State v. RuffinsState v. Ruffins
Following а jury trial, the defendant, Carl C. Ruffins, was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of
FACTS
On August 8, 1998, the defendant and his brother, Zaniel Jerome Adkins, were passengers in a car driven by their friend, Montgomery “Monte” Williams, as they drove down Orla Street in Shreveport toward the home of Williams’ girlfriend. At about the same time, Donald “DJ” Rеed, the victim, was entering Dupont Street on his bicycle and was nearly hit by the car in which the defendant was a passenger. A brief, non-physical argument ensued between Reed and Williams. Williams got back into his car, drove down the street, turnеd around, and returned to Reed‘s location. This time when the car passed by Reed, Reed walked up to the passenger side of the car. At that point, the defendant opened the car door, stepped out, and began to fire a .357 magnum revolver at the apparently unarmed Reed. Reed turned and began to run. Shortly thereafter, Reed fell to the ground after suffering gunshot wounds through the arm into his chest and wounds in his back. Reed died in surgery.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of Evidence
By his first assignment of error, the dеfendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his post verdict judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second degree murder. Instead, the defendant contends that the facts support a verdict of manslaughter.
The constitutional standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the state proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Nealy, 450 So.2d 634 (La. 1984); State v. Morris, 521 So.2d 1214 (La.App. 2 Cir.1988), writ denied, 530 So.2d 80 (La.1988). The Jackson standard, however, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/04/96), 680 So.2d 1165. The appellate court does not assess credibility or re-weigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’ testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support the requisite factual finding. State v. Gradick, 29,231 (La.App. 2 Cir. 01/22/97), 687 So.2d 1071; State v. Braswell, 605 So.2d 702 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992).
According to
A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
According to
A. Manslaughter is:
(1) A homicidе which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an averаge person of his self control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender‘s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person‘s blоod would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106 (La.1986), discussed manslaughter as follows, at pages 110 and 111:
Manslaughter is a homicide which would be either first or second degrеe murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self control and cool reflection.
La. R.S. 14:31(1) . Thus, the presеnce of “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” distinguishes manslaughter from murder. The court has stated on several occasions, however, that “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of the offense of manslаughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So.2d 644 (La.1981); State v. Temple, 394 So.2d 259 (La. 1981); State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974). Since they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in a “sudden passion” or “heat of blood” is entitled to a manslaughter verdict. Where such proof has been introduced, a second degree murder verdict is inappropriate.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant shot Reed. Thus, the issue before this court is whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bryan, 454 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 128 (La.1984).
The jury‘s determination, either that the defendant did not act in the heat of blood or sudden passion, or that the defendаnt‘s blood had cooled, or that an average person‘s blood would have cooled, is clearly supported by the evidence. Although both of the parties may have consumed some alcohol during the evening, there is no evidence that either was so drunk that it would have had an impact on them at the time of the confrontation. The evidence does not show that the defendant and Reed ever exchanged any words other than the pоssible utterance of the phrase “Blood” or “What‘s up Blood?” that may have been said by Reed to the defendant immediately prior to the shooting.
The defendant was armed and in a car with his friend and brother. Reed was alone on a bicycle and was unarmed. The defendant shot at Reed four or five times, even as Reed was running away from the car and falling on the ground. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, indicates that the defendant shot Reed several times at close range with a .357 revolver, using sufficient force to cause death. Although intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact and may be inferred from the circumstances. State v. Guice, 26,440 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/26/94), 645 So.2d 1193, writ denied, 94-3122 (La.06/30/95), 657 So.2d 1022; State v. Kennington, 515 So.2d 521 (La. App. 1 Cir.1987). Viеwed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed Donald Reed while possessing the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. The еvidence presented does not establish the mitigatory factors required to support a verdict of manslaughter. The jury assessed the credibility of the witnesses, the veracity of their testimony, and returned a verdict rationally related to the evidence presented. Defendant‘s assignments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence are thus without merit.
Admissibility of Evidence
In his next assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of State‘s Exhibit S-9, a photograph taken on the night of the shooting of the place where the body had been lying, because such evidence was unduly prejudicial, unnecessary, and failed to accurately depict the scene of the homicide at the time it occurred. The state responds that S-9 was necessary to illustrate the crime scene and that the officer who took the photograph testified at the trial that the photograph depicted the sсene that night as he saw it.
Relevant evidence is evidence which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Photographs are generally admissible if they illustrate any fact, shed any light upon an issuе in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, thing or place depicted. State v. Washington, 30,866 (La.App. 2 Cir. 08/19/98), 716 So.2d 936, writ denied, 98-2473 (La.01/08/99), 734 So.2d 1229; State v. Jackson, 30,473 (La.App. 2 Cir. 05/13/98), 714 So.2d 87, writ denied, 98-1778 (La.11/06/98), 727 So.2d 444. Additionally, the cumulative nature of photographic evidence does not render it inadmissible if it corroborates the testimony of witnesses on essential matters. State v. Langley, 95-1489 (La.04/14/98), 711 So.2d 651. Photographs are not admissible if they are so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient other evidence. State v. Craig, 95-2499 (La.05/20/97), 699 So.2d 865, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 935, 118 S.Ct. 343, 139 L.Ed.2d 266 (1997); State v. Tolbert, 30,821 (La.App. 2 Cir. 08/19/98), 716 So.2d 949, writ denied, 98-2562 (La.01/15/99), 736 So.2d 207. A trial court‘s ruling in this regard will only be disturbed if the prejudicial effect of the photographs clearly outweighs the probative value. State v. Washington, supra; State v. Craig, supra.
The defendant argues that Exhibit S-9 should have been excluded pursuant to his objection because it was cumulative and prejudicial. The photograph shows the scene, as the photographer witnessed it, after the victim (Reed) had been transported to LSU-MC.
While the picture does show some blood, it is not gruesome, and its probative value, i.e., corroborating the testimony of the witnesses as to the final resting place of the victim, outweighs any prejudicial effect the photograph might have had. No one disputed the fact that there was a homicide in this matter. The defendant now simply argues that it was manslaughter rather than murder. This one photograph, in
Excessive Sentence
By his final assignments of error, the defendant contends that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder, as set forth in
Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to articulate the reasons for the mandatory life sentence imposed. The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
CONCLUSION
We hereby affirm the conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.