State v. SalinasState v. Salinas
We granted the state‘s application for review because it appeared that the court of appeal misapplied this Court‘s jurisprudential rule that a trial court may not use its assessment of the defendant‘s credibility as the sole basis for imposing an apparently severe sentence. State v. Soco, 441 So.2d 719, 721 (La.1983); State v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009, 1014 (La.1982); State v. Smith, 407 So.2d 652, 657 (La.1981). The Third Circuit vacated the defendant‘s sentence of 25 years imprisonment at hard labor following his guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of
A routine traffic stop in September of 1996 led to the defendant‘s arrest for possession of
On the basis of the information disclosed in the presentence report, the trial court at sentencing ordered the defendant arrested for perjury, rejected the recommended term of nine years, and imposed a penalty of 25 years imprisonment at hard labor. In addition to the defendant‘s deception regarding his prior record, the court relied on the defendant‘s second felony offender status, his commission of the present offense while still on probation for a similar offense in Texas, and the relatively large amount of marijuana involved in this case. At the hearing on defendant‘s motion to reconsider sentence, the trial judge explained to counsel that if the defendant had “lied to me about his place of birth or where he grew up or if he had lied to me about how much marijuana there was, that would be one thing.” “It‘s not just the lie,” the court emphasized, “it‘s the fact that his entire status changed .... from a first offender with 62 pounds of marijuana to someone who misled the Court about his prior record, who was a second felony offender currently on probation at the time he was transporting 62 pounds of marijuana through our state.” Defense counsel took responsibility for some of the confusion surrounding the defendant‘s prior record but conceded that the defendant told the court that “he didn‘t have any priors, there‘s no getting around that.”
As the trial judge‘s comments underscored in this case, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more material falsehood than a defendant lying ... [about] the extent of his criminal record during a pre-sentence investigation.” United States v. Delgado, 936 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir.1991); see
We therefore find no arbitrary misuse of the trial judge‘s discretion in taking into account the defendant‘s falsehood designed to impact its sentencing decision. We also find no abuse of the trial court‘s broad sentencing discretion in imposing a penalty of 25 years imprisonment at hard labor based on its assessment of the defendant‘s prospects for rehabilitation as revealed by his prior record, continuing drug activity, and attempts to mislead the court with spurious information about both. Accordingly, the defendant‘s term of 25 years imprisonment at hard labor is reinstated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for execution of that sentence.