State v. RumneyState v. Rumney
The defendant was convicted of the crime of armed robbery committed in Manchester on September 3, 1965. Trial was by jury before Morris, J. At the сlose of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal upon the ground that the only evidencе connecting him with the crime was the testimony of an alleged accomplice which was uncorroborated and unworthy of belief, and upon the further ground that his conviction based upon such evidence would violate his “federal constitutional rights.” To the denial of this motion, and of his motion for a mistrial previously made the defendant duly excepted. The questions of law presented by these and оther exceptions taken at the trial were reserved and transferred by the-Presiding Justice.
It is not disputed that the only direct evidencе of the defendant’s participation in the robbery came from the testimony of the witness Catudal, who testified in detail to the planning and execution of the robbery. The robbery occurred at approximately *545 2:30 P.M. when John M. Sullivan was “held up” by two armed men in a parking lot near his store on South Main Street in Manchester, and robbed of over $4,000. According to the evidence, the robbers placed the money in a canvas bag, and escaped by running through a swampy woods area behind the parking lot to a get-away car furnished by thе defendant, in which the witness Catudal was waiting. According to Catudal’s testimony, the trio then proceeded to the home of a Mrs. Brady in Manсhester, where they remained from 3:00 to 4:00 P.M., and then went their separate ways.
While the testimony of Catudal that the defendant had been аrrested in Auburn on his way to Manchester that morning, lor operating the same automobile without a license, and that the defendant was аt Mrs. Brady’s home on the afternoon of the crime was corroborated by other witnesses for the State, Catudal’s testimony that the defеndant participated in the robbery was not. The defendant did not testify, but called a witness who testified that he had accompanied the defendant to Rockingham Park to attend the races on the afternoon of September 3, 1965, but could not say what time he met the defendant in Manchester that afternoon.
It is established law in this jurisdiction that the uncorroborated testimony of an alleged accomplice is competent evidence upon which to found a verdict, in the absence of statutory provision to the cоntrary.
State
v.
Desilets,
96 N. H. 245;
State
v. Keegan, 106 N. H. 152, 154. The defendant recognizes that this is so, and that no statute prevents its application in this case. He points out hоwever that such evidence is universally received with caution, and that it has been said that it cannot be accepted by a jury if it аppears on its face to be “bald perjury, preposterous, or self-contradictory.” 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, s. 1151. See
Sparkman
v.
State,
The record does not support the argument. Contradiction of details in Catudal’s tеstimony by the testimony of other witnesses does not constitute self- contradiction. The testimony of the alleged accomplicе does not impress us as “preposterous,” even though he testified that the defendant participated in the robbery as planned, after being arrested outside of Manchester that morning, and that the same automobile was used in the robbery and parked within view of the public streets in Manchester for a time after
*546
the crime was committed. Such conduct on the part of the defendant might be thought tо have been bold and ill-advised but testimony that it occurred does not for that reason necessarily require disbelief. Nothing in the recоrd establishes that Catudal’s testimony was “bald perjury.” Although there were discrepancies between the testimony of Catudal and that of оther witnesses concerning the conduct of the robbers, their wearing apparel, and the appearance of the canvas bag later seen at Mrs. Brady’s house, these were not of such a character as to establish perjury on Catudal’s part. Wе are furnished with no authority supporting the argument that the verdict violates the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States becausе the testimony of the accomplice was uncorroborated. The decided cases indicate the federal rule to bе otherwise.
United States
v.
Caci,
On the fourth day of the trial, which was held in Nashua, the defendant’s counsel called to the attention of the Court an item which had appeared the day before in a daily newspaper of statewide circulation published in Manchester. This item, of single column width on the fourteenth page of the paper, was headed “Convict To Be Tried On Robbery Charge” and reported briefly that the defendant was “brought from State Prison” to the Superior Court for trial “yestеrday.” On its own motion, the Court thereupon instructed the jury to recall preliminary instructions given at the commencement of the trial that thе case should be decided on the evidence presented in the courtroom and that newspaper and other outside rеports should be disregarded. Alluding to “newspaper articles” called to the Court’s attention the Court, without describing them, inquired “of each” juror whether he could disregard anything he might have read, and whether he had formed an opinion or was sensible of any prejudice because of what he might have read. Cf.
Commonwealth
v.
Crehan,
It is established law in this jurisdiction that evidence of the prior conviction of a defendant is inadmissible to prove commission of a latеr offense.
State
v.
Cote,
108 N. H. 290, 294. Thus the information conveyed by the publication, that the defendant was a convict brought from State Prison, was not competent
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to be considered by the jury. However, for this court to hold that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial because of thе publication, it would be necessary for it to assume in the face of the contrary indications in the record that the jurors were "exposed to the publicity and were prejudiced thereby.”
Welch
v.
United States,
The jury was instructed on three different occasions to ignore anything heаrd outside of the courtroom, and to decide the case upon the evidence presented at the trial. In the circumstanсes, it cannot be held that the trial was prejudiced by the publication in question so as to require a mistrial.
Frazier
v.
Cupp,
Exceptions overruled.