A jury convicted defendant, Ivan Jean Salazar, of dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner. A.R.S. § 13-1206. Pursuant to the version of A.R.S. § 13-1206 in effect at the time of the crime, the triаl court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of any release for twenty-five years.
See State v. Gonzales,
Defendant and Daniel Eastman were cellmates at the Maricopa County Jail. They were housed in an area of the jail reserved primarily for prisoners with emotional problems. Around 4:30 a.m. June 25, 1983, defendant аnd Eastman were observed in their cell behaving normally. A little after 4:30, a guard heard a suspicious noise in the jail but found nothing upon investigation. At about 5:00 a.m., Eastman was fоund in the cell with blood on his face. In addition, blood was found on the upper and lower bunks, the cell floor and bars, and in the toilet. The only people in the cell were defendant and Eastman, and no other prisoner could gain access to the cell.
Eastman, 71 years old, was five feet six inches tall and weighed 124 pounds. After he was removed from the cell, it was discovered that he had suffered a concussion from several blows to his head. His left wrist and some ribs were fracturеd. After spending some days in the hospital, Eastman died of bronchopneumonia, a complication from the broken ribs.
At the time of the incident, defendant was 28 yеars old, five feet eleven inches tall, and weighed 164 pounds. After he was taken from the cell, detention officers observed blood on his fingers, a bruise on one hand, and a slight cut on the other.
At trial, the state argued that circumstantial evidence showed that defendant assaulted Daniel Eastman causing his eventual death. Defendant, however, maintained that he was insane, or, alternatively, that he acted in self-defense. Defendant raises one issue on appeal.
Dеfendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective, thus denying defendant a fair trial. We have recently outlined the applicable Arizona test in this area.
State v. Gerlaugh,
In deciding an ineffectiveness claim, this cоurt need not approach the inquiry in a specific order or address both prongs of the inquiry of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. Strickland v. Washington, supra.
“In partiсular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as а result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that *542 course should be followed. Cоurts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.”
Strickland v. Washington, supra,
466 U.S. at -,
In thе instant case, we deem it appropriate to apply the prejudice component first. Thus, assuming arguendo that counsel’s performance was ineffective, we examine whether there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would havе been different. State v. Lee, supra.
We think not. Considering the totality of the evidence before the jury, see Strickland v. Washington, supra, we do not believe counsel’s alleged errors would have affected thе result of the proceeding. First, the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly shows that Daniel Eastman was assaulted in his cell, and that defendant was the only persоn who could have committed the crime. Defendant and Eastman were alone in a locked cell. A half hour before Eastman was found beaten, both defеndant and Eastman were observed in the cell behaving normally. Eastman sustained serious injuries to his head, wrist, and ribs. It is highly unlikely that these injuries could have been self-inflicted. The muсh younger and stronger defendant was found with blood on his fingers and only slight wounds to his hands. Such injuries strongly indicate that defendant was beating Eastman. Thus, the circumstantial evidence not only shows that defendant attacked and beat Eastman, but it also tends to negate the possibility of self-defense.
Second, the evidence overwhelmingly shows the defendant’s legal sanity at the time of the crime. Defendant’s own expert could only testify that it was his “educated guess" that defendant was suffering from a major mental disorder at the time of the crime. The witness, however, could not be “100% sure” of this diagnosis. The balance of the expert testimony indicated that though antisoсial, defendant was legally sane at the time of the crime. By far, the most convincing evidence came through the testimony of Dr. Bancroft Brooks, who had yeаrs of exposure to defendant in the New Mexico State Hospital. Brooks testified that defendant had an antisocial personality and a serious drug problem but that he was not legally insane. Dr. Brooks also stated that defendant was “malingering” or faking his insanity. This diagnosis was substantially confirmed by three other experts.
In reviewing thе evidence in an ineffectiveness of counsel case, we must, of course, be cognizant that some of counsel’s errors can affect the state of the evidence before us.
“Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the еntire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the reсord is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due accоunt of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached wоuld reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”
Strickland v. Washington, supra,
466 U.S. at -,
Defendant has pointed to numerous instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but we do not think these alleged errors substantially affected the record before us. In his most serious allegation, defendant points to trial counsel’s сross-examination of Dr. Brooks. We agree that this cross-examination was unartful. Counsel asked Dr. Brooks numerous open-ended questions allowing Dr. Brooks to ramble and explain in detail why he thought defendant was legally sane. *543 Nevertheless, Dr. Brooks’ testimony on direct examination was damaging to defendant’s case, and his statements on cross-examination did not substantially add to this damage. Counsel’s cross-examination could have been better, but in view of the strong evidence of defendant’s sanity, we cannot say the record before us was affected. Furthermore, as the jury’s verdict was strongly supported by the evidence, it is not likely that any оf counsel’s other less serious alleged errors could have had a substantial effect on the record before us.
As defendant has failed to show that the аlleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel caused any prejudice, we need not reach the performance question. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, we hаve searched the entire record for fundamental error and have found none. The judgment of conviction and sentence imposed are affirmed.