State v. Russell

rising grаde not a third led to those findings permanent above level of partial impair- ment Spencer’s prognosis conclusively its conclusion that establish legitimacy Spencer’s impairment. of competitive-level employment found to negative. presented be That information physical When there has been a ac sufficient to the Commission that evidence cident or trauma and disability a claimant’s previous might award have been inade- prolonged is increased or by traumatic neu quate, and it should have exercised its con- rosis, hysteria, hysterical pa conversion tinuing jurisdiction granted a new ralysis, it is uniformly now held that the hearing. That information also constitutes disability including full the effects of the prima Spencer facie evidence that can no compensable. Larson, neurosis is 1B A. longer required perform the duties in his 42.22(a) (1986); supra, Racz v. Chen occupation nault, Inc., and thus he cannot (Fla.App.1982); be rehabili- 418 So.2d 413 tated, Laboratories, Inc., Deziel v. so that the burden shifts to the em- Difco (1978); Mich. N.W.2d Elliott v. ployer prove regular existence of Castparts Corp., Or.App. Precision steady employee per- work that can 567 P.2d 566 See also North form, taking employ- into consideration the Carriers, Inc., supra, west and Inter education, capacity, age. ee’s mental Care, mountain Health Ortega, Inc. v. Commission, Marshall v. Industrial su- (Utah 1977), where this Court Larson, pra, (citing at 212 2 A. The Law of preexist affirmed the of award benefits for (1983)). Compensation 57.51 Workmen’s ing psychologically based disabilities. hearing, Because we remand for further The case is remanded to the Industrial one additional comment should made. purpose considering Commission for the of employer appears finding to read a of Spencer’s permanent claim of total disabili- malingering report into the of the medical ty light by of the evaluation the Division panel. However, panel the medical did not of Rehabilitation. Vocational Spencer’s conclude that seizures were not ordered. So legitimate, nor Spencer did admit that he driving job opportuni- had numerous truck if just

ties he would end his artificial sei- completely

zures. The record is of devoid Instead,

any implication malingering. of harmony, reports

read all of the in the Spencer file indicate that suffers from a Utah, STATE of Plaintiff post-traumatic vary- stress disorder that is Respondent, ingly labeled “factitious1 seizure disor- der,” reaction,” “hysterical “conversion symptoms.”2

conversion RUSSELL, Dick R. Defendant Appellant. fide absence bona seizures noted by panel simply the medical refers to the No. 18591. organic, structural causes of the absence Supreme Court of Utah. seizures, as manifested absence 9, 1987. Feb. sphincter rhythmic loss of control and shaking medical re- noted various panel’s findings and

ports. The medical judge’s adoption

the administrative law artificial; anxiety. A not natural. Factitial: condition in which the cause of Factitious: means; unintentionally produced anxiety symptoms artificial is converted into functional produced. deafness, Medical Dictio- Dorland’s Illustrated paral- include blindness or 1981). (26th nary ed. Schmidt, ysis, Attorneys’ Dictionary etc. 1 J.E. (1986). Hysteria may Medicine mimic psychoneurosis hysteria in which 2. A form disease. Id. physical signs symptoms are substituted for de- Hansen, City, Lake Salt

Phil L. appellant. fendant Gen., Earl Wilkinson, Atty. L. David Thompson, Asst. B. Dorius and David F. Gen., plaintiff City, for Attys. Salt Lake respondent. HOWE, Justice: appeals from his convic- Defendant in the second of murder two counts tion of not convict- contending that was degree, jury verdict and unanimous ed him to convict insufficient the evidenсe was charged. family his were Defendant Russell Rowley, LaRue neighbors Floyd A occasionally whose son tended Russell given similar instruction was II Count Floyd charged children. were shot to which and LaRue LaRue Row- ley. during home Russell their death discussion in which he that their requested Defendant son had taken indecent liberties with his they instructed that had to choose which of

five-year-old daughter. b, (a, c) the three alternatives listed paragraph under 2 of those instructions case, At jury the of defendant’s the close formed basis for any they might the verdict given general form on verdict both requested return. His instruction to that counts and instructed on murder in the rejected. objected effect was He to In- second as follows:

struction No. 14 on ground gave the that it paragraph alternatives, under 2 “three Instruction No. 14 telling jury they without the must be defendant, you can the Before convict in one unanimous or the other of those Roundy Russell, Dick of the crime of three jury alternatives.” The returned Degree, Murder in the Second a lesser guilty verdict both counts. Over the charged included offense of the crime in objection State, of the defendant then I, you Count must believe from all the jury asked the polled as to which beyond evidence and a reasonable doubt they alternative had to chosen convict de- every following each and one of the ele- request granted, fendant. This and ments of that offense. jurors they the answered that had chosen 1. on or day That about the 16th of paragraph different alternatives in 2 to ar- May, in County, Salt Lake State of guilty rive at their verdicts. Utah, killed; Floyd Rowley was Before we address defendant’s person That defendant the is who appeal, two contentions on we note the Floyd caused the death of Rowley and objection State’s to polling the of the did so one following under of the circum- point on which it us. A has briefed defend stances: ant may poll jury to determine whether a. intentionally Defendant or know- U.C.A., verdict unanimous. ingly Floyd caused the Rowley; death of 35—21(f). purpose polling is to § 77— signed by determine that the verdict b. Defendant intended to cause seri- jurors foreman is that the individual bodily injury ous Floyd Rowley by not one that has been coerced or caused an act clearly dangerous committed Agtucа, mistake. 12 Wash.App. human life that caused the death of 529 1159 P.2d Evidence that Floyd Rowley; or was confused or that it misunder c. Defendant acted under circum- disregarded stood or the facts or appli which evidenced in- stance[s] cable law is inadmissible as violative of the engaged difference human life and long-standing policy against attempts to grave conduct which created a risk of the integrity undermine of the verdict. thereby death to another and caused the Tri-O-Inc., (Utah P.2d Groen v. Floyd Rowley. death of 1983). inquiries pro All into mental improper. cesses of the are See State hand, Couch, (Utah If you 1981). on the other are convinced v. properly polled the truth element number above Defendant the individual one three to determine if the verdict on each circumstance[s] beyond element number above count was theirs. The court then contin doubt, you requested you then must find the ued: “It also reasonable has polled guilty the Second be of Murder as which subdivision under the homicide, offense of Degree included section of murder in a lesser criminal you your I. second degree, you crime Count found reached squarely had instant case has never been decid- verdict at.” Inasmuch general verdict been instructed under a ed this Court. it could find

form had been told that Many jurisdictions have considered the of the three guilty “any one scope of requirement the constitutional circumstances,” point polling at that unanimous verdict criminal cases. attempt thought their became an to reach virtually The decisions are unanimous that processes impermissible. and was Conse- a defendant is not entitled to a unanimous poll play result of will no quently, the precise verdict on the manner in which the part in our decision on the two issues be- committed, crime was of sever- which fore us. modes, al methods or or under alternative interpretation of so the evidence I. long as there is substantial evidence contends that Defendant first modes, methods, each of the statute, U.C.A., degree murder charged. manners One the earliest of 76-5-203, separate 1953, defines three Appeals cases is a decision of the of Court jury the upon theories which and distinct 1903, Sullivan, New People of York v. Consequently, him. could conviсted have case, 122, N.Y. 65 N.E. In that 173 right deprived his a argues, he was of to premedi- the defendant was Const., I, verdict, jury Utah art. unanimous during tated murder or murder committed 10, give trial refused when the court felony. the commission of a In answer jury that the requested his instruction had jury the unanimously agree upon one of the three the defendant’s contention that upon theory as the basis for its verdict. He it theories had to be unanimous Utah we refers to three cases where were him, follow- convicted the court stated the decide, with, a but did not similar faced quoted upon ing, which has been and relied Rasmussen, 92 question. In v. State Utah many subsequent cases: 357, (1937), P.2d 176 the defendant was 68 single charged in There a crime was but manslaughter, involuntary charged with defendant,— against the the indictment act consisting either unlawful not of degree; in the that of murder first hand, amounting felony, the one on by the the issue to be determined performed unlawful act in an man- lawful had the defendant jury was whether ner, A of this plurality the other. Court on our guilty of that crime. Under been In any found error harmless. State v. 183, Pen.Code), (section so far as statute 538, (1945), Roedl, P.2d 741 107 Utah 155 us, proof applicable to the case before assigned the dealt with an instruction error killed the de- either that the defendant Again, degree. on murder first premeditat- deliberate and ceased with a any found error in the instruction Court death, the effect his or while design ed 110 Thompson, In harmless. State v. engaged in the commis- defendant was 113, (1946), 153 a unanimous 170 P.2d felony, attempt of or an to commit sion charge first verdict on a design to though without felony, “depraved regard- on a mind based either life, guilt of the his take established life” less human or “malice afore- of necessary charged. “It not crime theory appeal thought” was attacked as verdict, to find should jury, in order preclud- containing two different theories single of transaction concur in a view the ing unanimity. Thompson The Court If the conclu- by the evidence. disclosed unnecessary the issue it to address found upon justified of two may be either sion had disputed instruction the evidence, interpretations the ver- limiting language “all contained showing impeached dict cannot be to either one or must concur as upon jury proceeded part that a of the of murder above kinds other tо_” part upon the oth- added.) Thus, interpretation one (Emphasis referred er.” presented by defendant question 166 (citation omitted). case,

65 N.E. at 989-90 Other one as a conspirator, v. Holland cases which ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‍are in accord State, does 134, 91 Wis.2d 280 N.W.2d 288 not have to be as to unanimous whether (1979), denied, 931, cert. 445 U.S. 100 S.Ct. premeditated committed 1320, (1980); 63 L.Ed.2d 764 People v. Bur felony murder or murder are Newsted v. gess, Mich.App. 214, 67 240 N.W.2d 485 State, (Okla.Crim.App.1986); 734 (1976); Carothers, v. State 84 Wash.2d Ellison, Wash.App. 564, State v. 36 676 256, (1974)(overruled 525 P.2d 731 on other (1984); Encinas, P.2d 531 State v. 132 grounds); driving in cases of while under 493, (1982); Ariz. P.2d 624 647 State v. intoxicating liquor influence where (Iowa 1979)(dicta), Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 the defendant could proof be convicted on 921, denied, 446 U.S. 100 rt. S.Ct. ce being of either under the influence or hav 1859, (1980); People 64 L.Ed.2d 277 v. ing by weight or more alcohol 0.10% 476, Fullwood, Mich.App. 215 51 N.W.2d blood, Bratthauer, his v. 354 State N.W.2d (1974); Milan, 185, People 594 v. 9 Cal.3d (Iowa 1984); Franco, 774 v. 96 State 68, (1973); Cal.Rptr. 507 P.2d 956 State (1982); Wash.2d P.2d 1320 (1957). v. P.2d Reyes, 209 Or. a murder case where People Sullivan, supra, rule v. required was not as to whether the defend employed has also in cases where the ant to kill intended victim his com convicted of assault. panion, Flathers, S.D. James, (Alaska State v. N.W. 72 A.L.R. 150 1985), was instructed that it could aрplica- Sullivan rule has also found guilty find the defendant if it unanimously tion in cases where it held agreed he had degree that committed first jury did not have to be unanimous as to the in assault as described either of two sub- exact rea of mens the defendant where the sections the statute. One of subsection statute contained more than one mens rea. required intent physical to cause serious Richardson, In Wash.App. State v. 24 person. injury to another The other sub- (1979), 600 P.2d 696 the defendant was required section the performing intentional charged with assault. The of an act that physical results in serious jury they instructed was could convict injury person to another under circum- they (1) the if defendant found that he manifesting stances extreme indifference knowingly assaulted victim the with to the value of Similarly, human life. in weapon likely produce harm; (2) to or he Commonwealth, Wells v. 561 S.W.2d 85 knowingly grievous bodily inflicted harm (Ky.1978), relying upon the court People v. victim; upon (3) physical the or caused he Sullivan, supra, jury held that the in con- injury by victim means of criminal victing the defendant of assault did not negligence. Dixon, In State Ariz. v. 127 have to (1) be unanimous as whether to he (Apр.1980), jury the intended cause physical injury, to serious charged they could convict the defend- (2) wantonly or engaged in conduct creat- (1) if they ant of theft knowingly found ing grave risk of death and under circum- property controlled of another with intent manifesting stances extreme indifférence deprive him property; (2) of such or to human life. another, property controlled of knowing or employed The also in rule has cases having property reason know that the robbery jury of armed where the was al- was stolen. if they lowed to convict found that the rule, There are simply limitations on defendant force or how- used threatened ever. If force, the statute under which the State, imminent of de- use Manson v. actually (1981); fendant is convicted in defines more Wis.2d N.W.2d merely than one jury cases crime and not one crime where the was allowed con- which be upon finding vict the that he committed in several differ- crime, participated ways, of the ent entitled in the commission the defendant is or, accessory in unanimity guilty either as which he is principal or an on crime (a), (b), (c). the crux of or limit our decision to committing. That is Unitеd We (5th F.2d 453 Cir. Gipson, proposition express any opinion States v. and do not 1977), upon which the unanimity on the in necessity of other situ- upon instant relies and which defend- case present ations not in this case. Defendant in in generally ants relied other cases have has not cited any authority and we have question which the pro- been unable would to find which Gipson, raised. In defendant was holding vide basis that the for must charged violating prohibiting a statute with unanimous as to which subsection six enumerated criminal acts. The defend- statute defendant’s conviction fits under. violating ant was with the statute This void is understandable. Several committing various criminal acts sev- difficulty courts have on the commented permit- eral incidents. The instruction juries that would be encountered with if requiring unanimity ted without conviction requirement. there were such a We concur about act the defendant had commit- which Supreme of the observation Court ted incident. Court of and which James, of Alaska v. State Appeals reversed the conviction and held 1165, where it stated: required to should have been determining adopt whether did,” agree upon “just what the defendant Alaska, must Sullivan rule we con- i.e., unanimously agree jury must consequences rejection. sider the of its reus element the offense be- actus conduct, There are differences intent acts fell prohibited cause the into two con- or circumstances between subsec- categories. group of ceptually distinct One every tions almost criminal statute in receipt, concealing, acts interdicted our code. Rejection Sullivan rule storing of motor vehicles aircraft. The disagree- juror result in would therefore bartering, category other interdicted many ment over semantics cases in selling, any such disposing property. they unanimously agree that entitled to defendant was unanim- wrongful defendant committed the deed. ity category of crime he com- to which experience Our is that have keen connection, see mitted. In this justice sense of that is served well (1944); Ewing, 174 Or. P.2d 765 requiring By rule. semantic Sullivan 703, People 203 Cal. P. 914 Scofield, v. 265 encourage overcomplicat- uniformity we (1928); Arndt, v. 87 Wash.2d State hung juries in ed and cases instructions (1976); Green, v. 553 P.2d 1328 upon actually agree in which the Wash.2d guilt. the defendant’s case, In the instant defendant was expressed on concern has two Similar been convicted under section 76-5-203 which by Supreme Court of Wiscon occasions the provides degree that second State, 91 Wis.2d sin. Holland v. in different manners and be committed (1979), 280 N.W.2d the defendant was clear, It is mens rea. how with different degree murder. The convicted second ever, only one crime defined—that jury was he could be found instructed that Thus, do being degree murder. we second ways in guilty three alternative problem the of several not in this case have —direct commission, abetting, aiding and and con single being defined in a distinct crimes spiracy. In defendant’s con answer to the Gipson, v. su statute as in States United tention that the had to be unanimous that defendant killed pra. found theory participation as to the of his the Rowley the LaRue with Floyd both and crime, approv quoting the court after set the circumstances mens and under rea Sullivan, supra, from People al v. and (a), (c) (b), out either subsections distinguishing Gip out, after United States (See 14 set instruction statute. son, observed, require supra, “To unanimi virtually unanimous infra.) Under participation above, ty as to the manner of would have discussed case we law which justice system, promote unanimity on to frustrate the be not entitled defendant was deliberations, encourage hung endless ther called or a call received from Mrs. juries, precipitate in an effort retrials Rowley. According defendant, he told agreement to find on a nonessential issue.” drunk, her that he angry, was and not Later, State, Wis.2d Manson v. making sense, any but that he would come (1981), the defend- N.W.2d where morning to their home in the and “we can ant who armed had convicted of rob- get straightened it all out then.” Mrs. bery had to be contended Rowley telephone then or in a later call deciding taking unanimous in whether urged him ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‍to come now. Defendant went accomplished by using against force to his bedroom and took from his closet a person of the simply owner or handgun placed which he pock- back force, threatening the imminent use of pants. way his et of On his the Row- requiring court held that such home, leys’ he encountered some friends to prob- would raise serious characterization gave intelligible whom a short but re- lems which should avoided. question sponse thеy asked about fish- II. ing. on was instructed first de Defendant Rowley entered the home gree murder, as well as on lesser in through He, a back Floyd, LaRue, door. murder, cluded of second degree offenses son, their daughter went into the manslaughter, negligent homicide. It living room. A discussion ensued in which guilty found defendant counts of two Floyd light claims made murder. Defendant assails daughter accusation. The son and denied grounds the convictions on the they their father made such statement but find no the evidence and that admitted that loudly defendant was viewing the evidence in light most fa screaming signs of drinking. showed State, only vorable to the a conviction of Finally, manslaughter pulled gun would have been warranted. from his requires This contention it, statement of the pocket, dropped picked up, it walked surrounding facts the shootings. seated, Floyd point- over to where gun in Floyd’s stating, ed face “If I When defendant arrived home one Satur- getting answers, start day don’t some I trip, afternoon from a am business his five-year-old wife told him that their going blowing everybody to start away.” daughter complained Rowley’s had Floyd told they defendant that could re- son had taken indecent liberties with her. problem solve like adults and that there Defendant, news, disturbed walked guns. placed was no need for LaRue her a short distance down the street urged hand defendant’s arm and him to Rowley residence. There he discussed the put gun away. Floyd his attempted to Floyd Rowley accusation with and LaRue gun the away move from his face and to time, for During about one-half hour. this get from up the chair. Defendant shot him argument there was no nor any was there killing once in the chin him. hostility toward shown defendant. Defend- through Defendant exited the house the ant stated that he would call and return rear door and ran to around the front of later Rowleys’ when the son was there. the house where he encountered LaRue Upon leaving, remarked, as “I don’t anyone him, she out. want to hurt came When she saw over this.” she ran back into the house. Defendant raised his home, After defendant returned to he his gun, ran, aimed it at her as she and then and several friends discussed business through large picture shot her window the daughter. accusation made his De- next to the front She door. died several fendant had earlier in the consumed day hоurs later. then beer, Defendant shot himself some drinking and his dur- continued ing in the twice the chest which afternoon when consumed from wounds he he also some bourbon. At he ei- p.m., about 6:00 hospitalization. recovered after first had argues pull Defendant the evidence will the that back hammer and then only permit pull a conviction the trigger gun the most the before fire. would U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-205, manslaughter. He also testified he knew gun the was manslaughter defines as: dangerous weapon and was aware of (1) Criminal homicide constitutes man- the if what result would be someone were slaughter if the actor: to shoot shooting another the face. The

(a) of LaRue Recklessly death occurred moments later after de- causes the of an- other; or fendant out the had run back door and around the house front where

(b) Causes death of another under the through took aim and then at LaRue shot influence of emotional dis- the extreme evidence, window. rea- for which there is a reasonable Given the turbance sonably rejected explanation or could have defendant’s excuse.... theory “recklessly that he caused the death argues he had a reasonable Defendant of another” that he “caused the death daughter five-year-old his had belief that another under the influence extreme abused, angry that he and had been emotional disturbance for which there is a afternoon, drinking all that he told been explanation reasonable excuse.” On the Rowleys that he did not want to discuss hand, supports other find- the evidence morning, matter further until that the ing that killed his now, victims with urged Rowleys him to come that he one of mens rea and under the circum- to resolve the matter and became went degree specious stances our second murder stat- infuriated at remark made ute, pulled gun point- section Floyd, that he his out 76-5-203. Floyd impress him with the

ed it at af- and sentence are conviction matter, and that in his seriousness firmed. by accident, Floyd He anger or was shot. through recklessly afterwards shot HALL, C.J., concurs. unintentionally room front window and LaRue. killed (con- STEWART, Associate Chief Justice Assuming sup- that the evidence would curring separately): manslaughter, port a conviction of join affirming I convic- defendant’s facts, judges are the sole did who I Although degree tions of murder. second way. conflicting evidence that not view preferable have submit that it would agree do not defendant that the We give judge an instruction trial does not his evidence also rea, I to the defendant’s mens He convictions. was seated principle of do not believe the fundamental neighbors’ front room his home I jury unanimity violated in this case. problem discussing a had arisen con- however, emphasize separately, write cerning Apparently their children. when context, a different when acknowledgement no from he received Rowleys incident on the basis of alterna- had oc- allowed convict curred, juror permits requiring the inference without evidence tive mental states pointed in pulled gun might out his it unanimity, that he a constitutional violation Floyd’s face an effort to force confes- occur. well Rowley acknowledgement.

sion testified no time was there children that at I. Rowley fami- any any comment from case, jury given in this instruction light or made of the situation was ly that U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-203 which tracked designed provoke Defendant defendant. ed.), (1978 degree murder stat- the second remarked, getting “If I don’t start some ute, permittеd jury to return a verdict answers, blowing I am start going to not guilty though of were even everybody away.” that he had He testified mental state of he unanimous as to the previously gun fired aware Thus, instruction de- fendant’s defendant.1 mental state as a of determinant mental possible scribed three alternative culpability under the Utah Criminal Code guilty states would suffice for which principles and traditional of criminal re- states are verdict. Because those mental statutes, sponsibility. The par- homicide similar, point of highly so from the of view ticular, culpability make the of a defendant functioning culpability, I think mental turn on his mental state at the time of the for essential constitutional killing. purposes unanimous on the mens rea ele- Subtle, important, but distinctions exist ment. between mental states that lie side side Nevertheless, applica- I fear that a broad along the continuum of various mental the Sullivan rule, of Court tion which the unanimity states. If as ato mental state is in a violation of the Utah adopts, will result required, jurors may forego thorough not requirement unanimi- constitutional analysis of the defendant’s mental state ty if a criminal conviction is allowed on possible and of lesser included offenses. proof of alternative mental states which depraved The difference between indiffer- essentially are not the same either na- murder, ence is one form of which degree culpability.2 To hold that ture or murder, degree manslaughter, and reckless only agree the act commit- need on crime, is a which lesser is so subtle that agree men- ted but need not on the actor’s facts, ignores importance tal state of a de- under different I would think it 1. Instruction number fourteen read as follows: in the next instruction. under this instruction then not er the elements of beyond gree, a lesser included the truth of one of the three circumstance not elements, evidence in this case to human life and that caused the death of created a thereby mitted bodily injury the death of one of the 2. That following caused the death of [sic] Floyd Rowley was reasonable doubt each and the crime Second Roundy lieve from all the evidence and 1. That on or about the 16th 1981, If, If, after careful consideration of all of the c. Defendant acted b. Defendant a. Dеfendant Before guilty guilty which evidenced on the in Salt Lake an act a reasonable doubt of the in Count I. If Degree, Russell, caused the death of you grave then elements of Murder in charged of Murder in the Second following element number other Floyd clearly dangerous can convict the you risk of death to another Floyd Rowely of the crime of Murder a lesser included offense of intentionally intended, hand, engaged Manslaughter Rowley in Count killed; must find the Floyd Rowley; County, circumstances: you you that offense: you offense under Floyd Rowely person you are not convinced find the defendant to cause serious in conduct and did so under are Segond every I, defendant, [sic] State of Floyd above should consid- [sic] you of the crime circumstance convinced of day May, indifference who caused as set forth human life in element one of the knowingly beyond foregoing and com- must be- [sic] Rowley. Degree Utah, [sic]; Dick De- 2. State v. when it was opposed sult. Jurors could have sufficient for a conviction senting). human unanimity as to opinion risk of the theories to the acted with extreme indifference Alaska Stat. added). presented victed of first utory a conviction for the crime ensured elements of the crime. The defendant was con- example (cited der of LaRue manifesting extreme indifference to the value injury of human life. performs ry ry instrument; James, ^[1] A similar instruction was then ed offense of the crime Murder in the Second number 2 above to another theories. At by majority opinion), presents with intent to cause serious you life, any to another by merely requiring jury agreement to serious correctly of a situation where Justice Rabinowitz 698 P.2d at James, committed an act that results in serious jurors agreeing must find the defendant person by but that Rowley. [or 2] person, degree one 11.41.200(a)(1), (3) (emphasis first a third noted that person physical beyond or the other runs a serious without under two alternative stat- degree as only physical ... time, assault. The case was ... causes means of a distinguished Degree thought that that was of first under circumstances [if] charged (Rabinowitz, a reasonable injury, given assault if a that a defendant presenting requirement statute allowed to the value of a lesser includ- assault. his degree (Alaska 1985) physical physical intеntionally for the mur- was the re- in Count I. dangerous dissenting injury, from the guilty physical assault J., a clear person doubt, is not both inju- inju- dis- y¡\ dentiary point, required, my a instruc- it is in give but error not to would be view, degree unanimity second on the as to both the ultimate criminal act tion on charge. committed and the defendant’s state of murder

mind. II. in essentially this case verdict protects the ac- Process Clause Due of the mental unanimous because all states upon “except against cused conviction in 76-5-2033 which were submitted to § every of a doubt proof beyond reasonable of malice are forms common law necessary to constitute the crime with fact because, given aforethought and the facts Winship, charged.” In re which he is case, suppose it is to of unreasonable 1073, 364, 1068, 358, U.S. S.Ct. the defendant acted with lesser mental Stronger proof is re- L.Ed.2d 368 state. than in civil cases quired criminal cases in convicting of the defendant second margin of reduce the inevitable order to degree murder under either 76-5- § 363, fact-finding. Id. at 90 S.Ct. at error (b), (c), juror 203(l)(a), or each found be- jury requirement, 1072. The unanimous yond a reasonable doubt the defendаnt standard, also doubt like reasonable (1) intentionally either caused the death of of fact the necessi- “impresses on trier (2) victims; intended cause serious of reaching subjective state certi- ty of bodily injury to the victims and committed 364, on facts in issue.” Id. at tude life; clearly dangerous act to human or I, section 10 of the at 1072. Article S.Ct. (3) depraved acted with indifference Constitution, states, crim- which Utah “[I]n human life and knew that his conduct cre- unanimous the verdict shall be inal cases death. grave ated a risk of civil cases three-fourths [but] [i]n degree definitions of second mur- These verdict,” suggests find a jurors may der the definitions the Model Penal verdicts in the certitude unanimous (from which the Utah Code’s murder Code fundamentally impor- criminal cases part) provision derived in substantial are tant to our Constitution’s framers. mental statutory definitions of various requires process that each Because due at constituted states which common law proved crime be- of a essential element aforethought. Model Penal Code malice doubt, fair- fundamental yond reasonable 210, comments Commentary, art. 210.2 § unani- requires jurors agree ness also 2, (1980)(“MPC Commentary”); & 13-19 element, including mously on each essential 1953, (1978 ed.); U.C.A., 76-5-203 § requisite type mens rea. The critical (1953 ed.) 1953, 76-30-1, -2, U.C.A., -3 is, up “How trunk and question far 1973). (repealed tree must branches of evidence 1973, was de- Prior to murder Rasmussen, v. unanimity extend?” State killing fined “the human (1937) unlawful 92 Utah U.C.A., aforethought.” being malice result). (Wolfe, J., concurring in the Clear- ed.) 1973). (1953 (repealed each 76-30-1 required is not evi- ly, thereby [see causes the death another read as follows: Section 76-5-203 1984) ]; Fontana, (Utah or degree. (1) Criminal in the second Murder — commission, (d)While attempted com- in the second constitutes homicide mission, flight from the com- the actor: or immediate if (a) Intentionally knowingly aggrava- causes the or attempted commission mission another; sodomy, death of robbery, rape, robbery, forcible ted (b) Intending bodily injury to serious cause assault, aggravated aggravated ar- sexual another, clearly dangerous commits an act he arson, burglary, son, aggravated burglary, ag- of anoth- life that causes death to human kidnapping, gravated kidnapping, or causes er; or person other than a death of another the party. [objectively] (c) Acting under circumstances evidencing life, to human indifference (2) felony degree is a Murder [knowingly] engages in conduct degree. the first grave death another and creates a risk of Russell, provocation, In 146 P.2d which case the crime was (1944), the the intent Court defined manslaughter. A species of mur- to constitute afore- necessary malice der grievous involved intent to cause thought: Again, bodily knowledge harm. necessary order to have malice to conduct bodily inju- would cause serious (not necessarily commit murder ry generally was assimilated to intent degree), killing in the first must be deemed sufficient for murder if unlawful, it must result from or be actually death A of another resulted. caused an act or omission to act com- category third of murder was sometimes following one of the inten- mitted with depraved-heart called murder. This la- (1) design previous- an intention or tions: bel derived from decisions and statutes ly great bodily kill formed to or cause condemning as murder unintentional (2) injury; design pre- or an intention or homicide under eyincing circumstances or formed to do an act omit to do viously “depraved mind” or an “abandonеd and act, knowing the reasonable and malignant heart.” Older authorities consequences natural thereof would be have described such circumstances as likely great bodily inju- death or to cause giving “implied” “pre- rise to an (3) ry; previously thought out inten- kill injure, sumed” intent to but designed perpetration tional or or at- concept essential one of extreme tempt perpetrate one of certain kinds regarding recklessness homicidal risk. of felonies. Thus, person might for mur- liable (emphasis Id. at der absent actual intent to kill or original). Similarly, Commentary the MPC injure if he caused the death of another concept summarizes the common law exhibiting in a manner a “wanton and aforethought malice as follows: disregard wilful of an unreasonable hu- law, At common murder was defined or, confusing elaboration, man risk” killing as the unlawful of another human disposition, “wickedness of hardness of being aforethought.” “malice heart, cruelty, recklessness of conse- original meaning Whatever quences, regardless a mind of social phrase, “arbitrary it time an became over duty.” The fourth kind of murder was symbol” by judges signify any used felony. based on intent to commit a This a number of mental states deemed suffi- rule, origin felony-murder is the liability cient for murder. assigns liability strict homicide generations Successive added con- new during committed the commission of a aforethought” tent to “malice until it en- felony. These four states of mind ex- compassed variety of mental attitudes meaning hausted the of a “malice afore- bearing predictable no relation to the or- thought”; phrase had no residual dinary sense of the two words.... content. given Various authorities have differ- meanings ent summaries of the several Commentary, MPC Art. 210.2 com- aforethought.” Generally, of “malice (1980) (emphasis added) ment at 13-15 converge these definitions on four con- (footnotes omitted). stituent states mind. First and fore- attempted clarify, modify, The MPC most, there was intent Com- to kill. codify the mental states and circum- mon-law authorities included the no- under stances which homicide is considered tion of kill intent to awareness that the defines murder. MPC murder as fol- death of another result from one’s would lows: actions, particu- if even the actor had no 210.2 Murder consequence. lar desire to aсhieve such a (1) Thus, Except provided 210.- knowing Section intentional or homicide 3(l)(b), homicide was murder killed in the criminal constitutes unless the actor passion engendered by adequate heat of murder when: Second, Legislature departed (a) or know- from purposely it is committed the MPC’s formulation of indif- ingly; or ference murder. The MPC formulation im- (b) recklessly under cir- it is committed poses liability if the murder actor reckless- manifesting indif- extreme cumstances ly causes death under circumstances evi- life. ference of human value dencing extreme indifference to human life. are and indifference Such recklessness 210.2(l)(b). 76-5-203(l)(c) MPC Section § engaged or is presumed if actor is depraved originally defined indifference of, accomplice in the commission or an murder as a homicide committed when the commit, flight or after attempt an engaged in “recklessly conduct to commit committing attempting grave which created a risk of death to robbery, rape or deviate sexual inter- evidencing circumstances another” under force, threat of ar- course force or depraved indifference tо human life. 76—§ son, kidnapping or felonious burglary, ed.) 5-203(l)(c) (1978 added). (emphasis In escape. 1979, Legislature deleted the word degree (2) felony of the first Murder is a 76-5-203, “recklessly” from and this § person convicted of [but held that mere reckless conduct was Court death, provided in as sentenced be prove not sufficient to the offense of sec- Section 210.6]. Bindrup, ond murder. State v. omitted.) (Footnote (Utah 1982). 674, P.2d State v. (Utah 1984), Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 we intent to cause drafters deleted MPC under 76-5- held that to be liable § independently bodily harm “as an grievous 203(l)(c), knowing- defendant roust act culpability for murder sufficient [because creates a aware that his conduct ly be preferable to judgment that it is of] grave of death. Id. at 1046. risk the standards of such cases under handle Legislature and recklessness” retained Finally, recklessness the Utah extreme category separate extreme indiffer- felony in the MPC’s murder as contained murder, manslaughter rather than as a circumstance murder and reckless ence depraved in- Commentary, 210.2 com- recklessness from which statutes. MPC § Further, presumed. can 76-5- 5, the MPC difference 28-29 § ment at 203(l)(d). liability” felony murder “strict eliminated presumption and created instead departures from the Model Despite these enumerated felonies commission of certain Russell, 106 Code, clear from it is Penal that demon- objective circumstance is 1003, 116, the MPC acted reck- that the defendant strates both mental states Commentary that all of the sufficiently his conduct was

lessly and that (b), (c) essentially 76-5-203(l)(a), are in § human life that the value of callous to aforethought. law malice forms of common during of one the commission death caused design “an intention or is at least Each extreme indifference of those felonies or omit to formed to do an ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‍act previously manslaughter or murder, opposed act, knowing that the reasonable do an MPC homicide. See type of some other would be consequences thereof natural 29-42 at 210.2 comment Commentary, bodily inju- § great likely cause death change). for this (outlining the reasons Russell, 145 P.2d at 106 Utah at ry.” 1007. 76-5-203, is supra, note Although § statute mental state the Utah MPC murder is each Not

consistent with malice afore- of malice form of common law commentary’s discussion statute a and the to a also аmounts significant thought, but each one clearly contains aforethought, it mur- depraved indifference retains form of First, statute varied departures. causing intentionally death bodily Certainly, der. serious to cause law “intent common indifference depraved mental demonstrates separate as a mental state injury” of the life taken. murder. value indifference state from significance ference, of purpose or knowl- present problem jurors. still edge culpabili- as a standard of 76-2-103(3), Under [murder] a defendant acts that, ty provocation cases or other “recklessly ... he is when aware but mitigation purposeful knowing apart, consciously disregards a substantial and in- precisely homicide demonstrates such unjustifiable risk that the circumstances difference to the value of human life. exist or that the result will occur.” In words, other engaging in conduct while Commentary, MPC 210.2 comment aware Therefore, that the conduct creates a juror substan who finds that unjustifiable tial intentionally or com- risk is a knowingly reckless act mitted necessarily a homicide must find would a conviction for reck depraved manslaughter. indifference because a defendant less 76-5-205(l)(a). This § intends to kill is that con- who aware his Court reduced a second murder con grave a risk duct creates of death. manslaughter viction to in State v. Bindr (Utah 1982), up, 655 P.2d 674 because the person A who intends cause to serious evidence that showed the defendant “was bodily injury doing “clearly act while aware of the risk occasioned his conduct dangerous to life” a human also acts with consciously disregard and that he chose to depraved to hu- indifference the value of it.” Id. at 676. bodily life. injury man Serious is defined “bodily injury that or as creates causes liability 76-5-203(l)(c), Murder under § disfigurement, permanent protract- serious hand, on the other attaches when the actor impairment ed loss or of the function of engages in conduct which causes death any bodily organ member creates a “knowledge grave with that a [it creates] 76-1-601(9). risk of death.” substantial § risk of death to another.” State v. Fonta person objective A whose “conscious na, 1042, 1047(Utah 1984). Caus type injury desire” is to cause that while ing knowingly engaged death while in con dangerous committing clearly an act hu- to grave a duct which creates risk of death is life, 76-2-103(1), man also demonstrates § virtually causing the same as death while depraved objective indifference. The de- by danger “aware of the risk” occasioned praved judgment indifference out made Therefore, Fontana, ous conduct. after injury when nature of the the defend- depraved distinction between indif “serious,” op- ant intends to cause is manslaughter ference murder and reckless posed “slight.” Commentary, See MPC juror judgment is the additional (intent 210.2 comment at 28-29 § magnitude of by particu the risk created a injury particular “cause of a nature or objectively lar defendant’s conduct evi course, gravity is, of a relevant considera- dences the depraved defendant’s indiffer in determining tion whether [a defendant] ence to human Development, life. See De acted with ‘extreme indifference to val- Murder, praved 1985 Utah Indifference ”). ue human life’ 150; Note, Fontana; L.Rev. State v. An It men- regardless follows that of which Illusory Depraved to Utah’s Solution In jurors upon tal state relied individual Problem, Murder Mens Rea difference verdict, reaching agreed all J.Cоntemp.L. 186-87 In cases knowingly engaged in conduct necessarily where the facts do not demon grave that created a risk of death to depraved strate indifference value victims circum- he acted under life, might human examine not care evidencing depraved stances indifference fully manslaughter reckless if some to human life. opinion are of the defendant acted intentionally, Although verdict under 76-5- some think while the defend § unanimous, merely knowledge ant essentially logically 203 was acted that his grave relating indif- conduct created the subsection risk death. If could, murder, 76-5-203(l)(c), in unanimity required, manslaugh ference were not § conviction, depraved indif- evidencing ter clearly cases not no matter how viable an alternative, I, 10; seriously U.C.A., 1953, con- art. 77-35-21(b). would not be § jury. Moreover, sidered prove the State must each ele- ment of beyond the offense a reasonable here, problem That presented is not how- U.C.A., 1953, doubt. 76-1-501. The ever, clearly because the facts of this case words “element of the offense” mean: objective depraved meet the indifference (a) conduct, attendant circumstanc- Floyd standard. The defendant told es, or proscribed, results of pro- conduct LaRue, getting “If don’t some I start an- hibited, or forbidden the definition of swers, going blowing I every- am to start offense; body away.” pointed gun Floyd He his (b) culpable required. mental state Floyd attempted when move it away, Floyd in the chin. shot once He Id. outside, then ran and when LaRue went Although this Court has never estab- house, through back in the he shot at her requirement lished a give that a trial court the window. He also testified that he a unanimity instruction when gun dangerous weapon knew the was a and could be convicted of crime under alter- probable aware result if some- theories, nate early several Utah cases dis- one were to shoot another in the face. problem. cussed the In State v. Rasmus- sum, sen,

In require unanimity (1937), a court should 92 Utah the jury to the mental state when charged could State the defendant with involun- tary manslaughter; information, base a conviction on two or more mental in the it alleged and a is constituting states lesser-included offense several acts reckless possible depending driving, any alternative conviсtion sup- one of which would have by jury. ported on the mens rea found charged. Care- a conviction on the offense paid jury ful attention should also in cases The was instructed that in order to involving perhaps defendant, other crimes beyond where even convict the it had to find more subtle distinctions exist between the a reasonable that he had doubt committed alternative alleged mental states and other lesser “one or more of the acts” included plurality opinion mental states. Because of the information. The found prejudicial essential nature of a defendant’s mental that this instruction constituted finding culpability, permitted state to a juror be- error because it “each cause of the separate subtle distinctions between choose one or more of the five states, which, various mental fundamental fair- if unlawful acts ... the minds of the clearly requires unanimity screened, ness might on the is- could be disclose at sue of the defendant’s mental state. separate upon sepa- least five verdicts five grounds.” rate and distinct 92 Utah at DURHAM, (concurring in Justice the re- 371, majority A 68 P.2d at 182-83. of the sult): Court, hоwever, disagreed this assess- with prejudicial justices ment of error. Three Although I concur in the result reached writing separately found that the instruc- by majority opinion, I believe that its given prejudice tions did not the defendant analysis unanimity of the rule is insuffi- they essentially required jury because una- Therefore, possibly misleading. I cient and nimity alleged on “one or more” of the acts I separately explain what believe write in the information. the una- appropriate to be the context of degree mur- nimity analysis rule in second 538, 155 Roedl, In 107 Utah P.2d der cases in Utah. (1945), challenged the defendant n felony-murder in and the trial court’s instruction on Under Utah Constitution Code, jury verdict a case which the information a unanimous “willful, deliberate, only him mali- required in cases.1 Utah Const. all criminal unanimity Disagreement by Verdicts are Invalidated Juror 1. For discussion of an excellent Verdicts, Trubitt, Issues, see Patchwork 36 Okla.L.Rev. 473 Different-Jurors Verdicts, Theory: Jury Whether and American cious, killing,” premeditated unlawful and requiring unanimity, although not univer- but the felony was also instructed on sally required, accepted have been an prac- murder based on robbery. 107 Utah at ticе in Furthermore, this state. impli- 550, 155 P.2d at 747. The cited Court cation from the careful consideration of the Rasmussen (inaccurately) as by issue foregoing Court cases is

[holding jury unanimity prosecution ... in a on the elements of an that] involuntary manslaughter important offense is safeguard wherein sever- in crimi- al alleged ... acts . nal proceedings. -.. were to have been death, resulting committed jurisdictions Cases from other have de- unanimously agree must on one or more veloped principles establishing specific ex- specified they unlawful acts and ceptions general requirement may not combine their conclusions on unanimity. exceptions may Those be sum- specified different converge acts so as to (1) marized as single follows: crime has on an guilty. ultimate verdict charged, though may even it be com- Roedl, 107 Utah at 155 P.2d at 747. mitted in ways alternative alternative however, found no error that case be acts, (2) but related those acts are not overwhelming cause the sup evidence substantially distinct from each other in ported finding killing, of an intentional factual, terms of legal, either their or con- and the Court wаs “convinced from a read ceptual content, (3) the State has ing of the record could presented substantial supporting evidence agreed upon premeditated have kill each alternative mode of commission of the ” ing.... 552-53, 155 Id. at P.2d at 747-48. crime. words, In other robbery the evidence of foregoing exceptions three and the instruction thereon deter were origins rule have their in three mined the Court merely to be “inciden first, seminal People cases. v. Sul- tal” prejudicial and not to the defendant’s livan, 122, (1903), 173 N.Y. 65 N.E. 989 right jury unanimity on the elements of court unanimity concluded that was not charged. the crime required single when a charged. crime was Bleazard, In 113, State v. 103 Utah 133 applied Sullivan has been frequently most (1943), P.2d 1000 and in Thomp State v. in involving questions cases in- variable son, 113, (1946), 110 Utah 170 P.2d 153 tent, rea, underlying or mens single a again Court arguments considered concern second, crime. In the United States v. ing the trial court’s give claimed failure to Gipson, (5th Cir.1977), 553 F.2d 453 sufficiently specific unanimity instruc appeals court of reversed conviction be- cases, however, tion. In both the Court cause the trial permit- court’s instructions found that given instructions fact ted the to convict the defendant with- required jury unanimity on one of the acts reaching agreement out on what act or underlying the conviction of the offense group of acts ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‍the defendant had committed. therefore, charged; sepa the Court did not appeals The court of held that rately treat the issue of whether such in substantially agree must “just on what the generally required. structions were Blea did,” 457, id. at because when zard, 118-19, 133 103 Utah at P.2d at 1002- “conceptually distinct” alternatives for the 03; Thompson, 119-21, 110 Utah at 170 actus reus of a charged, crime are P.2d at 156-57.2 must be unanimous on at least one of the

The cases cited alternatives returning guilty above indicate that a before ver- unanimity requirement (In regard, is not an dict. Gipson aberration this seems to be in Utah instructions and in consistent early fact has cases dis- upheld Thus, above.) when used. Comment, instructions cussed See also Case Thompson, ever, 2. questioned In mandatory Court the con- treat the issue of instructions given requiring jury struction unanimity Rasmussen in the deci- Roedl because it found that 118-19, Thompson, given sion. 110 Utah at P.2d required 170 instruction in that case una- not, Thompson nimity. decision did how-

177 ever, actions, Material Right Jury Unanimity may statutes also refer to states, Gipson, opposed to mental Fact v. which are Issues: United States also virtually (1977).3 indistinguishable in terms of their Harv.L.Rev. 499 legal import, although factually distinct. Finally, exception to the una the third U.C.A., example 1953, 76-6-302, An is nimity rule, requires that the State which includes in the aggrava- definition of produce sup on each substantial evidence robbery ted the use of “a firearm or a porting committing a alternative method of firearm, facsimile of a knife or a facsimile crime, origin its case of v. has State deadly weapon.” of a knife or a Just as no Arndt, 248, Wash.App. 529 P.2d 887 purpose by requiring would be served ju- (1974), 374, aff'd, 87 Wash.2d 553 P.2d 1328 ries be unanimous on alternative mental (1976). Arndt, said, “If sub court states, any legitimately of which can be presented support stantial evidence is facts, inferred from the same committing each alternative method of support which is sufficient to a conviction single crime, and the alternatives are not single insignifi- for a offense. It would be other, repugnant unanimity to each then aggravated robbery cant in an case wheth- as to the mode of the commission jurors unanimously er individual decided required.” is not 529 P.2d at 889. See robbery that a firearm used in a was “real” Benite, Conn.App. 507 A.2d “facsimile” order for them to con- (1986). vict. Thus, may before the rule be single it has been Once determined that a with, dispensed must courts undertake crime has been and that the alter- three-part inquiry analysis. The first committing native methods it do not single whether the statute defines a of- meaningful contain differences in their le- may fense that be committed more than content, gal or factual one further inquiry way multiple one or instead defines of- must made before a be unanimous verdict Sullivan, fenses. 173 N.Y. See dispensed on the alternatives with. (1903). single N.E. 989 When a offense is inquiry That is whether there is factual defined, step is if the the next to determine in the evidence for a conviction sepa- alternative modes of commission are charged. under all of the alternatives See rate and distinct from each other terms Arndt, Wash.App. factual, legal, conceptual of their con- suggests majority analysis tent. This will often focus on analysis is the one which need be depend whether the modes of commission undertаken, asserting: merely (as, on alternative mental states for virtually are unanimous decisions case, example in this where the a unan- that a defendant is not entitled to required compare statutory alterna- precise manner in imous verdict on the bodily inju- tive of “intent to cause serious committed, crime was which the ry combined with commission of an act methods or which of several alternative clearly dangerous modes, to human life” with interpretation or under which creating grave of death com- long “conduct risk is the evidence so as there substan- indiffer- each of the meth- bined with evidence tial evidence ods, modes, life”). occasion, charged. how- or manners ence to human On Franco, holding Gipson, v. Wash.2d Despite that deci- cord State the broad State, (1982); Manson v. 101 Wis.2d led to a wholesale reversal of sion has not Rather, (1981) (treating subsequent N.W.2d 729 "use of force” convictions in cases. when alleged, of force” in the Wisconsin courts have and "imminent use alternative acts are Robbery conceptually legislative de- Armed Statute as not dis- intent to sometimes identified target of the tinct alternatives because the two acts were that is the fine an "umbrella” act id., Bratthauer, See, indistinguishable,” "practically e.g., 304 N.W.2d v. offense. State State, 737); (Iowa 1984) driving (holding at 91 Wis.2d under Holland N.W.2d 774 (1979) (holding unanimity driving as to with blood N.W.2d 288 and the influence of alcohol participation precise in the alter- manner of percent are consistent alcohol level of .10 crime, crime, i.e., committing aiding driving directly ways native commit the crime intoxicated, 777); conspiracy, necessary). abetting, was hot ac- and id. motor vehicle while approach inadequate ignores This first, necessary questions:

the other single

whether is a of- the crime

fense that can be committed more than or, instead, offenses; way multiple

one sec-

ond, single charged, if a offense is whether methods of are alternative commission

significantly distinct from one another in legal content;

terms of their or factual

third, whether there is evidence on each of agree I alternatives. the three

sections of Utah’s second

statute, under charged, single

case was define a offense separate be committed in three

ways. agree I further that the three alter- meaningfully not

natives are distinct from they merely

one another because address rea, any

different forms of mens or all of properly

which could be inferred from the any proper

evidence and or all of which are

predicates guilt charged. of the offense

Finally, agree I adequate that there was permit

evidence to conviction based on

of the three alternative mental ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‍states at Therefore, killing.

the time of the I concur result, majority’s object overly scope opinion broad of the

its adequately failure to refine the stan- for appropriate application

dards rule other cases..

ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the

result.

RICHFIELD CARE CENTER Fund, Plaintiffs, Insurance

Lydia J. TORGERSON Utah State Commission,

Industrial Defendants.

No. 20412.

Supreme Court Utah.

Feb. Silvester,

Fred R. City, Salt Lake plaintiffs.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Russell

Court Name: Utah Supreme Court

Date Published: Feb 9, 1987

Citation: 733 P.2d 162

Docket Number: 18591

Court Abbreviation: Utah