*1 Caldwell, court’s 1982), (Minn.
N.W.2d 574 in which a new Minnesota, Respondent, STATE of granted trial was the convicted defendant expert opinion inadvertent testi- SALDANA, Appellant. Camilo mony incorrectly identifying fingerprint No. defendant, as that of 81-549. notwithstanding that, acknowledgment may that it well Supreme Court of Minnesota. upon retrial, will prove the other evidence Aug. sufficient my to convict him. In view de- fendant directly Howard’s confession link-
ing Weber, his accomplice, with the murder
and making possible interception
pay-off police authorities, was no less linking
critical than the evidence defendant
Caldwell with the location of the crime. It here, there, be said as it was that a
jury, evidence, absent such “might” have
reached a different result. Id. at 584r-588. court’s that “to reiterated allow
factually strong cases to erode such a basic process] right deny is to the existence
[due right.” Id. grant at 592. The
new trial in Caldwell was based only upon this
court’s supervisory powers; present
appeal we are concerned with a more seri-
ous issue of constitutional dimension.
AMDAHL, Chief Justice (concurring spe-
cially).
I concur in majority opinion
write special because the concurrence majori- Justice Peterson asserts that “ * * * ty opinion appears inconsistent with
the court’s opinion in Caldwell * * *.” It seems to me there can be no comparison,
valid inconsistency and thus no
between admittedly false on a
fact of such import basic as the defendant’s
fingerprints tying him to the locale of the
crime, evidence, here, as the truth of questioned. is not *2 Jones, Defender,
C. Paul Public and Mark Anderson, Defender, F. Asst. Public Minne- apolis, appellant. for Gen., Spannaus, Gary Warren Han- Atty. Gill, Attys. Sp. sen and Barbara D. Asst. Birkholz, Gen., Paul, County Daniel St. James, Atty., respondent. for St. SCOTT, admissible, Justice. To be expert testimony must helpful in reaching its from his appeals Camilo Saldana convic- decision: tion of criminal sexual conduct the first requirement basic of Rule 702 is degree in violation of Stat. 609.- § the helpfulness requirement. If the sub- 342(e)(i) (1980). appellant At trial admitted ject of the *3 is within testimony the knowl- that sexual intercourse had occurred but edge experience and lay jury a and the it To appel- claimed was consensual. rebut testimony of the will expert not pre- add claim, presented expert an lant’s the state cision or depth jury’s to the ability to typical post-rape witness who the described reach subject conclusions about that victims, rape symptoms and behavior and experience, is within their then the gave the that was testimony does the helpfulness not meet a not rape victim of and had fabricated her test. allegations. that the admission We find such the reversal of testimony requires Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d
pellant’s conviction, and we remand for a (Minn.1980). jury If the is in good as a new trial. position to reach a as expert, decision the testimony would be of little assist- Our concern is toward the testi- directed ance jury to the and should not be admit- mony Lynn a counselor for sexu- Expert ted. testimony also be exclud- victims, al assault who testified for the ed if probative its is substantially value state. Dreyer, the director of the Victim outweighed danger by preju- the of unfair Mankato, Program Assistance holds a dice, confusion, misleading or the psychology and social degree bachelor’s Minn. R. Evid. Under 403. this test of Dreyer work. that she met Mar- testified admissibility, seg- we examine each must Fuller, tha complainant, days the after Dreyer’s testimony. ment of alleged the that she rape and counseled Fuller approximately period. for 10-week of the stages discussion Dreyer explained In her testimony, the rape through victim typically goes was es victim stages rape typically goes that a sentially explanation “rape an trauma through typical and discussed behavior of syndrome,”1 although she did not so label victims rape. us, after a She then described it. On the case before facts of the such Fuller’s reactions she had observed them. help jury as is of no and In response Dreyer to a question, testified produces danger prej an extreme of unfair was not unusual Fuller did not udice. The question factual be decided report following day incident until the jury alleged is whether the criminal and that never many rape report victims necessary conduct occurred. It rape. Dreyer that Fuller was stated typical Fuller react in a manner “acquaintance victim of rape,” that she def- display typi incident. Fuller need not initely believed was a victim Fuller of sexu- post-rape symptoms cal and behavior of al assault and that rape, she did not rape jury that her victims to convince think Fuller it up.” “made truth. view of the facts is the Rape type
The issue is whether admission of testi-
trauma
is not the
symdrome
mony
post-rape
accurately
reliably
scientific
concerning typical
symp-
test
rape victims,
rape
toms
has occurred.
opinions
and behavior of
determines whether a
symptoms may
that Fuller
a victim of
The characteristic
follow
any
that Fuller did not fantasize the
traumatic
event.
psychologically
Association,
Diagnos-
American Psychiatric
was reversible error.
syndrome,
Burgess
trauma
Lynda
For a discussion of
Ann
Holmstrom coined
see
Against Rape,
Pittsburgh
In re
494 Pa.
term in their
1974 article to de-
Action
seminal
(1981)
J.,
(Larsen,
recurring pattern
post-rape symp-
scribe the
428 A.2d
138-40
Holmstrom,
Burgess
Rape
dissenting).
toms.
&
Trauma
Syndrome,
Psychiatry
(1974).
Am. J.
occurred,
alleged
danger
Mental Disor-
crime
of unfair
Manual of
tic and Statistical
best,
1980).
(3d
syn-
probative
ders 236
ed.
At
value.
prejudice outweighs any
occur
only symptoms
drome describes
inevitably
To
such
would
allow
pre-
with some
but makes no
frequency,
in-
experts
to a battle of
that would
lead
describing every single
tense of
case. C.
fact-finding and
jury’s province
vade the
Warner,
Rape and
Assault
Sexual
clarity.
rather than
add confusion
case
jury
must not decide this
is not a fact-
Rape
syndrome
trauma
people
on the basis of how most
react
tool,
finding
therapeutic
tool useful in
but
rape or on whether Fuller’s reactions were
counseling.
jury
Because the
need be con
typical
reactions of a
who has
determining the facts and
cerned
with
Rather,
jury
been a victim of
law,
applying the
and because evidence of
case,
happened
must decide what
in this
people
reactions of other
does not assist the
whether the elements of the
crime
function,
fact-finding
in its
we find the
proved
beyond
been
a reasonable
*4
testimony
rape
expert
admission of
on
trau
doubt.
ma
to be error.3
syndrome
The
trauma
rape
scientific evaluation of
syndrome
has not reached a level of reliabil-
testimo-
segment
The second
of
of common
ity
surpasses
quality
the
ny
questionable admissibility
opin-
of
is her
present
jury
sense evaluation
in
delibera-
The
is
raped.4
ion that Fuller was
issue
refusing
permit
tions. As we
in
to
stated
may
expert
the
introduce
whether
state
syn-
“battering
parent”
introduction of
that,
rape prosecution
in a
drome,
may
the evidence
not be introduced
opinion, a
in fact occurred.
expert’s
rape
“until further evidence of the scientific ac-
primary
The
criterion for admissibil
curacy
reliability
syndrome
profile
ity
helpfulness requirement
is the
as dis
diagnoses can
v.
be established.”
An
testi
expert
cussed above.
witness
Loebach,
58,
(Minn. 1981).2
310
64
N.W.2d
fy
opinion,
in the form of an
Minn. R. Evid.
in
Permitting
expert
a
the role of an
702,
opinion testimony
objection
is not
suggest
complainant
that because the
merely
able
because it embraces an ulti
symptoms
rape
exhibits some of the
jury,
mate issue to be decided
the
trauma
syndrome,
the
However, according
R. Evid. 704.
raped, unfairly prejudices
therefore
the
704,
Advisory Committee Comment to Rule
pellant by creating
special
an aura of
relia-
opinions involving
legal analysis
bility
jurors
or mixed
trustworthiness.
Since
ordinary
competent
questions
abilities are
to consider
of law and fact are deemed to be
the
evidence and determine whether
of no use to the
* * *
through
Compare
A
She has went
a lot
in which
testimo-
because
other cases
ny
unreliable,
scientifically
rape
acquaintance rape,
inaccurate and
is excluded as
is what we call
Mack,
know,
they
State v.
231
rape.7
A
con-
fantasized the
Once
that have
a witness is
majority
the courts
competent, expert opinions
deemed
concern
sidered the issue have held
admission
ing
reliability
the witness’s
rape
distinguish
or sexual
doctor’s
ing
fantasy
few
truth from
are generally
A
inad
assault
is error.5
had occurred
opinions
missible because such
invade
jurisdictions
permitted
courts in other
jury’s province
to make credibility
examined
determi
physically
doctor who has
Jackson,
nations. United
shortly after
the al-
States
576 F.2d
complaining witness
46,
(5th
1978);
49
Cir.
United
States v.
leged
give
sexual
Wertis,
683,
(5th
1974)(per
505 F.2d
685
Cir.
voluntary.6
was not
intercourse
curiam),
1045,
denied,
cert.
422
95
U.S.
S.Ct.
Dreyer’s testimony
admission of
2662,
45 L.Ed.2d
testi
Expert
697
the majority
error under
rule.
constitutes
credibility
mony concerning the
of witness
Furthermore,
Dreyer is
physi
not a
should
received
“unusual cases.”
cian,
examined Martha
physically
never
Barnard,
907,
United States v.
490 F.2d
days
Fuller and did not meet Fuller until 10
denied, 416
(9th
1973),
Cir.
cert.
U.S.
alleged
after
admission
310 (1974).
An ex
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
even
Dreyer’s testimony constitutes error
such
ample
an unusual case is
sexual
under
minority
rule.
assault case where the
victim a
Drey-
We conclude that the admission of
mentally
child or
retarded.
Common
See
jur-
er’s
Because
was error.
Carter,
9 Mass.App.
wealth
-
equally
considering
ors were
capable
aff’d,
-,
N.E.2d
Mass.
determining
evidence and
whether a
(Mass. 1981)
(examining pe
N.E.2d 438
*5
occurred,
helpful.
Dreyer’s opinion was not
may give opinion relating
diatrician
to the
Her
legal
was a
conclusion which
ability
child
retarded
to differentiate
Furthermore,
was
use
of no
reality
fantasy
between
not con
but
outweighed
the danger
prejudice
of unfair
cerning
telling
whether the child was
any probative
Dreyer’s testimony
value.
assault).
truth
an
sexual
about
“gave
stamp
legitimacy
of scientific
to
Dreyer’s
The
of
admission
of
fac-
complaining
truth
witness’s
that Martha Fuller did not fantasize or
Izzo,
tual
testimony.”
v.
90 Mich.
People
First,
her
was
story
fabricate
erroneous.
730,
10,
App. 727,
(1979).
11
282 N.W.2d
in
there are no unusual circumstances
this
segment Dreyer’s
The final
tes
case
warrant
the admission of
timony
opinion
was her
that Fuller had not
testimony concerning
credibility
Full-
See,
State,
(Fla.
(1959)
Farley
(no
permitting physi-
e.g.,
461
5.
324 So.2d
P.2d
error in
v.
662
Gardner,
App. 1975);
prosecuting
v.
350
Commonwealth
who
short-
cians
examined
witness
664,
(1966); People
Mass.
McGillen,
er,
an
with
who is
adult
Second,
Cox,
who had no
overruling
in
intelligence.
story,
her
unquali-
training, was
education or
medical
cate but whether she Dreyer was at issue. particular
ed the facts Fuller was stating
simply is the credibility
telling the truth. Because of the jury, admission province
sole
testimony was erroneous. for our determi question The final Minnesota, Respondent, STATE of the erroneous admission
nation is whether mandates reversal of Dreyer’s testimony Ap new trial. conviction and a appellant’s McGEE, Appellant. Joseph Michael intercourse oc that sexual pellant admitted No. 81-547. dispute curred. The sole issue intercourse was volun whether sexual of Minnesota. Supreme Court at trial could tary. produced The evidence the claim of either interpreted support Aug. appellant. jury’s largely upon which depended determination these circumstanc it believed. Under
party
es, testimony, presented as the un expert, well
biased
tipped the balance. *6 prosecution for crim-
We hold in this where the
inal sexual conduct defendant consent was reversible error for
claimed concerning typical post-
rape symptoms victims and behavior give opinions that the had not
a victim necessary holding is to ensure Our truth-seeking process and to
accuracy to the accused. We
guarantee fairness Cox, 172 Minn.
overrule State v.
N.W. 189 to the extent it is incon- opinion.
sistent with We reverse this and remand for a new
pellant’s conviction a new trial
trial. Because we have ordered the other issues raised.
we need reach
Reversed and remanded.
PETERSON, (concurring special- Justice
ly)- result,
I based upon concur Dreyer of Ms.
impermissible