Edith Tillyne Sammons is awaiting trial on an indictment charging her with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the death of her husband on July 8, 1998. 1 Sammons filed a motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement authorities on July 9 and 10, 1998, and the trial court granted the motion in part. The State appeals directly 2 3from this order pursuant to OCGA§ 5-7-1 (a) (4).
It is undisputed that, on July 9, 1998, an attorney asking for Sammons arrived at the sheriffs office while Sammons was making a written custodial statement. The attorney and Sammons conferred, Sammons ceased writing her statement, the custodial interrogation terminated with Sammons’ invocation of counsel, and Sammons was placed in a jail cell. The trial court found that the parties agreed that the interview would be continued after Sammons had been given the opportunity to rest. On July 10, 1998, the day after the termination of the custodial interrogation, the investigator removed Sammons from her cell and resumed the videotaped interview without counsel being present. The trial court suppressed the videotape of the resumed interview, as well as the written statement Sammons gave at that time.
1. The United States Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an accused has a right to an attorney during a custodial interrogation.
Miranda v. Arizona,
an accused,... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
We have adopted a “bright-line rule” that counsel must be present during all police-initiated interrogations once the accused invokes the right to counsel.
Roper v. State,
There is no dispute that Sammons invoked her right to counsel on July 9 when she met with her attorney. The State contends, however, that because Sammons was allowed to meet with counsel on July 9, the rule in
Edwards v. Arizona
was satisfied and it had the right to continue its interrogation on July 10 outside the presence of counsel. This contention is inconsistent with the law. We have held that merely allowing the accused to have a conversation with counsel does not obviate the rule propounded by
Edwards v. Arizona.
See
Roper v. State,
2. The State contends that Sammons waived her right to counsel by affirmatively agreeing to be interviewed on July 10 without her attorney present. However, the matter of whether Sammons’ waiver was knowing and intelligent need not be analyzed because the interview was initiated by the authorities.
Walton v. State,
The trial court found that after Sammons met with her attorney on July 9, she was placed in her cell and allowed to rest. Law enforcement, on their own initiative, resumed the interview on July 10 without Sammons’ counsel being present.
4
This was an express violation of
Edwards
and any alleged agreement by Sammons to be interviewed at that point was invalid.
Roper v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
A jury convicted Sammons of her husband’s murder in the spring of 1999 and she received a life sentence with 25 years to serve. In 2005, we reversed the conviction due to a violation of Sammons’ constitutional right to be present at all the proceedings against her.
Sammons v. State,
See OCGA § 5-7-2.
Jackson v. Denno,
The investigator who interviewed Sammons testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that he, Sammons, and her attorney agreed on July 9 that Sammons would be interviewed again after she had been given a chance to rest. The investigator admitted, however, that no one told him that Sammons could be interviewed without her attorney being present.