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State v. Rummel
326 N.W.2d 64
N.D.
1982
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*1 the summary judgment, clearly powers the ma- The law delineates peal from the jority powers the unwarranted and dis- the the of the Su- has made trial court and Court, puted of fact as follows: finding preme Supreme The Court. “_we power the trial as a fact usurping was no duty conclude there finder, Sheridan, problems creates untold LaMoure, the Piehls because intersection, litigants as it unneces- by encourages controlled and numerous an unreason- If is to stop represent sary appeals. Supreme did not sign, dangerous pru- condition to grant novo, able risk or de the law should trial using the lawfully dent road.” individuals do so. changed Until limit it- happens, Supreme Court must finding by of fact made the ma- Another appel- self functions vested with an to the is jority as follows: late and trust court review “_however, that the inter- function as triers of fact. courts to section, stop it was controlled as sign, dangerous unusually was not a exercising condition to a driver

hazardous within and the lim-

ordinary care

its of law.” Court, in a continuation Supreme trend, again acting

an is once unauthorized finding

as a trier The fact of fact. function Supreme not with the Court in vested of North novo has been abolished in civil trial de longer cases. this trend should no

engaged in. found facts in majority RUMMEL, 1)

dispute support position as follows: sign adequate that the warn- stop was an Cr. No. 857. 2) ing; stop properly sign located; 3) that the intersection was not a North Dakota. Court of Supreme situation; dangerous 4) that fence as dangerous traveling public barrier to the dangerous

could not be forseen as care; 5) ordinary

exercise that DeLair care; 6) not ordinary

did exercise that De- 7) highway unlawfully;

Lair used the

that no exist in the engineering defects planning

construction and of the intersec-

tion. Walter Piehl and Hattie

Defendants

Piehl, landowners, adjacent as also owe a

duty traveling DeLair public and the exist

to not allow a condition to unsafe,

renders travel conceded point opinion. Piehls majority Whether respect

were or not is an negligent

issue of fact. The Court cannot Supreme

make determination and find a fact agree

that the I negligent. Piehls

with the Pederson who dissent Justice

holds that the action Piehls summarily.

cannot disposed

65 Freed, Dynes, Buresh, Reichert & Dickin- son, for appellant; defendant and argued Reichert, by Ronald A. Dickinson. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the Rummel, Conviction, a Judgment from 1982, April 8, dated County Stark of Increased Jurisdiction. We re- verse and remand for a new trial. appeal

On Rummel raises one issue: not, Whether or under the facts this day delay 119 between the selec- jury tion of the and the commencement trial denied Rummel’s to an “impartial Sixth Amend- jury” ment to the United States Constitution I, and the Due Process Clause of Article 12, of the North Dakota Constitu- tion?

Rummel was while liquor under the of intoxicating influence violation of Section N.D.C.C. On 20, 1981, September Rummel plead not guilty requested per- 12 sons hear the him. The 1981, 10, selected November which time Rummel exercised all of his peremptory challenges. By virtue cir- no way cumstances which were in attributa- the trial did not Rummel commence 1982, days until March after the jury had selected.

Approximately one week before the trial before commenced Rummel made motion requesting the trial court that he be al- voir lowed conduct additional dire jurors and also requesting selected addition- challenges. grant- al The court peremptory request ed the for additional voir dire but request perempto- denied additional dire, challenges. During the second voir ry day of the March conducted on the 1982, it was discovered at least other had sat as been select- DWI ed as for Rummel’s trial. On Fox, John J. Atty., Asst. States and Owen ground Rummel moved to strike those nine Mehrer, K. Atty., Dickinson, cause, States jurors for but his was denied plaintiff and argued J. by John case appellee; proceeded the trial court. The Fox, Atty., Asst. State’s guilty, Dickinson. Rummel was found and he appeal then filed this from his bias if that has served on a conviction. trial at which another was charged the same law or statu- We believe that Subsection tory provision dispositive appeal this person’s alleged of whether or not that vio- requires a reversal of conviction: *3 lation involved the same event or incident constituting im- upon .charges challenge A im- plied specified. bias for based. juror for all may taken causes, any following pro- or If it were the intent to vide which a upon other: a more limited basis

juror could be struck under Subsection 29- 17-36(5), N.D.C.C., ex- it could have clearly 5. served on a trial which pressed by including language that intent person has tried another for the of- juror may provi- be struck under the charged; fense ...”1 only sion if the other at which the Upon construing foregoing provision on sat, juror involved the same challenged face, there two its are reasona- upon event or which the defend- incident interpretations of it. One is that a charges were based. ant’s juror may ground be struck cause juror of bias if the has served as a implied rule of It is a well-settled juror charged on the trial another parts all of a statute construction that with violation as the defendant the same together. We believe should be construed involving the same event incident. or that under Section two other subdivisions pro- second reasonable N.D.C.C., 29-17-36, support our construc juror may vision is that a be struck for tion of Subsection juror justice.” ed the same law or cause on not the event or incident another promoting C.C., Title 29 of the North are ant’s to be all has Pursuant alleged person charged provisions “liberally In State v. served as a ground were based. objects violation involved the to upon construed with a view to statutory provision Mees, and in furtherance Dakota juror which the defend- proceedings 196 N.W.2d 399 on the trial of of whether or having violat- Century bias if the under Code N.D. vides: plied bias of a Subsection “29-17-36. any ter the cause was sworn to whose verdict was Having been one of discharged specified. 29-17-36(6), following try juror may be taken for all Matters the same without A set causes, and for no submitted N.D.C.C., aside, which jury formerly charge, and verdict, af- to it; (N.D.1972), that rule of con we construed striking for cause 6 refers to the Subsection under require provisions struction to sworn to formerly 29, N.D.C.C., construed strictly Title “same charge.” phrase try the “same to against liberally the state and construed specif- unambiguously refers to charge” justice. that an accused receives end against has been made charge ic construction we con view of that rule of however, refers defendant. proper interpretation clude that the Sub served on juror who has N.D.C.C., jur- striking is that a to section “the of- person for be struck for cause on the may appear denying 29-17- ruling that Section it does of the trial court’s In defense brought 36(5), the trial court’s to challenges jurors who for cause for the nine challenges being time of the attention had sat in a similar case to jurors noted cause. chosen as it should be charged.” fense It is reasonable infer involves the same event or upon incident phrasing the different between Sub- which the defendant’s sections 5 and 6 legislative demonstrates a Accordingly, we conclude that intent to make Subsection more broad in trial court erred in to grant its refusal its scope. may struck strike for cause the only if that jurors that sat as least in at been formerly try sworn other DWI trial subsequent specific charge for which the defendant has selected as for Rummel’s but been charged involving the same event or prior to commencement his trial. The However, incident. can be struck refusal to strike those nine under Subsection 5 for having served as a violated Rummel’s rights under Subsection juror at a trial for another who is 29-17-36(5), N.D.C.C., and infring thereby the same law or ed impartial his to a fair and *4 provision statutory irre- legislature. mandated our spective of whether not the same event incident is accordance with this we here- involved. reverse Rummel’s of convic- We believe 9 also tion and remand for a new trial. vides support interpretation for our of Sub- section 5: SAND, PEDERSON, JJ., PAULSON concur. specified. A challenge or any bias of a following causes, may be taken for all specially. YANDE I concur in the result. WALLE, Justice, concurring as a served member of the

jury panel years.” within two provides

Because Subsection 9 for the strik-

ing that has served as member

of the jury panel within two it years,

reasonable to construe the in-

tent under Subsection to the strik- ing that has served North same statutory law or provision as the irrespective of whether or not the violation JENKINS, involves the same event Fred or incident scope broad does Cr. No. support a strict construction of Subsection North Supreme Court of Dakota. giving very limited or scope, narrow supports but instead our Subsection 5 as scope. more broad

We hold that Subsection

N.D.C.C., permits for cause on

serves on a has tried anoth-

er law provision as for which defend-

ant charged,

whether or not the other person’s charge

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Rummel
Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 10, 1982
Citation: 326 N.W.2d 64
Docket Number: Cr. 857
Court Abbreviation: N.D.
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