STATE OF OHIO v. CHARLES J. SAMUELS
C.A. Nos. 25982, 25983, 25984
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
November 21, 2012
[Cite as State v. Samuels, 2012-Ohio-5401.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nоs. CR 10 04 1082(C), CR 10 11 3050(B), CR 11 02 0413(A)
WHITMORE, Presiding Judge.
{1} Defendant-Appellant, Charles Samuels, appeals from his convictions in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{2} Samuels was indicted in three different cases, all three of which were consolidated for trial. The first case arose from an incident that took place on August 27, 2010. On that day, the police searched Samuels’ brother‘s apartment as the result of a tip that there was a methamphetamine lab inside. The search of the apartment uncovered an active lab, complete with all the items necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. The police found Samuels asleep on a bed in the apartment amidst several bottles of actively cooking methamphetamine. The police then searched Samuels and found coffee filters that later tested positive for methamphetamine. They also searched Samuels’ car, which had beеn parked outside the
{3} Samuеls’ second case arose from an incident that took place on October 23, 2010. On that day, the police responded to a Kmart in Tallmadge after one of the store‘s loss prevention specialists reported having seen a suspicious looking individual purchasing methamphetamine-related items; specifically, Coleman fluid. Several officers waited in the parking lot and observed Samuels leave the store, get into his car, аnd remain in the car for approximately ten minutes. Another man with a container of Coleman fluid protruding from his pants pocket then ran from Kmart and jumped into Samuels’ car. The police stopped the car and sеarched it. The search uncovered several canisters of Coleman fluid, a grinder containing trace amounts of pseudoephedrine, used coffee filters, small Ziploc bags containing trace amounts of methаmphetamine, burnt foil, and several other items related to the production of methamphetamine. As a result of the October incident, the jury found Samuels guilty of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufaсturing of drugs, aggravated possession of drugs, and possession of criminal tools.
{4} Finally, Samuels’ third case arose from an incident that took place on February 10, 2011. On that day, the police responded to a home in Springfield Township after they received a call from child welfare. Upon their search of the house, the police discovered paraphernalia used to smoke methamphetamine in plain view and Samuels asleep on one of the couches. The police searched Samuels and found a vial in his pants that later tested positive for
{5} The trial court sentenced Samuels to six years in prison on the charge of illegal manufacturing of drugs and imposed concurrent sentences on each of the remaining counts. Samuels appealed from all three of his criminal cases, and this Court consolidated the three cases on appeal.
{6} Samuels’ appeal is now before this Court and raises two assignments of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT CONSOLIDATED THE TRIALS IN THIS CASE.
{7} In his first assignment of error, Samuels argues that the trial court committed plain error when it consolidated his three cases for trial. We disagree.
{8} “It is well-settled that the law favors joinder.” State v. Merriweather, 9th Dist. No. 97CA006693, 1998 WL 239773, *3 (May 6, 1998). A trial court “may order two or more indictments * * * to be tried together, if the offenses * * * сould have been joined in a single indictment * * *.”
{9} Samuels concedes that a plain error standard applies, as he never objected to the joinder of his three cases. See id. at ¶ 18. Under
{10} “When a defendant claims that he was prejudiced by the joinder of multiple offenses, a court must determine (1) whether evidence of the other crimes would be admissible even if the counts were severed, and (2) if not, whether the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct.” Schaim at 59. Thus,
[a] prosecutor can use two methods to negate such claims of prejudice. Under the first method, the “other acts” test, the [S]tate argues that it could have introduced evidence of the [] crimes under the “other acts” portion of
Evid.R. 404(B) , [even] if thе * * * offenses had been severed for trial. Under the second method, the “joinder” test, the [S]tate is not required to meet the stricter “other acts” admissibility test, but is merely required to show that evidence of each crime joined at trial is simple and direct. Thus, when simple and direct evidence exists, an accused is not prejudiced by joinder regardless of the nonadmissibility of evidence of these crimes as “other acts” underEvid.R. 404(B) .
(Citations omitted.) State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163 (1990). Accord State v. Shipley, 9th Dist. No. 03CA008275, 2004-Ohio-434, ¶ 75. “[T]he jury is capable of segregating the proof of
{11} Samuels first argues that the trial court improperly joined his cases under
{12} Samuels argues that he was prejudiced by the court‘s joinder of his cases for trial because (1) the evidence from each case would not have been admissible at separate trials on each of his indictments had the cases been severed for trial, and (2) the joinder of the cases permitted the jury to combine inferences and receive cumulative evidence tending to show his guilt. Because it is dispositive of the appeal, we begin with the issue of whether the evidence of each of Samuels’ crimes was “simple and distinct.” Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59.
The charges set forth in each count constitute a separate and distinct matter. You must consider each count and the evidence applicable to each count separately and you must state your finding as to each count uninfluenced by your verdict as to any other count. The Defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any one or all of the offenses chаrged.
“It is well settled that juries are presumed to follow the trial court‘s instructions.” State v. Witcher, 9th Dist. No. 26111, 2012-Ohio-4141, ¶ 33.
{14} Samuels has not shown that the trial court committed plain error by joining his cases for trial. The evidence of each crime was uncomplicated, and the record supports the conclusion that “the jury [was] capable of segregating the proof required for each charge * * *” Calhoun at *3. See also Hamblin at 159. Samuels’ primary complaint is that having all three of his cases tried at once made his defense (i.e., that he was addicted to methamphetamine, but not involved in its production) less plausible. While a joint trial may have detracted from the believability of Samuels’ defense, the joinder was permissible so long аs the evidence of each case was simple and distinct. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 59. Because the record supports the
Assignment of Error Number Two
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO MOVE TO SEVER THE CHARGES IN THIS CASE.
{15} In his second assignment of error, Samuels argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever his three criminal cases for trial. We determined in Samuels’ first assignment of error that he was not prejudiced as а result of the joinder of his three cases for trial. As such, “his ineffective assistance of counsel argument also must fail, as it is premised upon the same error.” State v. El-Jones, 9th Dist. No. 26136, 2012-Ohio-4134, ¶ 45. Samuels’ second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{16} Samuels’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court оf Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. Aрp.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE FOR THE COURT
BELFANCE, J. CONCURS.
CARR, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
PETER GALYARDT, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.