*1 MONTANA, STATE OF Respondent, Plaintiff v. SATTLER,
RODNEY JOSEPH
Appellant.
Defendant
96-285 & 96-305.
Nos.
Argued September
1997.
4, 1997.
Submitted November
Decided March
1998.
For Sheehy, Helena. Mazurek, Attorney General; Respondent: Joseph Hon. P.
For Jr., (argued), Jennifer Anders John P. Connor Assistant Attor- General, County Helena; Christopher; Deborah Kim Lake neys Attorney, Poison. delivered the of the Court. Opinion
JUSTICE GRAY (Sattler) judgment from the Rodney appeals Sattler Joseph 1¶ Court, Judicial District by entered the Twentieth death sentence finding guilty him of the offense of County, on a verdict Lake and death pen- raises both trial-related homicide. Sattler deliberate 46-18-308, MCA, and, is appeal alty-related pursuant issues § penalty review of a death with this Court’s automatic consolidated case. We affirm. the following We address issues:
¶2 1. Did the District Court by abuse its discretion limiting ¶3 Sat- questioning prospective jurors during tler’s voir dire? 2. by Did the District Court abuse its discretion refusing
¶4 to allow inquire Sattler to into the reason the victim had been at the Pine Hills youth facility? correctional 3. Was there sufficient evidence support the conviction?
¶5 4. Did the District Court commit reversible error in analyzing aggravating mitigating or circumstances? 5. the death influence imposed Was sentence under the
passion, prejudice any arbitrary other factor? 6. the death sentence imposed disproportionate penalty Is to the
imposed in similar cases? 7. Are the District Court’s findings regarding the existence of 46-18-303(2), MCA, aggravating circumstance set forth in any the nonexistence of supported by circumstances evidence?
BACKGROUND (State) 2, 1995, May On charged State of Montana committing information with the offense of deliberate homicide in 45-5-102(l)(a), violation of alleged support MCA. The facts that, 20, 1995, charge April were on or about Sattler purposely or (Martinson) knowingly Raymond caused the death of Carl Martinson by beating him to death with a blunt instrument. Both were incar- (Jail) County cerated in the Lake Jail charged at the time of the had offense. Sattler been convicted of deliberate homicide in 1987 and *7 (MSP); in the subsequently incarcerated Montana State Prison he (Swan Training was moved to the Swan River Correctional Center River). At the time of the incident on which the deliberate homicide based, charge being in this case was Sattler was held in the Jail as by an attempted the result of deliberate homicide committed him at pleaded guilty charge present Swan River. Sattler not to the in the gave rely notice of his intent on the case affirmative defense force, justifiable commonly use of called self defense. County The case was tried to a in Powell in March of 1996. undisputed The evidence was that the altercation between Sattler death shortly and Martinson which resulted Martinson’s occurred 20, 1995, 1 the A midnight April before on in Cell of Jail’s Cell Block that Sattler inflicted a minimum of six blows to Martinson’s head a metal and neck with bar which had affixed the seat to an exercise bicycle located in that cell. A Each of four cells Cell Block contained bunks and a any inmates, sink and toilet. Cell 1
combination did house but was used as a common bathroom and exercise room the inmates. inmates, Sattler, Martinson, Cell 2 including housed five and two inmates who testified for the State at trial. Cells 3 and 4 housed two inmates, respectively. and five The remainder of Cell A Block was composed containing of a common area a main room and a shower. during period from Except approximately midnight to 6:00 a.m. day, cells, each which time the during inmates were locked in their frequently inmates sat at two picnic tables in the main room and television, played watched cards and the like. According State, to the presented by jailer Luc (Mathias)
Mathias checked on the inmates in Cell Block A at around 20, 1995, 11:20 p.m. April and saw that a few of them were watching room; in the main everything television was quiet and later, seemed normal. About 20 Healy (Healy), minutes Darlene dispatcher responsibilities monitoring whose included a surveillance Jail, system and intercom at the noticed pacing back and forth any in the main room of Cell Block A. She did not see other inmates later, in the main room at that time. Approximately 15 minutes pressed someone the intercom button in Cell A. Healy Block When pressed the button which allowed her to communicate with the caller needed, and asked the caller response what was “Man down.” repeated. Healy “Man down” was advised Mathias ofthe message and (Alexander). County called Lake Deputy Sheriff David Alexander She system; continued to monitor the surveillance and intercom she did unusual, anything thought not see but she could hear trying someone to breathe. block, Mathias went to the catwalk in front of the cell
¶ observed protruding feet from Cell locked down all of the inmates and lying entered Cell Block A. He saw Martinson on his back in Cell 1. cell; Martinson’s head was under the opposite bunk the door to the a lot lying he was of blood but was still alive. Mathias also noticed bloody lying bicycle. metal bar across the sink and the exercise Healy left the cell block and directed an Mathias to call ambulance. arrived, together emergency personnel Alexander with who approximately also noticed that Martinson’s head was three to four bunk. the local transported inches under Martinson was and died there less than an hour later. hospital *8 88 (Tammen) Tammen testified that a number of Inmate Dale Sattler, himself at
inmates, including watching and were television 20,1995. shortly midnight April Martinson tables before picnic 1, thump” a “loud from Cell and off. Tammen heard there on was turned, slumped against Martinson on the floor of Cell 1 and saw bunks; back toward the Martin- bicycle legs facing with his exercise him standing and Sattler over to be unconscious was appeared son in the back of Martin- large Tammen noticed a wound looking down. head, spin it. He possibly another next to saw Sattler and son’s lay him flat on the floor. around and Martinson cell, 2, briefly Cell and then followed went to his own Tammen away Cell 1. He the cell farthest from inmates to Cell the other “thumps” rapid five or six more approximately heard a series thereafter, Sattler period. Soon over a three- to five-second succession go to their cells. Sattler directed the inmates to Cell 4 and came then went to Cell laid began pacing, room and to the main returned borrowing a book. After a shirt reading and started on his bunk down inmate, wiped his own shirt and his feet Sattler took off another from toilet; it his shirt and flushed down up it. He then tore with changed on Sattler when he any injuries observe Tammen did not so, Tammen okay pressed it to do After Sattler said was shirts. According that there was a “man down.” reported and intercom button anything any the inmates had seen Tammen, asked if Sattler betray him. going to anyone if was Nunn identical, testimony of inmate Jonathan While not (Nunn) the events at issue. Tammen’s version of corroborated largely Cell 1 which sounded coming noises from banging loud He heard (Butler) Butler heard Similarly, inmate Leslie metal on metal. him like hitting like “metal which sounded showering while “thumping” noises cell, wrong suspected something Butler returning to his metal.” On BlockA. in the main room of Cell was alone Sattler because (Law) that the had been on testified seat Jody Inmate Law 19¶ incident an hour before the bicycle approximately in Cell exercise when he shortly before the incident there and was still question Law into Cell 1 while Sattler came 1 to use the toilet. into Cell went to the main Law returned in the cell when and remained was there tables, that Sattler noticed picnic to the Law Upon his return room. view, noteworthy, in Law’s table; this was on the glasses had left did not see off.” Law glasses] [his never took “just because but, “maybe there he left Sattler Cell 1 after into anyone go else which on behind” later, going a “scuffle he heard minutes” couple then thumping sounding of a sound and started with kind dull started something.” hitting it metal... or Law taking pipe against “like momentarily one; he noticed into and saw no looked Cell He saw bicycle a little bit. then Sattler come out the exercise moved *9 2, off on shirt. Sattler went to Cell then of his hands his wiping Cell and gathered, where the other inmates were said came to Cell inmates, anybody got a with that?” Like other Law problem “Has for in Cell while Sattler re- gasping could hear someone breath pace. to turned to the main room intimidating, unpredictable, as Inmates described Sattler bigger of the cell He was than the and the “boss” block.
temperamental smaller, Martinson, hand, the as a on other was described other inmates. lucky quiet, wimpy, was “happy go guy,” kind of who naive nonaggressive very like and pest. apparently a did not Martinson much and Sattler to him. slap frighten Martinson’s bunk frequently would (Swimmer), to Shannon Swimmer Sattler’s According inmate the weeks undergone change a for worse several before attitude had receiving when Sattler learned he would be a Martinson’s death attempted on the deliberate homicide offense significant sentence Indeed, the and in his at Jail. he Sattler placement which resulted disassembling from considered plan escape a to the Jail and devised including the the bicycle parts to use of metal bar to the exercise it— gotten removing as the but They had far as seat weapons. seat —as the seat —and which Sattler not removed bar which held the had the ultimately to beat Martinson to death. Swimmer abandoned used receiving anticipated a sentence than he had plan upon lesser escape underlying his offense. for 20,1995, April 19 or Swimmer morning April On of either the leaving he was the MSR Before asked —and transported to be to
was that, their speak during Sattler. testified permitted to Swimmer —to somebody going that was conversation, Sattler indicated to Swimmer the Martinson or the other in direction of pointed to die. Sattler could tell bunk in Cell 2. Swimmer top on a sleeping inmate event, but, any in he did not was joking serious whether an at Jail. He later told anyone to the the conversation report conversation, he stating going Sattler said was the investigator about “do” someone. to no that there were defen- The evidence presented State also to of testimony addition that on Martinson and sive-type wounds —in the on Sattler after injury no were observed signs
Tammen —that injured in claim have been attacked or did not incident. Sattler incident at the time. No fingerprints identifiable were found on metal bar which inflicted resulting death, the blows in Martinson’s spatter but blood was consistent theory with State’s most of the blows Martinson received were inflicted after his head to the ground low Cell 1. on Sattler testified his own behalf the only as witness for deny defense. He did not having death, caused Martinson’s but that he so in testified did self defense not purposely. According Sattler, he had working during been which he did not wear out — eyeglasses 20, 1995, his evening April and then —earlier watched David Letterman show on television with other inmates. toilet, When he entered Cell 1 to use dropping pants preparation, person he saw who turned to be out Martinson stand- ing by the toilet. Sattler swung testified Martinson at him with that he weapon, posture, went into a defensive and that he was hit under arm on cage. punched the left rib He Martinson and they struggled hands; over metal bar Martinson had in his went Martinson down his knees and Sattler hit him again, but According Sattler, Martinson continued to come at him. he no had of killing intention Martinson and did not think he hit had Martinson *10 hard; protect that his intent was to himself. Sattler’s version of the incident was that he struck on of top Martinson the the a head times, couple pretty of Martinson hit the lower bunk hard he when it, against fell and then hit Martinson his head on the floor. block, Sattler also testified that he was not the “boss” of the cell ¶25 that Martinson’s bunk slapped occasion, admitted he had on but any problem denied that he had with Martinson. having He denied had a conversation with Swimmer about Martinson when Swimmer leaving Jail, the expressly telling was denied that Swimmer he was and, indeed, anyone going having to kill denied ever had a conversa- long tion with Swimmer which lasted as as the conversation Swim- mer described. presented The State six rebuttal witnesses. A Jail inmate addition, jailer
testified about Sattler’s to In threats inmates. who being transported talk to allowed Swimmer to Sattler before to the IV2 minutes, MSP that the testified conversation lasted about and the transported who MSP 12 employee approximately Sattler to the swelling bruising that he no or hours after incident testified saw pretransport a search. Pat during strip Sattler Warnecke (Warnecke), juvenile County, probation the chief officer in Flathead years through testified that he had known Martinson for his work
91 that, his was not Martinson considered opinion, and otherwise Finally, aggressive individual. Martinson’s particularly a violent or that he get Martinson nonviolent and would testified that was widow at him. cry got angry even if she upset and, of homicide guilty The found Sattler deliberate notice intent thereafter, Sattler with formal of its provided State Following sentencing hearing, the death sentence. to seek fact, law, judg- its of conclusions of findings Court entered District statutory of two and sentence. The court found existence ment circumstances The and no circumstances. aggravating to death and set an execution date District Court sentenced Sattler 10, stayed July and the sentence was appealed of 1996. appeal this and automatic review. pending resolution of
DISCUSSION by limiting 1. the District Court abuse its discretion Did prospective jurors during of voir dire? questioning Sattler’s dire, counsel of individual During inquired voir Sattler’s jurors they thought jail “would prospective whether someone unless was this to something a homicide there caused commit asked the third question prospective When this was happen[.]” juror, objected question suggested the State State had to objection. District prove motive. The Court sustained We review (1985), Turley Hill v. Mont. rulings such for abuse discretion. 218 50, 511, 520, 710 56. P.2d had a to voir right Sattler contends that he dire on justifiable right infringed use of force and that the
defense of
him inquire
Court’s refusal
to allow
about whether
the District
jail.
to commit homicide
It is true
must be a cause
reason
there
that,
given,
of a
is
a refusal
allow
where notice
defense
defense
prospective jurors
dire
on the
constitutes
voir
defendant
501,
(1980),
481,
186 Mont.
See State v. McKenzie
prejudicial error.
339,
428,
480
(citing
Olson
P.2d
State v.
822),
denied, 101 S.Ct.
¶31 and the defendant mental or defect regarding dire disease voir was the voir dire appeal. We concluded prejudice on claimed not of reliance on given had been prohibited because notice properly McKenzie, Here, the at defense. 608 P.2d 441. notice of the defense and, therefore, given was applicable. McKenzie is not Olson, In the insanity defendant asserted an ¶32 defense and was denied the to opportunity subj voir dire the ect. We determined that impartial the defendant could not be assured of an without questioning prospective juror each to see if he she could understand insanity Olson, and accept plea, the and reversed the trial court. Here, Olson, P.2d at as in gave 825. of notice the defense on however, which he to rely. Olson, intended Unlike in Sattler was permitted dire justifiable Indeed, to voir on his defense of use offorce. juror he asked each two prospective questions directly related to the first, justifiable defense of use of a person right force: whether has a him against to defend himself attacking someone with a weapon; second, against the extent to which could one defend an aggressor. questions These pointed regarding the properly sought defense to jurors ascertain prospective whether could understand accept or, alternatively, the defense at issue they whether were biased against the defense from the outset. question The disallowed the Court in present District
case, however, directly theory. did not relate to Sattler’s self defense Instead, question Sattler’s about whether a cause or reason must jail suggested exist to commit a homicide in prospective jurors to motive, required the State was to prove and Sattler concedes that it, need not do so. On the of question beyond State face went an attempt to whether were potential jurors determine biased against justifiable of force use defense. We conclude that the Court did abuse District not its discretion limiting prospective jurors. Sattler’s voir dire 2. by refusing Did District Court abuse its discretion inquire allow Sattler to into the reason the victim had been at the youth facility? Pine Hills correctional above, As set forth Sattler testified that Martinson Thereafter, Warnecke, aggressor in encounter. State called juvenile probation County, chief officer in Flathead as a rebuttal through witness. knew Martinson work and Warnecke his otherwise. opinion, Martinson was considered a or particularly In violent aggressive individual. Warnecke, Sat- beginning Prior to his cross-examination apparently counsel for a bench conference at which he
tler’s asked having Warnecke sought permission question about Martinson (Pine Hills) youth facility been sent the Pine Hills correctional once *12 was that “molestation” theory, apparently, Sattler’s for “molestation.” of prior of Martinson’s acts act and that evidence a violent was had identified Martinson as relevant after Sattler became violence recorded The bench conference was not in the incident. aggressor the inquiry thereafter. Sattler pursue the line of did not and Sattler questioning his line of prohibited the District Court that contends prejudicial of discretion and ruling constituted an abuse and that the error. review this issue absent both asserts that we cannot The State conference, did ensure was which Sattler of the bench
a record facts which would have made, specific of as to the proof and an offer evidence. Sattler contends he was unaware by the offered proven been directs our attention to reported was not the bench conference instructions, that, he advised the during settling of fact question to make a record ofhis effort to Court that he wanted District to Pine Hills for “molestation” being about Martinson sent Warnecke an violent act theory that the molestation was admissible and of his Sattler’s earlier acknowledged The District Court by Martinson. response in to an effort, prohibited questions it had agreed that record will so reflect.” “[t]he the State and directed objection Sattler, entirety reflects the of the bench this record According to to his cross-examination of prior which occurred conference word, at his the record contains neither Taking Warnecke. the State’s admissibility for or the basis of legal argument specific and, result, appellate for purposes it is deficient objection as review. however, for which generally, that the offense Sattler asserts Pine Hills was a sexual offense which
Martinson was sent to threats, bodily injury or used intimidation or force Martinson caused such, Sattler, according to Martinson’s offense the victim. As against 46-18-104(2)(c),MCA, which con- under a “crime of violence” conduct admissible under instance of Martinson’s specific stituted M.R.Evid., in the 405, identifying aggressor as Rule unresolved, certainly issue almost Rather than leave this incident. proceeding future collateral addressing it in a necessitating our case, accept we Sattler’s fact-related penalty death related to this act as true nature of Martinson’s earlier violent about the assertions merits, address, only and opinion of this purposes for Court opening brief that the District in Sattler’s arguments presented inquiry to Sattler’s line of precluding its discretion abused Warnecke. 1, Sattler relies first on two predated cases which the July
1977,
effective date
the Montana Rules of Evidence—State v. Jones
441,
(1970),
Logan
Mont.
139 P. and State v.
arguing
admitted the homicide and asserted the
of self
defense
defense.
*13
appeal,
139 R at 443. On
we addressed the issue of whether evidence
turbulent,
that
the
was reputed
decedent
to be a
violent man was
any purpose
admissible for
unless it was
shown
first
to have been
that,
to the
known
defendant. We concluded
when the issue is self
and there is doubt as to
aggressor,
defense
who was the
of
evidence
reputation
the decedent’s
for
is
in
violence
admissible
order to enable
Jones,
(citations
the
to
the
resolve
doubt.
ity by the of regarding reputation defendant the decedent’s case, for violence. Neither addressed the issue before us in this admissibility “specific the namely, of instance” evidence the regarding by victim’s character the defendant. attempting Since Sattler was to Martinson, by introduce “molestation” incident than rather evi- regarding reputation violence, dence Martinson’s for Jones and do Logan support position not his that the District Court erred in excluding the evidence. rules, regard evidentiary With to current Sattler to cites Rule
404, M.R.Evid., support in of his of argument that evidence Martin- rule, admissible. general son’s character for violence was a As char- not in prove conformity acter evidence is admissible to action there- 404(a), rule, exceptions M.R.Evid. There are to general with. Rule however, exceptions applies and one of those to the before us. case “[ejvidence 404(a)(2), M.R.Evid., pertinent Rule trait Under of by victim is character of the of the crime” admissible when offered Thus, that Sattler is correct evidence of accused. Martinson’s “pertinent” violence was admissible this case as a character for justifiable vis-a-vis his use of force defense. That character trait does however, question regarding end remains inquiry, because prove to by which Sattler entitled Martinson’s char- the means was acter for violence. pursuant character evidence is admissible Rule Where
404, M.R.Evid., proven through character or a character trait can be specific instances of conduct evidence as reputation evidence argues M.R.Evid. summa expressly authorized Rule 405(b), him M.R.Evid., that authorized to introduce the rily Rule prior support act of violence to specific instance of Martinson’s in the altercation aggressor claim that Martinson between 405(b), M.R.Evid., permits proof the two Rule of character via men. 1) specific of conduct in two situations: where character or instances person charge, a trait of a is an essential of a of character element 2) defense; character claim or and where the victim relates to defense. of force used the accused in self reasonableness 405(b), in Rule regard With first circumstance outlined determine justifiable to the use of force defense to we must look character for violence was an essential element whether Martinson’s 45-3-102, MCA, justified is person of that defense. Pursuant using another against force reasonably
when the extent he and to believes such necessary to against defend himself ... such other’s conduct is However, justified use of unlawful he is in the use imminent force. likely bodily cause harm he *14 of force to death or serious if necessary prevent that force is to immi- reasonably believes such bodily nent or serious harm to himself. ... death statutorily-defined directly defense to the Nothing in the relates identity aggressor of the and Sattler cites to no question of the an identity aggressor which the is “essential authority under justifiable of force defense. His bare contention element” of the use character was an essential element of that Martinson’s for violence We of force does not make it so. conclude justifiable his use defense regarding prior instance” Martinson’s that “specific through to introduce Warnecke was sought violent act Sattler which 405(b), forth in Rule under the first circumstance set not admissible M.R.Evid. 405(b), Rule outlined in The second circumstance conduct admis-
M.R.Evid., specific instances of victim’s renders 96
sible where victim’s character regarding violence or aggression relates to the reasonableness of the force used the accused in self this regard, defense. In we need observe that this was not purpose sought for which Sattler prior to introduce Martinson’s act Indeed, above, of violence. as discussed sought to introduce to the evidence show that Martinson was the aggressor in the inci- dent, support any not against to claim that the force he used Martin- son knowledge was reasonable based on his of history Martinson’s of result, As a violent acts. we conclude that “specific of instance” conduct sought through Martinson’s which Sattler to introduce Warnecke was not admissible under the second circumstance set 405(b), in forth Rule M.R.Evid. two new arguments relating Sattler raises to this issue reply Legal
his brief. theories raised for the first in an appellant’s time reply scope outside of a brief are such brief and we do not address 23(c), M.R.App.P.; Loney Rule Milodragovich, See v. & them. Dale (citation (1995), 512, Dye, 506, 158, P.C. 273 Mont. 905 P.2d 162 omitted). do so tilt the in a To would balance case in favor of the party gets who the final word presenting arguments its this Court. Moreover, we while have addressed this issue an absent appropriate later, record in now order resolve it rather than we did arguments so on presented the basis in Sattler’s opening presented during brief were those to the District Court trial cases, this all a principles guide party may case. Under not theory from change appeal on that advanced in the trial court. See 524, (1994), 520, 626, 629; State v. Fisch 266 Mont. 881 P.2d State v. (1994), 454, 458, 1013, 1016. may Henderson 877 P.2d Nor party argument City an for the time appeal. raise first Jones v. (citations 341, 347, Mont. Billings P.2d omitted). Notwithstanding case, penalty that this is death we are inclined, neither nor required, Sattler to re-create both the allow once, record arguments and his but twice. We decline to address newly these raised arguments. Finally, any we observe that error in the District
Court’s refusal to admit the evidence of violent prior Martinson’s act 405, M.R.Evid., necessarily under Rule would not have resulted prejudicial and error. is error reversible Reversible error which 46-20-701, MCA; of a See rights party. affects the substantial Rule 103(a), Here, if prove M.R.Evid. even Sattler were entitled to Martin- specific son’s character for violence via the instance of conduct under M.R.Evid., we that exclusion ofthe evidence would Rule conclude
97 rights light affected Sattler’s substantial in of the other not have Thus, the record here does not establish prejudi- evidence of record. 46-20-701(1), MCA, and, a reversal is cial error under not war- § ranted. First, act while Martinson’s of “molestation” was relevant
¶50 tendency disputed had a to make the existence of a fact— that it testified, whether, the aggressor as Sattler Martinson was —more (see 401, M.R.Evid.), slight given Rule the relevance was probable It was from the other evidence of record. clear circumstances of this addition, jury Martinson was incarcerated in the Jail. In case that that Martinson had been committed to Pine Hills during was aware youth that he had in an escape attempt been involved when Furthermore, years he was 14 or 15 old. Warnecke testified that if weapon, Martinson “could be” violent armed with a as Sattler Thus, specifics he was. whatever of the evidence of testified “molestation,” it Martinson’s act of would have been cumulative to jury. about Martinson which was negative other evidence before the Moreover, whatever the nature of Martinson’s “molestation” act, years approximately eight it had occurred before Martinson’s death, by reckoning during argument, Sattler’s counsel’s own oral at years. Therefore, a time when Martinson was in his mid-teen the act only potentially remote but excludable on that basis. was not See 404, (1992), 401, 565, Benton 825 P.2d 567. Even State v. grounds, lapse if not excluded on remoteness of time between act and his death in Martinson’s “molestation” 1995 rendered the at probity of his act minimal best. did abuse We hold the District Court its discretion
refusing inquire to allow Sattler to into the reason the victim had Hills. been at Pine support 3. Was there sufficient evidence to the conviction? homicide, ultimately guilty The found Sattler of deliberate MCA, 45-5-102(l)(a), purposely knowingly defined in as
which is so, being. doing implicitly of another human In it causing the death justifiable defense of use of force. rejected Sattler’s case, every required the State was As is true in criminal 46-16-204, reasonable doubt. See guilt beyond Sattler’s prove producing had the burden of sufficient Conversely, MCA. justifiable use of force defense to raise support of his v. Daniels guilt. about his See State reasonable doubt 173, charged the elements of the P.2d 181. Like Mont. is, that he was not offense, of Sattler’s defense —that the elements reasonably aggressor, he believed he inwas imminent danger force and that of unlawful he used such force reasonably as was *16 (see necessary prevent bodily his own death or serious harm MCA) 45-3-102, factual in nature and are to be by determined —are (1994), jury. Arlington 127, 140, See State v. 265 Mont. 875 P.2d (citation omitted). 307, 314 It is within the province of the finder of weigh fact to the evidence presented and determine the credibility of witnesses; in the event conflicting issues, of evidence on factual trier of fact determines which will prevail. (1993), State v. Flack 260 (citation omitted). 181, 189, 89, Mont. 860 P.2d argues Sattler that prove beyond there was insufficient evidence to a reasonable doubt purposely that he acted and knowingly causing Martinson’s death light presented of evidence he in support justifiable of his use force defense. of This Court the sufficiency reviews evidence to a guilty whether,
sustain verdict in a criminal case to determine after viewing light the evidence in the prosecution, most favorable to the any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of beyond a (1995), offense reasonable doubt. State v. Richards (citations omitted). 180, 184, 222, 224 Mont. 906 P.2d Given our regarding discussion above the factual justifiable nature of the use of force defense and Sattler’s burden producing enough evidence on doubt, the defense to raise a reasonable it is clear that our sufficiency where, here, of the evidence standard remains unchanged as we are reviewing a verdict which necessarily rejected the fact-based words, question defense advanced. In other of whether the defen produced regarding dant sufficient evidence the affirmative defense a reasonable guilt to raise doubt as to his is in the question subsumed whether, light viewed in the most the prosecution, any favorable to rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the beyond offense a reasonable doubt. above, person As set forth a commits the offense of homicide if he or she purposely knowingly
deliberate
or
causes the
45-5-102(l)(a),
being.
death of another human
See
MCA. A person
with
to a result
purposely
regard
by
acts
or to conduct described
a
if
defining
person’s
object
statute
an offense
it is the
conscious
45-2-101(63),
engage in the conduct or cause the result. Section
MCA.
regard
person
knowingly
person
A
acts
with
to a result when the
is
highly probable
that it is
that the result will be caused
aware
45-2-101(34),
purposely
her conduct. Section
MCA. The
or
or
know
ingly
required
support
mental state
a criminal conviction can be
circumstantial
by direct evidence or inferred from
proved
of the accused and the facts and circumstances
as the acts
such
45-2-103(3), MCA; State v. Albrecht
surrounding the offense. See §
413,
791 P.2d
766.
record, we conclude that a rational
trier of fact could
On this
that Sattler
beyond
purposely
a reasonable doubt
have found
Factually,
undisputed
Martinson’s death.
it was
knowingly caused
by inflicting
Martinson’s death
blows to his head
that Sattler caused
inflicting
a metal bar. Sattler admitted
the blows
and neck area with
killed Martinson and the State’s medical examiner
testified
which
actually
of the blows
indented —or caved in —Martinson’s
that one
skull;
beating
also was sufficient
to bruise
brain. Notwith-
testimony
Martinson,
that he did not intend to kill
standing Sattler’s
injuries
together
the nature of Martinson’s
fatal
with Sattler’s
—
jury’s ability
of his conduct and the
to infer that he
awareness
also
that there was a
high probability
was aware
that conduct would
result
in Martinson’s death —was sufficient
to support
finding
purposely
knowingly
beyond
caused Martinson’s death
*17
Arlington,
See
supporting
reasonable doubt.
774 P.2d on which support that, his argument having presented evidence on all defense, three elements of his jury had insufficient evidence before it to find that he acted purposely knowingly and to convict him of deliberate homicide. In Arlington, Popescu we cited to for the three proved elements which must be to establish the justifiable order affirmative defense of use of force. (citation omitted). Arlington, 875 P.2d at Popescu, In the issue on appeal was whether the defendant had introduced sufficient evidence submitting justifiable to warrant use of force jury. defense to the had, held that he reversed the We trial court’s refusal to instruct defense, jury on the and remanded Popescu, for new trial. 774 P.2d at That is not present Here, 396-97. issue before us in the case. jury justifiable District Court did instruct the on Sattler’s use of force defense and the instruction reflected its determination that there was submitting sufficient evidence to warrant jury. defense to the Neither nor Arlington Popescu proposition stands for the that evi- justifiable dence sufficient to warrant submitting use of force defense to a raises a reasonable doubt as to a criminal defen- a matter guilt dant’s as of law. Finally, we observe that Sattler effectively conceded this issue There, reply appeal.
in his brief on he stated that “it could not be said *18 that the State had failed case ...” prove [sic] it’s that, record, We conclude on this the could have found the ¶63 charged beyond essential elements of the deliberate homicide offense result, a doubt. As a we hold that there was sufficient reasonable support evidence to Sattler’s conviction. 4. Did the District Court commit reversible error in
¶64 circumstances? analyzing aggravating mitigating its intent to seek formal notice of served After State hearing re- sentencing District Court held penalty, death or nonex- 46-18-301, MCA, the existence to determine by quired § 46-18-303, as set forth in § circumstances aggravating istence of 46-18-304, MCA. forth in § as set MCA, mitigating circumstances cir- mitigating and no circumstances aggravating that two It found sentenced Sattler Accordingly, the District Court existed. cumstances to death. regard- District Court’s determinations challenges the Sattler We consider his circumstances.
ing aggravating both in turn. arguments circumstances Aggravating
a. statutory aggravating that two determined The District Court first, which Sattler was that the offense of existed: circumstances by person a and it “was committed deliberate homicide convicted was as set forth prison!,]” in the state imprisonment a serving sentence and, second, deliberate 46-18-303(1), MCA; that the offense was in § of another “had been convicted previously and Sattler homicide 46-18-303(2), homicide[,]” MCA. Sattler as set forth in § deliberate that the offense was Court’s determination that the District contends imprisonment in the serving a sentence of person committed law, on v. Keith relying a matter of State is erroneous as prison state and, result, as a that his death (1988), Mont. 754 P.2d vacated. should be sentence offenses, Keith, guilty charged to six pleaded In the defendant Keith, 754 kidnaping and deliberate homicide.
including aggravated
Washington
the state of
at
parole
Keith was on
from
P.2d at 476-77.
basis,
ultimately
and,
that
the trial court
the offenses
the time of
MCA,
46-18-303(1),
circumstance
aggravating
determined
concluding that
appeal,
that determination on
We reversed
existed.
serving “a sentence
applied
person
to a
expressly
the statute
plain language
of the
prison” and that
in the state
imprisonment
include an
interpretation which would
permit
an
statute did
Keith,
aggravating circumstances existed in this case. The first is the “serving a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison” circum- stance discussed above. The second is that contained in 46-18- § 303(2), MCA, and undisputed by namely, Sattler: that the deliberate homicide was committed previously defendant —Sattler—who had been convicted of another deliberate homicide. The court also concluded that “either [aggravating circumstance] is sufficient to support the sentence to be imposed.” In determining whether to impose sentence, a death a sentenc- ing court in Montana must take into account the statutory aggravat- ing and mitigating circumstances and impose “shall a sentence of death if it finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances” and mitigating no sufficiently circumstances substantial to call for leni- ency. 46-18-305, Thus, Section MCA. the District Court in this case was statutorily required to sentence Sattler to death upon the finding single aggravating circumstance that previously he had been convicted of a deliberate homicide and the absence of mitigating circumstances sufficient to call leniency. for Nor, statutory under a penalty death scheme like Mon tana’s, must a death sentence be reversed or a new sentencing hearing conducted if one of several aggravating circumstances found to exist is subsequently held to inapplicable. be See Zant v. Stephens 862, 873-80, 103 462 U.S. 2733, 2741-44, 77 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 247-52. Sattler does not Indeed, contend otherwise. he concedes that the death penalty may still imposed be under Zant so long as this Court ensures that the inapplicability of one aggravating circum stance does not render penalty the death arbitrary or capricious. goes on to argue that this penalty death is arbitrary or capricious, and we address his arguments in that regard in issue five part below as of our automatic review ofthe death pursuant sentence through 46-18-310, 46-18-307 §§ MCA. above, As noted District Court concluded that the existence of either one of the aggravating circumstances was sufficient to That conclusion is correct in this case. the death sentence support result, 46-18-305, MCA, and, any error in the court’s as a under § MCA, 46-18-303(1), aggravating circum- the § determination rights not affect Sattler’s substantial exists in this case would stance Therefore, 46-20-701, MCA. we hold that the him. See prejudice analyzing reversible error in Court did not commit District circumstances, aggravating Mitigating circumstances b. findings regard made extensive with to both The District Court MCA, 46-18-304(1), circumstances enumerated *20 in circumstances set forth 46-18- mitigating § the “catchall” Indeed, mitigating addressed each of the
304(2), findings its MCA. meticulously in the statute and methodi- enumerated circumstances each, relating record and found cally, any forth evidence of set existed. Sattler advances mitigating circumstance whether or not relating to the District Court’s assertions of error a number of circumstances. analysis mitigating of is that the District Court erred Sattler’s first contention mitigating factor rather than considering every enumerated
in mitigating circumstances. He cites he raised and relied on as those error and it is clear that of this assertion of authority support to no in 46-18-306, MCA, imposing a death sentence to requires a court § to the existence or nonex findings of fact as make written “specific set forth in ... 46-18-304.” See each of the circumstances istence of 158, 167, 1272, 1277, P.2d Mont. 931 v. Smith also State (1997). We conclude that 139 L.Ed.2d cert. denied 118 S.Ct. considering mitigating each of the did not err in the District Court 46-18-304(1), MCA. in circumstances enumerated § improperly that the District Court also contends justification as for mitigating circumstances considered the lack of 46-18-305, sentence, contrary to MCA. This imposing § the death 46-18-305, above, As discussed entirely § without merit. contention is if or more a death sentence one MCA, imposition of requires circum mitigating are no exist and there circumstances aggravating leniency. reaching In that for sufficiently to call substantial stances carefully case, District Court in this sentencing issue ultimate required 46- § circumstances analysis mitigating performed existed. mitigating circumstances 18-304, MCA, that no and found conclusions, sentence judgment and findings, in the court’s Nothing urged by Sattler. interpretation supports the Next, Sattler asserts that the District Court erred in failing to find the existence of the mitigating circumstance contained 46-18-304(l)(e), MCA, namely, in § “[t]he that victim partici was a pant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.” The court found that there was no evidence that Martinson was a participant in conduct or Sattler’s consented to the act being beaten to death by him. The court also found that accept “[t]he did not defen claim dant’s of self defense and neither does the Court.” argument that, Sattler’s seems to be notwithstanding the jury’s rejection theory, of his self defense the court was required to testimony consider his aggressor Martinson was the as mitigat- 46-18-304(l)(e), MCA, ing evidence under that Martinson partici- pated in or consented death, to Sattler’s acts which resulted and to make findings his favor thereunder in sentencing. We that, at that observe outset as a matter of logic, argument Sattler’s apples is flawed because it mixes and oranges. The cir- 46-18-304(l)(e), cumstance set forth in MCA—that Martinson par- ticipated in or consented to Sattler’s act—would not exist even assuming arguendo testimony the truth of Sattler’s that Martinson aggressor. that, The theory, reason is even under Sattler’s own, words, Martinson’s acts were his as were Sattler’s. In other may produced Martinson’s acts have responsive Sattler’s acts—in Sattler’s version of the events at issue—does not make Martinson a participant or a consenter to Sattler’s acts of him beating to death. Therefore, Sattler’s self testimony defense-related that Martinson *21 aggressor simply was the did not constitute mitigating evidence ofthe 46-18-304(l)(e), result, circumstance set forth MCA. As a § District not obligated Court was to consider it or to make findings relating thereto. Nor is Sattler’s reliance on State v. Korell
¶79
992,
legal support
690 P.2d
as
for this
well
argument
placed. In
Korell,
charged
the defendant was
with
deliberate
attempted
homi-
aggravated
gave
rely
cide and
assault and
intent
notice of his
to
on a
prove
“mental disease or defect” defense to
that he did not have the
required
mental state
as an essential element ofthe
charged.
offenses
Korell,
jury
charged
required
defect,”
jury
even where
had
from a “mental disease
suffered
Indeed, the court could sentence the defen-
the defendant.
convicted
finding that the defen-
specifically
after
imprisonment
dant to
the time of the
from such a disease at
offense.
dant did not suffer
Korell,
imposing
In
of the statutes
an affirm-
light
hearing and the District Court merely found that sentences in other cases did not mitigating constitute a circumstance with regard to Sattler and the deliberate homicide at issue. This determination is not at holding was, odds with our most, Smith and it at an indication of the sentencing court’s caution and thoroughness in attempting to all arguments address of Sattler’s and evidence in the findings mitigating circumstances. Sattler’s second relating assertion of error his reference to cases, riot prison disproportionality vis-a-vis his argument, is
that the District Court failed to address whether the death sentence in this case was excessive disproportionate to the penalties im- after the posed authority riot trials. He cites no under which the so, however, and, required District Court was to do as discussed above, Montana statutes and case law reserve the proportionality 46-18-310, MCA;Smith, review to this Court. Sections 46-18-307 and P.2d at 1282. Next, argues that the District Court did not (1) (2) psychological consider either report presented, he that he dysfunctional family circumstances, came from as outlined in the (3) report, or that the presentence unwilling negotiate State was away penalty mitigating the death as circumstances under 46-18- 304(2), MCA. It is clear that the court did the psychological consider by as established its report, finding report fully “said has been authority considered the Court.” Sattler advances no under which the fact that the sentencing report court considered relation to 46-18-304(l)(d), MCA, circumstance set forth in § rather than as a mitigating 46-18-304(2), MCA, circumstance under § legal *23 constitutes error. Moreover, while the District findings
¶88
Court’s
on mitigating
expressly
circumstances did not
reference
family
either the
informa
tion contained in the presentence report or Sattler’s evidence of the
unwillingness
State’s
to enter
plea bargain
into a
that excluded the
penalty,
death
the court indicated that it had considered all of the
defendant,
evidence and all of the
circumstances
including his
propensities.
character and
The
require
law does not
the sentencing
court to make
on
findings
piece
each
of purportedly mitigating evi
Smith,
produced.
dence
See
¶89 Court did not err in analyzing mitigating circumstances. 5. Was the death imposed sentence under the influence passion, prejudice any arbitrary or other factor? This Court automatically every reviews death sentence
imposed 46-18-307, under Montana so, law. Section MCA. In doing we determine “whether the imposed sentence of death was under the passion, prejudice, any influence of arbitrary other factor[.]” Sec 46-18-310(1), review, tion MCA. Our conducted from a statewide perspective rather than from the individualized perspective the sen tencing apply, court must against serves as a check arbitrary impo Smith, sition the death penalty. See 1282; 931 P.2d at State v. (1991), Langford 420, 436, 936, 813 P.2d 948 (citing Gregg 153, Georgia 206, 2909, v. 428 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 893). Here, Sattler asserts that the death imposed sentence was passion, prejudice under the influence of arbitrary or other factors imposed because the District Court the sentence day on the same sentencing hearing was held and because the sentence was based on Indeed, Sattler’s lack of rehabilitation. urges the District improperly Court converted the lack of aggra- rehabilitation into an vating circumstance. We have reviewed the record and conclude that it penalty imposed any does not indicate that the death was under arbitrary influence. regard With to the promptness of the District Court’s written conclusions,
findings, sentence, judgment and the sentencing hearing in this case lasted hours and the presented 1V2 complex. neither extensive nor The District Court recessed the hear- ing and indicated that it findings had drafted and conclusions to fit both a life sentence and the death sentence give and would its findings predrafted consideration, and conclusions full along with “the material that was introduced the sentencing hearing] [at and the my later, court file and notes.” Two hours the court reconvened and conclusions, findings, read its sentence and judgment open court presence. above, in Sattler’s As discussed the District Court’sfindings aggravating circumstances thorough were detailed; further, they reflected that the court took the evidence determining impose before it into account in penalty. the death Sattler also contends that the District Court improperly used imposing his lack ofrehabilitation as the for basis the death sentence and, indeed, converted that lack of aggravating rehabilitation into an *24 support First, circumstance. The record does not this contention. the and findings addressing court’s conclusions were confined to aggravating and circumstances set forth 46-18-303 §§ 46-18-304, conclusions, and MCA. On the of findings basis those and judgment the District Court entered its and sentence imposing the sentence on Sattler. In a later of the portion judgment death sentence, correctly quoted policy court correctional of this society by being protect preventing through pun- State as “to crime (see MCA) 46-18-101, ishment and rehabilitation of the convicted” conduct, that, by and observed his own Sattler had not taken advan- tage opportunities provided prison of the for rehabilitation via his legal term for the 1987 deliberate homicide. No or factual error exists and, portion judgment in that of the while discussion of Montana’s may required, certainly not have been it was not policy correctional support That discussion does not Sattler’s contentions prohibited. of his lack of imposed that the death sentence was because rehabili- the lack improperly and that the court converted of rehabilita- tation circumstance. aggravating tion to an conclude, us, on the record before that the sentence of death We
¶95 passion, prejudice, any under the influence of or imposed was not arbitrary factor. other imposed disproportionate the death sentence to the 6. Is imposed in similar cases?
penalty
above,
required
this Court is
to determine
As noted
given
in a
case is “excessive
imposed
the sentence of death
whether
cases,
consid
penalty imposed
to the
similar
disproportionate
or
46-18-310(3),
Section
MCA.
the crime and the defendant.”
ering both
review,
reference the
we must
proportionality
In performing
46-18-310(3),
Moreover,
Section
MCA.
cases we considered.
similar
could have
only
penalty
where the death
was—or
examine
cases
we
appealed.
and which were
See State
imposed after conviction
been—
333-34,
1000, 1020,
(1979),
299,
605 P.2d
cert.
185 Mont.
v. Coleman
970, 100
2952,
(1980),
denied,
S.Ct.
limitation vis-a-vis conviction, been, into was, after and to take imposed or could have in which inmates at the MSP prison the so-called riot cases account sought penalty homicides but the death was committed deliberate however, request argument, at oral imposed. or He withdrew 46-18-310, MCA, amended noting Legislature that the 1997 review we set essentially incorporate scope proportionality Laws, Ch. Sec. 1. See 1997 Mont. forth Smith. mind, our review in scope proportionality proper With
therefore, ofthe death sentence proportionality we must examine in which a appealed other cases to us compared in this case as with incarcerated defendant and was committed an deliberate homicide imposed. undisputed It is penalty sought the death and, circum- they because arose from the same cases exist two such stances, together. them we consider with, charged Gollehon were Turner and William Douglas *25 accountability of, by based on their deliberate homicide
and convicted
bat while all
Pileggi to death with baseball
having beaten Gerald
237;
Turner,
P.2d
v.
at the MSP.
864
at
State
incarcerated
three were
1,
249, 254,
denied,
8-9,
513
P.2d
cert.
864
Gollehon
(1994).
testimony at trial
95,
L.Ed.2d 45
The
S.Ct.
130
U.S.
115
injuries
the head and trunk
multiple
Pileggi
died of
indicated
blows,
which was sufficient
including one
from at least four
resulting
Gollehon,
Turner,
238;
P.2d at
at
864 P.2d
in his skull.
to cave
An
252-53.
inmate testified that Gollehon “had indicated that he was
going to ‘mess [Pileggi] up.”’ The same inmate saw Gollehon start the
fight
Pileggi
with
yard,
the exercise
watched the two struggle for
control of the bat and then saw Turner
join
arrive and
Gollehon in
continuing
Pileggi
to beat
after he fell
ground. Gollehon,
to the
253; Turner,
P.2d at
Regarding
the court found the existence of two aggravating
circumstances, namely, that Turner
serving
was
a term of imprison-
ment at the MSP when he committed the offense and
pre-
that he
viously had been convicted of a deliberate homicide. It also found that
Turner’s difficult childhood was insufficient
to call for lenity under
Turner,
the circumstances.
viously been convicted of a and, deliberate homicide while we have not resolved whether the second aggravating circumstance which existed in Turner’s and here, Gollehon’s cases applies it is clear that all three men were incarcerated at the they time committed their deliberate Finally, homicides. mitigation evidence of on which Sattler premised lenity his call for stronger no than that presented by Turner and persuasive less than that presented by Gollehon. arguments Sattler’s imposition penalty death
this case would be disproportionate to the penalties imposed death generally Turner and Gollehon are based on his version of the facts rather than the accepted by jury. version argues He also differ- *26 offenses, two persons two such as that relating to the in the facts enees than Pileggi, who was smaller beating death of in the were involved conceive, certainly and we cannot explain, He does not of them. either A—acted alone in “boss” of Cell Block that Sattler —the the fact how smaller, death renders the death wimpy guy Martinson —a beating —to and imposed in Turner Gollehon. to those disproportionate here penalty Pileggi beaten to death to the fact that points also 105 Sattler ¶ this, he Martinson was not. From while eyewitnesses, front of in and circumstan- against speculative him was that the evidence posits essentially jury’s weighing relates to the Again, argument this tial. homicide, rather of the deliberate convicting in him the evidence of Having in this case. penalty of the death proportionality to the than the convic- support evidence exists above that sufficient concluded arguments. of types further address these tion, need not we that, the existence of both argue absent also seems Sattler Gollehon, in Turner and circumstances found aggravating matter law. He cites to here as a disproportionate is penalty death however, dispropor- support proposition in authority, no aggra- the number of penalties death when tionality exists between factually equal. similar cases is not Nor is in vating circumstances under proportionality of our review scope within the that a matter 46-18-310, MCA, Turner. Smith and Gollehon, that, unlike Turner and Finally, contends and, result, the death his acts as a responsibility for accepted he a defen- regard here. Without to whether disproportionate penalty is proper offense at issue is a responsibility for the acceptance of dant’s review, reject prem- Sattler’s we proportionality in our consideration Martinson, killing he has that Sattler admitted it is true ise. While he was right he had a to do so because assert continued to justifiable continuing to assert a equate We do not defending himself. “ac- rejected has it—with defense —even after use of force Thus, homicide. we for a brutal deliberate cepting responsibility’ further. this contention need not consider in the and the defendant the offense Having considered and defendants in other to the offenses proportion in case
present this imposed that the death sentence cases, conclude we Montana penalty imposed to the disproportionate is not excessive case cases. similar findings regarding Court’s 7. Are the District 46-18-303(2), set forth circumstance aggravating theof
existence MCA, any and the nonexistence of mitigating sup- circumstances ported the evidence? Our includes, automatic review of death sentences in addition “arbitrary proportionality above,
to the factor” and issues discussed supports sentencing whether regard- court’s findings ing aggravating mitigating 46-18-310(2), and circumstances. See § This issue separate apart arguments MCA. is and from the relating aggravating which circumstances Sattler raised— we resolved —in issue four above. *27 The Court District made a number of factual underlying ¶111 findings ultimate relating finding to its that the circum aggravating 46-18-303(1), in namely, stance contained that deliber the § MCA— by homicide was a person serving ate committed a of sentence prison in the state The imprisonment findings underlying —exists. only by evidence, they supported are the are undisputed. As above, discussed we need not resolve whether here the court’s ulti regarding aggravating mate determination this is circumstance cor because, incorrect, even if it rect was harmless. Nor need address we length at whether the evidence supports the District ultimate Court’s aggravating determination that the circumstance set forth in 46- § 18-303(2), by MCA—that the deliberate homicide was committed previously of a It person convicted deliberate does homicide —exists. and, indeed, Furthermore, is undisputed. this also the evidence findings the the supports regarding court’s nonexistence other 46-18-303, set aggravating circumstances forth in MCA. § With whether regard supports the evidence District the ¶112 findings Court’s on the existence or nonexistence of the mitigating 46-18-304, MCA, circumstances enumerated we conclude that it § The mitigating does. enumerated circumstance on which Sattler argument “participating consenting evidence or was the offered or 46-18-304(l)(e), argument the homicide under As to” MCA. dis- § above, testimony self cussed Sattler’s defense did not this establish fact, Thus, mitigating logic circumstance as a matter of law. supported finding mitigating the District Court’s this circumstance did not exist. other mitigation Sattler’s evidence in was advanced MCA, 46-18-304(2), and provision
under “catchall” contained in § evaluation, family background, psychological consisted of his a 1984 Jail, the fact housed in rather that he was than returned MSP, upon charged attempted with deliberate homicide being However, at Swan River. the mere introduction of evidence while regarding mitigating require circumstances does not finding circumstance to which the evidence relates exists. We conclude that the District Court’s findings regarding the aggravating 46-18-303(2), existence of the circumstance set forth MCA, any mitigating nonexistence of circumstances are supported by the evidence. Affirmed. TURNAGE,
CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICES NELSON and REG- NIER concur. LEAPHART, specially
JUSTICE concurring. I concur with result reached the Court and I would However, judgment affirm the of the District Court. for the reasons my (1996), forth in special set concurrence in State v. Smith 158, 186, 1272, 1289, I 931 P.2d agree do not with the limits that this legislature Court and the placed upon scope have propor of our (1997). tionality 46-18-310, Nonetheless, review. Section MCA 46-18-310, whether reviewed under MCA or under the more expansive standard that I have I suggested, agree that the sentence imposed on Sattler was not out proportion cases, to other similar specifically the Turner and opinion. Gollehon cases cited in the specially
JUSTICE TRIEWEILER concurring. I concur with the result majority opinion. of the I would affirm judgment of the District I agree Court. do not with all that is said therein, however, particular, and in with disagree parts major- *28 ity’s affirming rationale for the District Court’s exclusion of the prior victim’s criminal offense. majority 45-3-102, MCA, The first sets forth which pertains self-defense, and then nothing
to concludes that the statute has to do with which of two aggressor. individuals was the I would conclude is, that the all aggressor. statute is about who was the Self-defense definition, by aggression. a reaction to an act of The fact that the term 45-3-102, MCA, “aggressor” is not used in should not foreclose the obvious. I would affirm the District Court’s exclusion of evidence (whatever was)
regarding prior Martinson’s offense that offense adequate proof preserve the basis no offer of was made to the 103(a)(2), M.R.Evid., for Rule appeal. provides issue as follows: (a)... may predicated upon ruling Error not be which admits right party or excludes unless a substantial is affected, and
(2)... evidence, In ruling excluding case the is one the substance of the evidence was made known the by court offer or was within from the context apparent questions which were asked. case, we, court, In reviewing this as the do not know sought of the evidence Sattler to introduce. During substance juvenile probation during cross-examination of the officer which offense, sought to introduce evidence of Martinson’s prior with the District Court occurred in a manner that discussion could by jury not be heard and was not recorded. The record we do during have are comments made after conclusion of evidence and time, following the settlement of instructions. At that discus- sion was had: ATTORNEY]: Your while Honor, waiting,
[MARTINSON’S we’re thing one other I think we need to on the record would put be testify- had in terms of when Mr. Warnecke conversation we Martinson my in of Mr. ing, wanting get being about sent to Pine Hills for molestation because I believe that was a violent act. And that it objected the State and the Court indicated would not allow questions. me to ask those respect charge,
THE COURT: to the molestation that’s cor- With rect. Right.
[MARTINSON’S ATTORNEY]: THE record will so reflect. COURT: The “molestation,” There is no offense in Montana known as sought acts Martinson which Sattler to introduce were specific Therefore, adequate I that an proof not identified. conclude offer of that there is an record on was not made and insufficient which to a pertaining conclude that relevant evidence characteristic by the District Court. violence was excluded affirm reasons, judgment I would of the District 122 For these ¶ Court, majority though agree even I do not with all that is said opinion. specially
JUSTICE HUNT concurs. majority opinion join I in the result of the Justice concur Leaphart in their concur- Terry N. Trieweiler and Justice W. William ring opinions.