Dеfendant’s primary contention on this appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from the airplane as the fruit of an illegal search and sеizure. The trial court below conducted a hearing on the motion pursuant to G.S. 15A-977(d). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on these findings and conclusions, the court ruled that the search of the plane and the luggage on board was valid on two alternative theories. First, the pilot of the plane had freely given his knowing consеnt to search the plane, and the scope of such consent could, and did, include the luggage on board. Second, the court concluded that an airplane falls within the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, requiring only that the Sheriff have probable cause to believe the plane or its contents contained contraband. The cоurt specifically found that such probable cause existed.
In our view the search of the plane and its contents was justified because probable cause existed to believe that the plane carried contraband. An airplane is a highly mobile vehicle, subject to extensive regulation, in which a defendant has a diminished expectation of privacy and, therefore, comes within the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., United States v. Rollins,
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In this case, the initial “stop” of the airplane and detention of its occupants were justified, as they must be, by the “reasonable suspicion” of thе law enforcement officers that the plane was transporting contraband.
See Terry v. Ohio,
Once the plane was on the ground, several things occurred which elevated this reasonable suspicion to probable cause. Upon seeing the plаne taxiing toward the officers, the driver who had been waiting for the plane said in response to a question, “My name is Peter Rabbit and I want a lawyer.” The defendant here exited the plane and bеgan walking toward the gate. When he spotted the waiting law enforcement officers, he wheeled and began returning to the plane. Despite being requested to stop by the nearest officеr, defendant continued toward the plane. An officer followed him and as defendant approached the plane, the officer heard him shout, “Get the hell out of here.” Defendant then rеturned to where the officer was standing and produced a California driver’s license in response to a request for identification. The engines of the plane were still running and the officer requested that defendant return to the plane and ask the pilot to cut off the engines. Defendant returned to the plane, followed by the officer. As defendant reentered the plane, he was again heard to exclaim, “Get the hell out of here.” The engines began to get louder, but at that point the officer entered the plane and asked the pilot to cut off the engines. The offiсer noticed that defendant appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic, which he be *389 lieved to be either cocaine or methamphetamine. These additionаl facts, combined with those facts already known to the officers, were sufficient to give the officers probable cause to believe the plane contained contraband.
Having сoncluded that the officers had probable cause to search the plane, the question then becomes the permissible scope of the search. Under the decision in
Ross, supra,
when the рolice engage in a legitimate, warrantless search of an automobile, the scope of that search extends to any containers found inside that may conceal the objeсt of the search.
Id.
at 824,
In light of our holding on the issue of probable cause to search, we need not address the contentions of defendant related to the pilot’s consent to search the plane. That consent was unnecessаry to authorize the search; therefore, its validity or invalidity has no relevance to our inquiry.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress certain statements made by each of the suspects during their detention leading up to the search. Defendant argues that the initial detention was not supported by the required reasonable suspicion and that, even if it werе, their detention exceeded the limited intrusion allowed by
Terry, supra,
and its progeny. However, as pointed out above, we believe there was reasonable suspicion to justify the initial detention and, аs the facts developed to the officers, the reasonable suspicion became probable cause. So, even if there were a
de facto
arrest, as defendant contends, it was supрorted by probable cause and was, therefore, legitimate.
See Peters v. New York,
Defendant next assigns as error the denial by the trial court of his motion to sequester thе State’s witnesses, made at both the
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suppression hearing and the trial. The North Carolina rule is that the motion to sequester witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 615;
State v. Young,
Defendant is also unable to demonstrate any prejudice in this case. At the suppression hearing, Sheriff Goss was the first witness to testify and he related all the key facts necessary to support the trial court’s ruling on the motion. Thus, there could be no prejudice resulting from the failure to sequester the witnesses. Although defendant does allege that Sheriff Goss changed his testimony from that givеn at the suppression hearing, the alleged change related only to a collateral matter —corroboration of another officer’s testimony —and defendant was free to impеach the Sheriff s trial testimony with his earlier testimony given at the suppression hearing. This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant’s next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Baker of the Ashe County Sheriffs Department to testify at the suppression hearing that in his opinion, defendant was under the influence of narcotics the night of his arrest. The defendant objected to this testimony on two grounds: first, that it was improper rebuttal evidence and, second, that the officer was not qualified to give such an opinion.
As to the first objection, rebuttal testimony is permissible to “impeach defendant’s witnesses or to explain, modify, or contradict defendant’s evidence.”
State v. Sidden,
*391
Defendant’s final assignment of error is that his convictions and sentencing for the two separate offenses of “trafficking in cocaine by possession” and “trafficking in cocaine by transporting” violate the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense. This issue has been decided adversely to defendant in
State v. Perry,
Having carefully examined the record on appeal and thoroughly considered the contentions of defendant, we conclude defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.
No error.