State v. SanchezState v. Sanchez
Paula E. Ganz, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender
Will O‘Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
HANISEE, Judge.
{1} Convicted of murder in the second degree and third-degree tampering with evidence, Defendant Matthew Sanchez asserts three points of appeal: (1) the district court committed reversible error by allowing the State to question a witness regarding a prior act of Defendant that led to an unrelated assault charge, (2) insufficient evidence existed to support his conviction for tampering with evidence, and (3) thе district court‘s entry of conviction for third-degree tampering with evidence constituted fundamental error. We determine that Defendant‘s own areas of trial inquiry permitted the State, as allowed and limited by the district court, to inquire regarding the witness‘s awareness of the prior act. We also hold that Defendant‘s conviction for third-degree tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient trial evidence and was properly adjudicated. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} On Seрtember 10, 2011, Defendant fatally stabbed his friend Tupac Amaru Leyba (Victim) in the chest and later threw the weapon from his car window as he departed the scene of the stabbing. The knife was never recovered. At trial, Defendant testified and admitted that he stabbed Victim and lied to the police when interviewed following
{3} During cross-examination of a State‘s witness (Witness), defense counsel asked if Witness remembered stating at a preliminary examination that Defendant “was a very nice guy, that he‘s very quiet and that he never really talked, that he was just a nice guy.” When Witness indicated that she did recall making that statement, defense counsel went on to inquire of Witness whether Victim had enemies, what if any alcohol or other mood-altering substances had been consumed that night, and whether Victim habitually carried a weapon. After this exchange, the State notified the court that it intended to offer rebuttal evidence regarding Witness‘s opinion of Defendant‘s demeanor and character. Despite the State‘s warning, defense counsel further questioned Witness if she had ever seen Defendant “become aggressive in any way toward [Victim.]” Witness stated that she had not.
{4} Following this testimony, the State sought to rebut what it perceived to be the presentation of character evidence by Defendant. It argued that by eliciting opinion testimony from Witness regarding her impressions of Defendant‘s peaceable demeanor, defense counsel had opened the door to inquiry concerning three separate incidents that bore the potential capacity to change Witness‘s positive opinion of Defendant. The events consisted of Defendant: (1) discharging a gun over the heads of his family members, (2) threatening to kill a man over a debt, and (3) ramming a law enforcement vehicle аnd fleeing from police. Defense counsel objected, arguing that his queries had not opened the door to the State‘s desired topics of rebuttal and that admission of such prior act evidence would unfairly prejudice Defendant.
{5} After pointing out that it was defense counsel‘s questioning that elicited the pertinent character trait of Defendant being a “calm and very nice guy” and recognizing the State‘s opportunity to “present evidence of sоmething other than that[,]” the district court conducted an inquiry designed to determine whether the specific events of which the State proposed to question Witness were properly admissible. Although it initially ruled that admitting questions regarding the three prior incidents would cause undue delay and confusion of issues for the jury, after conducting its own research, the district court determined that
{6} Although the court found each of the State‘s three desired topics of rebuttal inquiry to be supported by good faith, it nonetheless disallowed inquiry regarding the second and third events on the basis that both had been initially charged but were later dismissed by the State. Noting thаt Defendant was then separately indicted for the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the district court announced its intention to allow the State to question Witness regarding any awareness she possessed of Defendant having discharged a firearm over the heads of his family members. It further ruled that upon any such inquiry, Defendant would be entitled to a limiting instruction regarding the jury‘s use of that evidence. The parties submitted proposed versions of the question to be asked of Witness regarding the shooting incident, and based again on its research the court chose to allow a “modified . . . proposal of the State[.]” The question presented to Witness, in relevant part, was as follows: “Were you aware that . . . Defendant had been accused of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for going to the property of an individual not associated with this case and shooting a gun five to six times?” When Witness declared herself to be unaware of the incident, the State asked: “If you were aware of that . . ., would your opinion have changed?” Witness responded affirmatively.
{7} Immediately thereafter, the district court verbally provided the jury with a previously agreed to limiting instruction, stating that it had “allowed questions by the prosecution to test the opinion previously expressed
A. The District Court Properly Admitted Rebuttal Character Evidence
{8} Defendant contends that the district court committed reversible error in allowing the State “to ask a question which recited unproven facts of an unrelated aggravated assault case against [Defendant].” Defendant specifically argues that the State‘s “naked assertion” of the occurrence of a separate shooting incident was highly prejudicial. He additionally appears to challenge allowance of the question on grounds that it violated the general prohibition on prior acts evidence.
{9}
{10} We first emphasize that Defendant fails to provide any analysis or discussion of
{11} First addressing the prior convictions, our Supreme Court adopted the reasoning оf Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (upholding cross examination inquiry of character witnesses regarding awareness of the defendant‘s prior conviction and the defendant‘s separate prior arrest), and determined that the district court erred in allowing testimony regarding the prior convictions because: (1) the district court failed to conduct an inquiry into whether the past events had occurred; (2) “none of the witnesses had known the [defendant] for more than six years“; (3) the district court did not provide the jury with a limiting instruction; (4) “the defendant offered no evidence of specific prior acts“[;] and (5) defense counsel objected to the state‘s inquiry. Christopher, 1980-NMSC-085, ¶ 16-17. Separately, the Court considered the propriety of the state‘s inquiry into the alleged spousal assault and once more determined that the district court erred, in part, because the abuse claim was supported by nothing more than the wife‘s allegation; further, the district court neglected to separately assess the veracity of the state‘s desired questions. Id. ¶¶ 21-23. Again, the Court emphasized the district court‘s failure to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose of the state‘s questioning. Id. ¶ 25.
{13} Apart from Christopher, we reiterate that while
{14} Although we recognize that Witness was the State‘s witness, and the State was not cross-examining Witness, but redirecting, Defendant has not asserted the inapplicability of
B. The Evidence was Sufficient to Support Defendant‘s Conviction for Tаmpering with Evidence
{15} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him for tampering
{16} “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with rеspect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the evidence in the “light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In our capacity as a reviewing court, we do not share the original ability of the jury to view the evidence and witnesses firsthand; thereforе, we defer to the jury‘s findings. Id. We will not “reweigh the evidence or attempt to draw alternative inferences from the evidence.” State v. Estrada, 2001-NMCA-034, ¶ 41, 130 N.M. 358, 24 P.3d 793.
{17} Our Legislature has defined the elements of tampering with evidence to be: (1) “destroying, changing, hiding, placing or fabricating any physical evidence[,]” (2) “with intent to prevent the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person[,] or to throw suspicion of the commission of a crime upon another.”
{18} In this case, Defendant testified that after he stabbed Victim with a knife, he “jumped . . . in the car and . . . took off real fast” because he was scared and “just freaked out.” He stated that he then “threw the knife out and . . . noticed [his phone] charger was hanging out.” At this point, Defendant realized he had dropped his phone, further deduced its possible presence at the scene of the stabbing, and reversed direction to retrieve it. Upon arriving and observing that Victim remained where he had been stabbed, Defendant left. He explained to the jury that he did not want Victim to “start another conflict.” When asked why he discarded the knife, Defendant stated that it “was [his] first reaction. [He] wanted to get it away” as he “just freaked out.” He contended that his purpose in discarding the knife was not to avoid being implicated in the crime.
{19} Defendant‘s testimony describing having thrown the knife from his vehicle satisfies the first element of tampering insofar as his act removed or concealed an item of evidence. See
C. Entry of Conviction for Third-Degree Tampering Did Not Constitute Fundamental Error
{20} Based on Defendant‘s act discarding the knife used to kill Victim, he was charged with third-degree tampering with evidence, which forbids tampering with evidence relating to a capital crime or of a first-or second-degree felony.
{21} We typically review this constitutional issue de novo. State v. Alvarado, 2012-NMCA-089, ¶ 5, ___ P.3d ___. However, as Defendant concedes that this issue was not properly preserved, we review solely for fundamental error. State v. Herrera, 2014-NMCA-007, ¶ 4, 315 P.3d 343. “The rule of fundamental error applies only if there has been a miscarriage of justice, if the question of guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand, or if substantial justice has not been done.” State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146.
{22} As we have stated, tampering with evidence is, in relevant part, “destroying, changing, hiding, placing or fabricating any physical evidence with intent to prevent the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person[.]”
{23} Defendant was charged with tampering with evidence of a second-degree felony as prohibited by
{24} Defendant relies upon Alvarado, where we held that “when a defеndant is charged with third[-]degree tampering with evidence of a capital, first, or second[-]degree felony,” the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence with which the defendant tampered related to the underlying felony. 2012-NMCA-089, ¶ 16. Because the State did not provide such proof, we determined that the proper resolution was for the defendant to be sentenced under the indeterminate crime provision of the statute. Id. While we acknowledge the analogous nature of Alvarado and the case before us, we view Defendant‘s case to be more appropriately on point with Herrera, 2014-NMCA-007, where, in an identical fundamental error analysis, this Court considered the issue of whether, in the case of a conviction and sentence for third-degree tampering with evidence, the omission of a finding that the weapon was evidence of a second-degree felony violated a defendant‘s right to have a jury find all elements of the offense beyond a reаsonable doubt. Herrera, 2014-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 4, 7. We determined that for the purpose of a
{25} Here, Defendant testified at trial that he stabbed Victim and “threw the knife out” of the window of his moving vehicle. In finding Defendant guilty of tampering with evidence, the jury determined that Defendant “tossed the knife” with the intent to prevent his apprehension, prоsecution, or conviction. Additionally, the jury found that the act of stabbing Victim with a knife was second-degree murder. Our review of the record herein reveals that the only evidence presented at trial that related to Defendant‘s discard of the knife was the act of stabbing Victim. Because the jury concluded that the stabbing constituted a second-degree felony, “the facts at trial established that the tampering related to a second-degree felony.” Id. ¶ 18. While the factors contained in Subsection (B) of
CONCLUSION
{26} For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Defendant‘s convictions for second-degree murder and third-degree tampering with evidence.
{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge