State v. SappState v. Sapp
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Swanstrom
Lead Opinion
Lаrry Sapp entered a guilty plea to the charges of delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to dеliver in exchange for the state’s dismissal of another delivery charge.
• Sapp raises severаl issues. Sapp contends that he is being illegally detained in violation of his due process rights because there exists no judgment and commitment. Sapp also asserts that the district court erred by imposing or “reimposing” sentences in Sapp’s absence. Finally, Sapp contends thаt the sentences imposed are excessive, and thus the district court abused its sentencing discretion. The state contends that the noticе of appeal is timely only with respect to the denial of the Rule 35 motion. Therefore, we must first decide which issues are properly bеfore the Court.
Contrary to Sapp’s contention, a judgment and commitment was filed on December 26, 1990. After a period of retained jurisdiction and a report from the jurisdictional review committee recommending probation from the North Idaho Correctional Institute (NICI) in Cottonwоod, the court temporarily suspended the sentence on May 13, 1991. The court ordered Sapp released from the custody of NICI and placed in the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff and further ordered Sapp to appear in court on May 24, 1991.
On May 21, 1991, however, the court filed an order relinquishing jurisdiction based on a new report from the jurisdictional review committee. The report informed the court of Sapp‘s receipt of several disciplinary offense reports arising from *19one occasion of disobedience of orders and his commission of internal NICI rule violations, namely, unauthorized possession of kitchen and commissary items. The new recommendation to drop jurisdictiоn followed the committee‘s conclusion that Sapp had failed to significantly change his attitude, that he minimized his responsibility and that he had initially refused to cooperate with an officer. The committee was of the opinion that Sapp would continue to have prоblems if placed on probation.
On June 7,1991, Sapp moved the court to reconsider its May 21 order to relinquish jurisdiction. The court heard the motion on June 17, and denied the motion. On August 20, Sapp moved the court to reduce his sentence under I.C.R. 35. On September 6, a hearing on Sapp’s Rule 35 motion was held. The court minutes from that hearing reflect that the court denied the motion. Sapp filed his notice of appeal on October 11, 1991, from the court’s order denying the Rule 35 motion.
The state contends that the notice of appeal is untimely with respect to all of the issues raised by Sapp. The state correctly points out that the notice of appeal (October 11) was filed more than forty-two days after the order to quash jurisdiction (May 21). I.A.R. 14. The state notes that Sapp did not argue in his brief that the time period to file an appeal was tolled by his filing of a motion to reconsider. Further the state contends that Sapp could not avail himself of this argument because Sapp’s motion to reconsider was filed seventeen days after the order relinquishing jurisdiction, and thus it cannot serve to toll the period in which tо file an appeal. See I.A.R. 14(a) (motion which could affect judgment filed within fourteen days thereof tolls the appellate filing period). As a result, the state asserts that all issues with respect to the judgment of conviction, sentence and retention of jurisdiction are not properly raised. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991). We agree.
The notice of appeal is timely with regard to the court’s denial of the Rule 35 motion. However, Sapp does not expressly contend that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the Rule 35 motion. Sapp only broadly asserts that the court erred in sentencing him too harshly, and that he has been incarcerated long enough to satisfy all of the sentencing goals. He has hardly framed an issue specifiс to the denial of his Rule 35 motion. Nevertheless, because our standard of review of a Rule 35 determination dictates that we apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence, and Sapp’s argument is broadly presented, we will аddress this issue. See State v. Matthews, 118 Idaho 659, 663, 798 P.2d 941, 945 (Ct.App.1990) (stating the standard of appellate review of denial of Rule 35 motion).
The maximum penalty for each of the two crimеs Sapp pled guilty to is life imprisonment in addition to a $25,000 maximum fine.
Sapp was thirty-seven years old when sentenced. He did not have a prior felony record; however, his presentence investigation report reveals sеveral moving violations and misdemeanors for reckless driving, driving without privileges and driv*20ing without insurance. Sapp stated at the sentencing hearing that previously he had never sold drugs for profit. He did admit to selling drugs to keep some for his own use. As to the specific nature of the offenses, Saрp sold approximately one gram of cocaine on one occasion and 2.79 grams of cocaine on another.
In light of Sapp’s violation of several NICI rules after the jurisdictional review committee had recommended probation, the committeе’s final recommendation against probation, and his character and the nature of the offenses, we cannot say that under any reаsonable view of the facts the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion or that the sentences are unreasonable. For the аbove reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sapp’s request for a reduction of his sentence. The order dеnying the Rule 35 motion is affirmed.
LANSING, J., concurs.
Concurrence Opinion
concurs in the result, concluding that the Court need not review the lower court’s decision on the appellant’s motion for relief under I.C.R. 35 because the propriety of that decision was not expressly raised as an issue on this appeal.