State v. SantiagoState v. Santiago
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Palmer, Norcott, Eveleigh, McDonald
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October 30, 2015
PALMER, J. Following the release of our decision in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, A.3d (2015), in which a majority of this court concluded that the enactment of
We further note that the state, in both the present motion and its motion for argument, repeatedly has complained that the majority opinion in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 1, was reached on the basis of issues that were raised sua sponte by the court, issues that the state contends it had no opportunity to brief or argue.2 As we explained at some length in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 120–26, this contention is
As the majority opinion in Santiago observed, the defendant indisputably raised and preserved ‘‘the claim that, following the enactment of
More important, however, any suggestion that the state was not on notice that the issues discussed in the majority opinion in Santiago were before this court, or that the state was not afforded a fair opportunity to address them, is belied by the state’s own submission in this case. See id., 126. In its supplemental brief, the state systematically reviewed the Geisler factors, explaining why, in its view, the Connecticut constitution provides no greater protection from cruel and unusual punishment than does its federal counterpart. See State v. Santiago, Conn. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, April Term, 2013, State’s Supplemental Brief pp. 32–38. Specifically, the state argued that the death penalty continues to find support in (1) the text of the Connecticut constitution, (2) federal constitutional developments—despite the elimination of capital punishment for certain categories of offenders, (3) developments in sister states—despite the repeal of capital punishment in those states, (4) recent Connecticut precedents, including this court’s lengthy discussion of the evolving standards of decency in State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn. 71, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011), and (5) various public policy considerations.5 It is precisely on the basis of our disagreement with the state on each of these fundamental points of contention that a majority of this court concluded that capital punishment no longer passes constitutional
In repeatedly arguing to the contrary, the state demonstrates its fundamental misunderstanding of this court’s decision in Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (Blumberg). In Blumberg, we held that, ‘‘with respect to unpreserved issues that do not involve subject matter jurisdiction, plain error or constitutional error, if the reviewing court would have the discretion to review the issue if raised by a party because important considerations of justice outweigh the interest in enforcing procedural rules governing the preservation of claims and adversarial principles, the court may raise the claim sua sponte, as long as it provides an opportunity for all parties to be heard on the issue.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 162. We also hastened to add, however, that, ‘‘when [a case] is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 148, quoting United States National Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 124 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1993). As we explained in Santiago, this is all the more so ‘‘when plenary consideration is necessary to thoroughly address and accurately decide constitutional claims and other matters of substantial public importance, our resolution of which will surely redound to the benefit or detriment of parties not presently before the court.’’ State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 124.
It is this court’s responsibility to construe the constitution of the state of Connecticut, and parties’ briefs and arguments play an indispensable role in that process. It has never been the practice or policy of this court, however, to refuse to consider any factor or point or line of reasoning that may be relevant under Geisler, including relevant scholarship, sister state authority, historical context, undisputed or unchallenged facts, and legal argument and analysis, unless first fully vetted by the parties themselves. In other words, as long as the state constitutional claim is adequately briefed in accordance with Geisler, as it unarguably was in this case, it is this court’s responsibility to identify and evaluate all of the relevant factors and considerations so that we may reach the correct constitutional result. For these reasons, the state’s contentions in its motion for stay of execution are without merit.6