State v. RyanState v. Ryan
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Blodgett
Thе mstructions requested by the dеfendant were properly denied.
It is true that “ in the earlier history of the common law only such acts were deemed criminal as had m them the vicious element of an unlawful intent, indicаting a deviation from moral rectitude; but this quality has ceased to be essential, and now acts unobjectionable M a moral view, except so far as bemg prohibited by law makes them so, constitute a considerable portiоn of the criminal code. In such statutes the act is expressly prolfibited, without reference to the intent or purpose of thе party committing it, and is usually of the class M which the person committmg it is under no obligation to act unless he knоws he can do so lawfully. Undеr these statutes it is not a defence that the person acted honestly and m good faith, under a mistake of fact. He is bound to knоw the fact as well as the law, and he acts at his peril. These statutes do not make a gmlty knowledge one of the Mgredients of thе offence.” State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329, 330, and numerous *197 authorities there cited; State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402—405; Commonwealth v. Uhrig, 138 Mass. 492; Commonwealth v. Savery, 145 Mass. 212; State v. Smith, 10 R. I. 258; State v. Hughes, 16 R. I. 403.
The statutе in question dearly comes within this class, and having been enacted nearly five yеars subsequent to the decision in State v. Cornish, of which the legislaturе must be deemed to have liad knowledge, no roоm for reasonable doubt remains that the legislative intent was that the statute should be construed in accordance with its language and agreeably to the construction obtaining not only in State v. Cornish, but in preceding cases.
_Exceptions overruled.
Peaslee, J., did not sit: the others concurred.