State v. SalaveaState v. Salavea
Dynamite Salavea argues that intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay by the State caused him to lose juvenile court jurisdiction, prejudicing his defense on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree. Salavea further contends that under the automatic decline statute,
FACTS
Salavea was born on October 9, 1982. Between February 1996 and June 1998, when Salavea was 13-15 years of age, Salavea raped and molested his cousins, R.U.T. and R.K.T. No issue is raised that relates to the facts of the abuse elicited at trial, so the details of the abuse need not be related. In August 1998, an aunt told the boys’ mother, Bonnie, that her son had been raped. Bonnie spoke with the boys and then reported the abuse to the police. The juvenile court‘s prosecutor‘s office received the investigative file on September 29, 1998. Salavea turned 16 on October 9, 1998. During October and November the prosecutor‘s office conducted interviews with the children and tried to contact Salavea, but could not find him. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 9-12; 4 VRP (trial, June 6, 2001) at 265-70; Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 38 (Detective C. Pollard‘s written report dated Dec. 1, 1998).
On March 8, 1999, the prosecutor‘s office reviewed the file for charging and transferred the file to the Pierce County Superior Court division pursuant to the automatic decline statute.
Salavea was charged and arraigned as an adult on four counts of rape of a child in the first degree and two counts of child molestation in the first degree on October 25, 2000. VRP (arraignment, Oct. 25, 2000) at 3; CP at 3-5; State v. Salavea, 115 Wash.App. 52, 55, 60 P.3d 1230 (2003). In April 2001 Salavea filed a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial delay. CP at 24. Judge Frederick B. Hayes applied the prosecutorial delay three-prong test and found Salavea had been prejudiced, but denied the motion because the State‘s reasons for delay were reasonable: the State was thorough in its investigation, Salavea was absent from the jurisdiction, the State knew Salavea had a bench warrant out and delayed charging. VRP (motion to dismiss, May 11, 2001) at 17-19. Salavea was subsequently found guilty by a jury and sentenced. Salavea appealed the decision based on prosecutorial delay and argued that he should have been charged following the police investigation. Br. of Appellant at 15. The Court of Appeals applied the same three-prong test to the facts and concluded that Salavea did not show prejudice from the delay because at the conclusion of the investigation he was 16. Based on Salavea‘s age and the nature of the crimes committed,
ISSUES
1. Does the age prerequisite in
2. If
ANALYSIS
Due process plays a limited role in protecting defendants against oppressive delay. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).1 Absent intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay, where a defendant commits a crime before he is 18 but is not charged until after he is 18, there is not a violation of due process. State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 858-59, 792 P.2d 137 (1990) (holding that where a defendant committed the crime at age 16 but was not charged until he was 18, due process was not violated because prosecutorial delay was justified); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 349, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). Whether Salavea‘s due process rights were violated based on prosecutorial delay is a question we review de novo. See State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 883, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (reviewing prosecutorial delay de novo under the error of law standard and finding that circumvention of precedents applying the prosecutorial delay test constituted reversible error).
To decide if there is prosecutorial delay, a court must apply a three-prong test. First, the defendant must show the charging delay caused prejudice. If the defendant shows prejudice, the court then examines the State‘s reasons for the delay. Finally, the court balances the delay against the defendant‘s prejudice to decide if the delay violates the “fundamental conceptions of justice.” If the delay is intentional, due process is violated, but if the delay only is negligent, due process may or may not be violated. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293; Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 865-66, 792 P.2d 137.
1. Actual Prejudice
Salavea must show the State‘s delay caused actual prejudice to his defense in order to satisfy prong one of the prosecutorial delay test. State v. Norby, 122 Wash.2d 258, 264, 858 P.2d 210 (1993) (emphasizing that prejudice must be actual, not merely speculative). Salavea argues that his loss of juvenile court jurisdiction fulfills this burden. We have held that offenders fulfill their burden of proof when prosecutorial delay causes a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction because the loss results in a decrease of benefits available to a defendant.2 Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860-61, 792 P.2d 137 (stating that two benefits lost to the defendant are the avoidance of the stigma attached to an adult conviction and the possibility for less harsh penalties); Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 (stating that loss of juvenile court jurisdiction results in the loss of juvenile adjudication or the opportunity to argue against a decline from juvenile court jurisdiction); State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d 602, 604, 746 P.2d 807 (1987).
However, the right to be tried in a juvenile court is not constitutional and the right attaches only if a court is given statutory discretion to assign juvenile or adult court jurisdiction. In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 570-71, 925 P.2d 964 (1996); Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 860, 792 P.2d 137; State v. Sharon, 33 Wash.App. 491, 494-95, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982), aff‘d, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983). Absent statutory discretion to assign jurisdiction, a defendant cannot suffer prejudice because his case was not adjudicated in juvenile court. Whether Salavea can prove loss of juvenile court jurisdiction, then, depends on whether the juvenile court had statutory discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction.
We must look to the appropriate statutory interpretation and application of the automatic decline statute,
2. Statutory Interpretation of RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)
Statutory interpretation is a question of law and we review the interpretation of
The two elements in
In light of previous case law, the clear wording of the statute, and legislative intent we disagree with Salavea and find the age of the individual at the time of the proceedings is the controlling age. Although the offenses occurred when Salavea was ages 13-15, the earliest the State could charge and try Salavea was after he was 16. Therefore, the age prerequisite is satisfied, the court did not have discretion to assign juvenile court jurisdiction, and Salavea fails to prove prejudice.
a. Case Law
Washington precedent supports the premise that absent intentional or negligent prosecutorial delay, “jurisdiction over offenses committed by a juvenile is to be determined at the time proceedings are instituted against the offender.” Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 351-52, 684 P.2d 1293; Sweet v. Porter, 75 Wash.2d 869, 870, 454 P.2d 219 (1969) (stating that determination of jurisdiction is based on the date of trial, not the date of the arrest, information, or plea); State v. Setala, 13 Wash.App. 604, 606-07, 536 P.2d 176 (1975); State v. Bushnell, 38 Wash.App. 809, 811, 690 P.2d 601 (1984). In Calderon the court was not applying the automatic decline statute. However, like Salavea, the defendant argued that jurisdiction should be based on the age at commission of the crime, not the age when proceedings were instituted. The court rejected the argument and held that juvenile court jurisdiction ends when a defendant becomes 18 unless jurisdiction has been extended by law. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 349, 684 P.2d 1293; see also id. at 350-52, 684 P.2d 1293 (discussing and upholding State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959), and State v. Kramer, 72 Wash.2d 904, 435 P.2d 970 (1967)).4 Therefore, it is clear that Calderon and its progeny support reading the age element in
b. Statutory Construction
When a statute is clear on its face and unambiguous, the court does not have to engage in an interpretation of the language. State v. Q.D., 102 Wash.2d 19, 29, 685 P.2d 557 (1984). Statutory inquiry ends with the plain language of the statute and the court assumes the legislature “‘means exactly what it says.‘” State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727-28, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Dep‘t of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 964, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)) (noting that words and clauses are not added to unambiguous statutes and criminal statutes are interpreted in a literal and strict manner). In Boot the court found
Moreover, if the legislature wanted the age element in
c. Legislative Intent
Additionally, our reading of the statute upholds the intent of the legislature in enacting the automatic decline provision. The legislature wanted to address the problem of youth violence “by increasing the severity and certainty of punishment for youth who commit violent acts” as opposed to “youthful offenders who commit other crimes.” State v. Mora, 138 Wash.2d 43, 50, 54, 977 P.2d 564 (1999) (focusing on the seriousness of the offense); see Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 562-63, 566, 925 P.2d 964 (listing the six purposes of the bill enacting the automatic decline provision and citing Laws of 1994, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 101). Automatically declining juveniles who commit certain offenses and are tried when they are 16 or 17 years of age properly would serve the intent of the legislature.
Salavea and amicus argue that adopting the State‘s interpretation would result in an absurd result. They fear that a juvenile who commits an enumerated offense at age 9, but is not prosecuted until age 16, will not receive a decline hearing. However, a juvenile who commits an offense at age 14 and is prosecuted at age 15 will receive a decline hearing. This interpretation leads to an unjust result because it may allow the prosecution to circumvent the juvenile justice system. Further, it seems that a 9 year old is less culpable (e.g., has less capacity to commit a crime) than a 14 year old and should therefore be more deserving of a decline hearing. State v. Vela, 100 Wash.2d 636, 641, 673 P.2d 185 (1983) (explaining that statutes “should receive a sensible construction to effect the legislative intent and, if
In conclusion, we construe the age element in
B. Prongs Two and Three: State‘s Reasons and Balancing Test
We need consider the State‘s reasons for delay only if Salavea proves prosecutorial delay prejudiced his defense. See Norby, 122 Wash.2d at 264, 858 P.2d 210 (stating that a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the delay in order to prevail); Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (explaining that generally proof of prejudice is a necessary element of a due process claim). Salavea bases his prejudice argument on loss of juvenile court jurisdiction. In light of our interpretation of
Absent extraordinary circumstances, a juvenile‘s case is managed in the same manner as all other cases and does not receive special treatment even if the juvenile is about to turn 18. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 354, 684 P.2d 1293. The State has broad discretion to decide when to prosecute and may delay prosecution until it feels it can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d 845, 850, 765 P.2d 1292 (1989); see also Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Broad discretion is allowed because the court does not want the State to mistakenly charge an innocent person or bring cases that are insubstantial and result in a waste of judicial resources. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 850, 765 P.2d 1292.
Encompassed in prosecutorial discretion is the need for the prosecution to undertake an investigation. An investigation may not occur until the charges are reported, but once reported a court should evaluate the investigation for deliberate or negligent delay. See Warner, 125 Wash.2d at 890-91, 889 P.2d 479 (noting that a reason for delay may be a delay in reporting). However, if an investigation follows standard practices, the delay caused is considered a justified investigatory delay and rebuts accusations of deliberate or negligent inaction. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 354, 684 P.2d 1293; Dixon, 114 Wash.2d at 865-66, 792 P.2d 137; Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795-96, 97 S.Ct. 2044.
Here, the charges were not reported to the police until August 1998. The juvenile court‘s prosecutor‘s office received the investigative file on September 29, 1998, child interviews were conducted the following month, and a detective tried to contact Salavea through the end of November. Therefore, the delay between the time the acts were committed and December 1998 may be justified by a delay in reporting, an investigatory delay, and the right of the prosecution to exercise discretion in filing charges.
Salavea turned 16 on October 9, 1998. The earliest the State could have charged and tried Salavea is after the justified investigatory delay at the end of November 1998. This means that Salavea would have been 16 at the time of the proceedings, the automatic decline statute would have applied to him, and he would have been automatically declined to adult court jurisdiction. Therefore, any argument that Salavea was prejudiced by a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction fails
CONCLUSION
We interpret the age element of
We affirm the Court of Appeals.
WE CONCUR: ALEXANDER, C.J., JOHNSON, MADSEN, IRELAND, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS and FAIRHURST, JJ.