thomas P. Gen., Weeg, Atty. Asst. and William E. Davis, County Atty., appellee. UHLENHOPP, Justice. appeal legal

This questions involves which arose in prosecution for murder — start, Marit, The Marit and a car v. theft. also State and See stopped patrolman to render aid. highway N.W.2d-(Iowa 1984). amiss, something Sensing pa- was presents R. three Mark Defendant Sauls for assistance. He soon dis- trolman called the trial court abused whether issues: that Marit was on covered wanted several his failing grant motion discretion outstanding Davenport warrants his of Sauls and of the trials patrolman and him. The fur- area arrested Marit; codefendant, Michael L. whether battery discovered that the had ther been assistance effective was afforded Sauls car, from the other and he there- removed counsel; jury instructions whether and Subsequently, arrested Sauls also. process of due deprived Sauls of and body officers found dead Estabrook’s law. plowed nearby field. find facts as follows. The custody, gave in each While were headed Daven- and Marit Sauls police several statements which were Litchfield, Marit Iowa, from Illinois. port, contradictory in nature. Each defendant’s seeking to collect a debt Steven to impeach were used him on statements finding previously Wayne Estabrook Both later cross-examination. defendants’ Esta- drugs were taken from stolen consistently implicated statements the oth- of Marit. acquaintance an car brook’s perpetrator er defendant as the of the they while were incar- had met Marit Sauls homicide. Hillsboro, Marit in Illinois. jail cerated charged were with first- Sauls Marit asked a driver’s license and did not have with degree murder and theft the bat- trip. accompany him on Sauls They sought unsuccessfully to tery. have trip pair had car trouble The trials, together. and were tried stop them to Interstate which caused At trial defendant testified with- interchange In- Highway near the with knowledge prior his the other defend- out The two men walked terstate 280. acts perpetrated the which resulted ant station, nearby Marit called service where rested, After the State Estabrook’s death. ar- In a short time Estabrook Estabrook. again trial court denied defendants’ testimony, Marit, by his intend- rived. own the trials. motions sever “rough up” because ed to Estabrook defendants The found both money him the refusal send Estabrook’s fifth-degree theft. first-degree murder of the Hillsboro so that he could bond out sentence, de- Following imposition the two men at jail. After Estabrook met appeal in- appealed. The fendants station, sat the back the service Sauls Sauls. volves of the car and the three headed toward seat assignment of error I. Sauls’ disabled vehicle. grant a refusal to sever trial court’s is the conflicting. point general the trials. ance grabbed Marit testified Estabrook Sauls together are are indicted who defendants arm, him the left then Esta- and stabbed 6(1), Iowa R.Crim.P. together. tried interstate, and took off across the brook 10(2)(e); 288 N.W.2d re- followed Estabrook later Marit 6(4)(b), however, (Iowa 1980). Rule testified, him. how- Marit turned without pertinent part: an indict “When states Estabrook, ever, then that Sauls stabbed charges two or or information ment interstate, off took across Estabrook defendants, those defendants more try him. pursued him to aid and Marit of the court jointly if in the discretion tried prejudice to he and Marit not result in next testified that trial will Otherwise, parties. battery car from Estabrook’s one or more removed the separately.” own disabled shall be attempt to start their us defend actually question now before is whether that Sauls Marit testified vehicle. joint trial prejudiced by a Sauls was battery. ant took Marit, and whether the trial court but also co-defendant_ presented by hostile witnesses his failing its discretion him abused impossi- A fair trial was a severance. inherently prejudicial ble under these condi- tions.” See also United States We have said Iowa Rule of Criminal Johnson, F.2d 1129 6(4)(b)is Procedure similar to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. State v. The case at bar example is as extreme an As a for severance as could be conceived. The result, cases, we have held that federal sole contention of each at defendant binding court, not while this constitute which could be called a defense was that authority. persuasive Id. the other defendant committed the homi- cide. Does circumstance constitute note, however, that the two rules are “prejudice” dictates defendants precisely operative the same in their separately? “shall” be tried parts. Our rule states that “defendants may be if in the discretion of prejudicial merely Evidence is not be- joint the court a trial will not result potent cause it damning. par- Both prejudice parties.” or the to one more of It naturally ties seek and introduce the most states, “Otherwise, then defendants shall powerful they evidence can find. Thus separately.” be tried Federal rule complain solely Sauls cannot because Mar- appears that if states “it a defendant the testimony strongly it’s indicated Sauls’ government by prejudiced joinder ... Rather, “prejudice” arises from un- together, trial severance_” may the court ... fairness, example, impeachment by (Emphasis added.) proof of long by an offense ago the find that a federal appeals court con 609(6). defendant. See Iowa R.Ev. very problem sidered a similar in United We think unfairness exists when Crawford, States v. 581 F.2d 489 Cir. core of the the defense of two defendants 1978). The two defendants in that case the other defendant committed the picked by up police were after police the crime, and the State forces the defendants Blanks, party they noticed that knew together to stand trial each convict license, be driving. without a driver’s other. The absolutely State can force police the impounding While were vehi the and, defendant to stand trial alone cle, they partially noticed a concealed joinder, modern it can generally force them shotgun sawed-off under the dashboard. together. to stand trial But we do not gun belonged Blanks claimed the to Craw think it should be able to force them to ford, but belonged it Crawford contended convict each other where their defenses are Charged to Blanks. Id. at 490. the jointly, diametrically opposed. The State should unsuccessfully sought sep two defendants defendants; convict the it should appeal arate trials. On Crawford’s given power absolute force de determining court stated that in whether so. to do That smacks of unfair fendants grant separate trials, trial court should it ness. should possible prejudice “balance the against government’s If does not exist in the judicial interest in economy and con must what kind of case would it exist? sider the ways in which it can suggested. lessen the None has been Compelling (cita prejudice by other means.” Id. give case would omitted). tions judges court also stated that absolute deny sever- effect, the “defenses asserted Blanks and ance. In it repeal 6(4)(b). Crawford were irreconcilable as the right compel well joint trial is to be mutually absolute, exclusive. sole defense of the proper way made is to submit each was repealer of the other.... Each rule to the General As- defendant only sembly. had to confront not 6(4)(b) hostile Rule was originally presented by government, witnesses adopted Assembly, and the Assem- opportunity pass did not constitute an abuse of discretion. given the bly should be case, however, 813.4 at 476. In repeal. we do on a have a core common defense. Each suggest that severance The State party lays the at the crime feet of the situations such as Bru be limited to should common; are not in other. States, U.S. 88 S.Ct. v. United ton they are In Snodgrass irreconcilable. we (1968). There the 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d determining the test stated irreconcil- implicated of one defendant confession ability thus: defendant, but second defense of a defendant reaches a not be [T]he take stand and could did not (with antagonism respect level of The United States Su cross-examined. codefendant) compels defense of a defend preme Court held that second jury, deprived of his constitutional ant was order to of testimony believe core he was forced to cross-examine when of that was offered behalf and confession stand 6(4)(b), however, necessarily must disbelieve the rule introduced. Our co-defendant_ in which a defendant offered behalf of his not limited cases severance; a constitutional Where two defendants has prejudice, depri antagonistic core, rule is not at their language that are a sub- “ right. A defend possibility of a constitutional exists jury vation stantial ‘that the not to obtain 6(4)(b) unjustifiably ant does need infer that this conflict he has a separate trial constitutional when demonstrates that alone both ” right to one. guilty.’ the essence of one defend- ant’s defense is contradicted a co-de- that a defendant may The State contend defense, then the de- fendant’s latter prejudice by joint actually does not sustain “preempt” fense can be said to the for- might accept because his codefendant This conflict de- mer. sort of between bargain extricate himself from plea impelling prejudice fendants creates testify against trial and the first de- that mandates severance. United States But this not mean anyway. fendant Berkowitz, 1134 v. contrary, prejudice did exist. On the not authority compel joint defend- trial of give antagonistic ants with defenses would prosecutor power to exert additional record, sole Under this where the make pressure by threatening on them which could contention of each defendant together and them stand trial convict was that he was be claimed be a defense course, if other. Of knew advance we defendant was cul innocent and other guilty perhaps both defendants are that so pable and each defendant testified argument would made that no harm be trial, trial court abused its we hold that the prob- such done a course action. refusing grant a severance. discretion lem is that one defendant —or even both proposition is II. Sauls’ second in fact guilty. defendants — representa effective he did have presumption start

do not The record by trial counsel. before us tion distinguishable This case is us to permit sufficient to decide is not 1984), (Iowa Snodgrass, 346 N.W.2d event, and, in any counsel’s question Hood, companion and State v. complains may not of which conduct Sauls (Iowa 1984). We held Snod- N.W.2d on retrial. recur not entitled grass Finally, the trial de- III. Sauls asserts that a “common core” of severance where exists, jury deprived 13 and 24 court’s instructions fense Id. at that since process ques- As this him of due of law. alleged shooting and stab- differing likely on retrial we direct our justified, under fac- tion will arise bing were but it. accounts, trials denial of attention tual Dilts, (Iowa 1969). Under the State’s trial information son v. 170 N.W.2d 408 presented, jury the evidence find In its marshalling and in its instruction personally that Sauls murdered Estabrook robbery, instructions on the trial court together him, or Sauls and Marit murdered underlying made clear that the offense as (a) premeditation and that did so with Sauls felony-murder robbery. was do (b) personally robbing or while Sauls was jury think the was misled. The crime of togeth- Estabrook or while Sauls Marit robbery felony qualifies forcible robbing Alternatively, er were Estabrook. first-degree a homicide murder under (a) could find Marit murdered felony-murder section. premeditation Estabrook with and Sauls § retrial, however, On 702.11. the district (b) knowingly participated in crime court would be well advised to substitute Marit murdered Estabrook while he felony” words “forcible in the instruc- robbing knowingly Estabrook and Sauls tion. participated robbery. Under argues also homicide must be these scenarios the could find Sauls standpoint from the foreseeable un- murder, first-degree either as the derlying offense. v. Kneedy, See State or as an accomplice. murderer State v. (1942); 232 Iowa Cuevas, 2S1 N.W.2d 627 Lucas, 55 Iowa 7 N.W. 583 objection specifi- Saul’s relates (“unless also Iowa See Code 703.2 the act cally particular to the instructions on the one person which the reason- accomplice scenario of Sauls as an to a ably expect to be in done the furtherance Marit, robbery by subsequent a mur- with offense”). the of commission of the the In by resulting felony-murder der in Marit present case this factor met is section 707.2(2) under section of the Iowa Code 707.2(2), making first-degree murder of a (1981). homicide committed while participating provides: Section 703.2 felony, 702.11, making forcible and section persons, acting When two or more in robbery felony. forcible the State concert, knowingly in participate pub- established Marit murdered Estabrook offense, responsible lic each is for the robbing in the of course him and that Sauls acts of the other done in furtherance of participated Estabrook, in robbery the of escape the commission of the offense or requirement foreseeability of section therefrom, guilt and his or her will be 703.2 would be satisfied. person acting, the same as that of so unless the act person was one which the Section 703.2 on of one crime reasonably expect could not to be done in through participation in another crime is the furtherance commission liability to expand beyond said criminal sec offense. abetting. 703.1 aiding tion Irvin, (Iowa 1983); App. 334 N.W.2d 312 (Emphasis added.) In one of its instruc- Carlson, tions, Yeager and quoted the trial court Criminal Law and this section § (1979). including “public verbatim words of- Procedure Commentators argues contend, however, fense”. provisions those that such as permitted words to find him guilty section 703.2 not without outer limits. first-degree felony murder if the Scott, LaFave and Criminal Law 516-17 found him participating in (1972); Dunahoo, Code, Iowa Criminal public offense—and evidence shows 237, (1979). Drake L.Rev. 287-88 in question that on the occasion Sauls and clearly case comes within those Marit committed two non-violent offenses: limits, however, complicity in murder smoking marijuana stealing Esta- participation the basis of underlying battery. car brook’s felony firmly forcible is rooted the law. § instructions, Scott, 517,

The trial court’s LaFave and at however, 553; Dunahoo, must all read together. Robe- 29 Drake L.Rev. parties jointly charged. com- nistic defenses of error in the instructions find no We plained of. Berkowitz standard tantamount falling per approach se for those cases to district court for return case antagonis- within broad definition of an separate from Marit’s of Sauls new trial majority tic “core” defense. A the fed- new trial. espouse eral circuits do not such a rule. AND REMANDED. REVERSED The cases on both sides of are set the issue forth Snodgrass. See Annot. 83 also HARRIS, J., except concur All Justices A.L.R.3d 260-61 favor- CARTER, Cases specially, and who concurs SCHULTZ, McGIVERIN, JJ., ing approach predominate. an ad hoc who dis- opted for approach ques- sent. an ad hoc tion N.W.2d HARRIS, (concurring). Justice 1980), (Iowa where we stated: opinion except agree majority I hostility among Mere codefendants holding in of our State v. its discussion insufficient to show an discre- abuse of Snodgrass, tion. Nor does an effort of a codefend- my I adhere to dissent Snod- Because ant incriminate even grass, I concur result. successful, by req- itself demonstrate CARTER, (dissenting). Justice Prejudice usually uisite prejudice. be avoided such situations the ex- I dissent. istence cross-examine opinion of the court limiting in- codefendant and use of unnecessarily highly curtails the desir- case structions. practice of criminal trials for able omitted). jointly charged. Only (Citations defendants who are passed propri- months have since few premise The basic of such cases as Ber- denying based in- ety of premise That that where kowitz false. among of compatibility defend- present defenses which two defendants charged jointly approved ants core, antagonistic jury will at their (Iowa 1984), 346 Snodgrass, N.W.2d 472 guilty. unjustifiably infer that both are ad to approach prejudice took an hoc which theory proponents of this Noticeably, the Today, deciding such issues. we take an support. empirical in its advance no data step from unwarranted backward Snod- by a unwarranted conclusions Even such adopt inevitably grass and rule which will cases, might the likeli- jury result some widespread practice among our lead firmly not so hood of an occurrence is such judges granting of severance on de- trial suggest experience as to rooted in common mand. out- for an potential that the unfair majority suggests opinion clearly advan- weighs demonstrable approved following Snodgrass stan joint society which from tages to flows quoted is dard which United States v. criminal trials. Berkowitz, 1127, Cir. pro- separate often 1981): Admittedly, trials will acquittal of a opportunity vide better of defendant’s defense If the essence one trial. joint than particular defendant by a codefendant’s de- is contradicted necessarily fense, can does then the latter defense be said This circumstance “preempt” joint former. This sort of any to unfairness flow basic creates the great- conflict between defendants from the that a trials but rather fact prejudice mandates compelling sev- range normally made er of evidence erance. joint some of which available particular tend to show a defendant’s approach approve did not Snodgrass involving is due the fact that antago- This circumstance instances it joint separate Rather, trials is within more sharp defendants. such persons evidence. conflict in very nature jury’s opportunity enhances the to focus its solely Often evidence within the attention on the relationship of evi- possession of defendant would be one una- regard dence each defendant. In separate for use at a vailable jury’s ability truth, to discern the such trial of another defendant who has been atmosphere preferable is ideal and charged. jointly such evidence does ordinarily sepa- which would result from come in a result of a trial and rate trials. suggests of the other this does not create a unfair- the role jury fundamental Given system in our procedure. system jus- ness in the justice, accept Our we must ability operates theory that, tice absent that institution to resolve the difficult is- exclusionary rule, credibility some established all presented. rele- sues which are ordinarily vant and material evidence is There is no reason to believe it is more jury. be heard fairly admissible should difficult for the do this when credibility weight peculiarly Its conflicting evidence involves the testi- Any mony jointly to decide. credible evidence of two defendants tried than which tends to show that the conflict is when is between the testimony produce prejudicial but does not of a defendant and that of an admitted accomplice an unfair trial. who is being aas agreement prosecutor. result of an with the carefully which have Courts considered place, yet latter situation is common no incompatible issue defenses have suggestion is found in the cases litera- that, justify granting concluded in order to it ture that denies a fair trial. The confi- severance, a motion more must be place which we dence the jury to shown than the likelihood that a carry resolve that situation should over might acquit offer a better chance of involving joint into situations trials of de- party. moving tal United States v. similarly incompatible fendants with sto- 521, (8th Cir.1979), Boyd, 610 F.2d cert. expressed ries. We such confidence in the denied, 1089, 1052, 444 U.S. 100 S.Ct. jury in 288 N.W.2d at 900-01 and (1980); L.Ed.2d 777 United States Ad should retract it now. ams, (9th Cir.), 581 F.2d cert. denied, 439 U.S. 99 S.Ct. imagination predict It takes little L.Ed.2d 683 See also Criminal opinion today’s the result of will be that Law in the Ninth Circuit: Recent Devel trial judges will severance on de- opments, 15 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 599-605 They of a mand tried defendant. (1982). In describing the nature of the going through will not wish risk a trial prejudice required justify severance, losing respect and then the benefit with Eighth Circuit has stated: on appeal a decision

Severance becomes necessary [only] mandating two new trials. The situation is proof where the such that a could aggravated by solely the fact that it will be expected to compartmentalize within separate as it evidence relates to defend- present theory evidence as to his of de- ants. fense advance of trial. Such evidence will bind party stage at a later Jackson, United States proceedings and will predictably be shaped produce sought the result to be simple In factual situation such as separate achieved—a trial. It be next presented present homicide impossible for the combat such fact that each of the defendants seek to tactics. exculpate by implicating himself the other jury’s ability does not frustrate the legislature com- the revised criminal partmentalize the evidence as it relates wisely code left to this court the role of re- establishing the standard trials.

quired to mandate and workable standard

adopted wise under which Snodgrass

Belieu easily be case can I retain that standard

upheld. would conviction in the

affirm defendant’s

case. JJ., SCHULTZ, join

McGIVERIN dissent. Iowa, ex rel. Gerald SHANA

STATE Director, Goepel,

HAN, and Lawrence Department of

Special Agent, Safety, In Division of

Public Criminal Plaintiff,

vestigation, COURT IOWA

IOWA DISTRICT FOR

COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 83-726.

Supreme Court Iowa. 17, 1984.

Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Sauls

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Oct 17, 1984

Citation: 356 N.W.2d 516

Docket Number: 83-704

Court Abbreviation: Iowa