OPINION
{1 Defendant appeals the jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, a *193 first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). We affirm.
FACTS
12 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and recite them accordingly." State v. Loose,
T3 Greg Davis, a front desk clerk for the Deseret Inn, was working on the night of January 20, 1998. By 6:00 p.m., there was approximаtely $800 to $850 in the cash box. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., defendant entered the motel lobby. Davis was immediately aware of defendant because of chimes on the front door and was instantly alarmed because defendant's hands were in his front pockets.
{4 Defendant stood directly across the counter from Davis, within approximately thrеe feet, and asked how much a room cost. After Davis told him the price of a room, defendant pulled a gun out of his right, front pants' pocket and told Davis to give him the money out of the cash drawer. Davis moved down the counter to the cash register, put the cash box on the counter, and watched as defendant took the money from the cash box. Davis then backed into a small room directly behind the front desk, locked the door, and waited until he heard the front door chime, indicating that defendant had left.
T5 During the time defendant was in the Deseret Inn's lobby, Leonard McCann had parked at the front door to check into a room for the night. Seeing defendant at the front counter and assuming he was there to register for a room, McCann stayed in his car to wait until defendant was done. McCann got out of his car and walked past defendant as defendant was exiting the lobby and McCann was entering it.
T6 When McCann entered the lobby, Davis told him that he had just been robbed. McCann immediately stepped outside to see what direction defendant was heading. McCann saw defendant heading west and, knowing that he would be questioned regarding defendant's identity, took particular note of what he was wearing. 1
T7 Because of the direction McCann had reported defendant was fleeing, the police focused on the Hilton Hotel. Officer Kerry Fowler entered from the east side of the building to begin his search while his partner entered from the west. As Officer Fowler canvassed his appointed area, defendant, who was then talking on the telephone, drew his attention. Officer Fowler noted that defendant generally fit the description given by Davis 2 Officer Fowler and his pаrtner stopped defendant and asked him why he was there, to which defendant responded that he was meeting his friend, Ed Bernard. Defendant subsequently told another officer that he was meeting his girlfriend, Melanie Swallow, for dinner. '
T8 Angela Dent was a supervisor at Annabelle's, a restaurant inside the Hilton Hotel. While defendant was in the hotel officе with the police, Dent walked by and noticed defendant in police custody. Dent recognized defendant because she had seated him earlier at Annabelle's, and when she returned approximately ten minutes later to see if he had been served, she discovered that defendant had left, leaving his sweater behind in a chair at the table. Dent turned the sweater over to the police.
T9 Luis Chuba was a housekeeping. supervisor for the Hilton Hotel. At approximately 7:00 p.m. the same night Davis was robbed, Chuba emptied the trash can in the men's restroom across the hall from Annabelle's and near the pay phone where Officer Fowler had seen defendant talking. Because the trash bag was askew, Chuba dumped the whole trash can and discovered that a gun *194 had been placed underneath the trash bag in the trash can. Chuba turned the gun over to the police who were at the Hilton questioning defendant. Davis testified that the gun was similar to the one defendant had used during the robbery.
110 Davis wаs brought to the Hilton to identify defendant. Davis did not enter the office in which defendant was sitting, but stood on the other side of a glass partition. When asked if he could identify defendant as the man who had robbed him at the Deseret Inn, Davis said that he was fifty percent sure that defendant was the same man. Davis noted that the differences were: (1) the рerson in custody did not have a grey sweater on, but the person who robbed him did; (2) at the time he robbed Davis, the person's hair had mousse in it and his hair was spiked; the person's hair at the Hilton was smoothed down; and (8) the robber was not wearing glasses, while the person at the Hilton was. While Davis had also noted that the person who robbed him smellеd strongly of cologne or mousse, the glass partition at the Hilton prevented him from detecting any smell. |
{11 Defendant was arrested and transported to the Salt Lake County jail. When he was searched at the jail, $850 was discovered hidden inside defendant's shoes.
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-302 (1999). A jury trial was held, after which defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant now appeals.
ISSUES
113 There are two issues for our review. The first is whether a criminal defendant must preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim at the trial court before he may raise that issue on appeal. The sеcond is whether the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
ANALYSIS
1. Preservation of Sufficiency, of-the-Evidence Claim
T14 The State argues that before a criminal defendant may challenge the jury's verdict on appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence, he or she must first raise that issue and thereby preserve it at the trial court. The State readily concedеs that this position is a novel one, and that preservation of sufficiency claims is neither required by the rules of procedure nor case law. However, it maintains that for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, as with any other claims on appeal, criminal defendants should be required to follow the well-established rule that if а party fails to bring an error to the trial court's attention, the appellate court will not address it absent plain error or exceptional cireum-stances. See Monson v. Carver,
T 15 "A timely objection provides the trial court with 'an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it'" State v. Labrum,
116 Neither of the above policy reasons supporting thе preservation doctrine is present with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.
a. Opportunity to Correct
«17 When the jury renders a verdict, as a practical matter there is little, if anything, relative to the sufficiency of the evidence that can be corrected. Even if the trial court is asked to review the sufficiency of the evidence, say, in the сontext of a motion to arrest judgment, or motion for new trial, the "'trial court may arrest a jury
*195
verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to thаt element'" State v. Giles,
Perhaps a more compelling reason to reject the State's position is the potential burden on the trial courts. It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challеnging the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to " 'marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hopkins,
b. Trial Strategy
€{19 The State also maintains that the preservation doctrine should apply to sufficienсy-of-the-evidence claims because a defendant may, as a matter of strategy, decide to forego challenging evidence at trial. See Labrum,
120 We disagree with the State's argument. Clearly, a criminal defendant is entitled to forego objecting tо the admissibility of evidence of questionable reliability in an effort to taint the State's entire case, know *196 ing full well that he or she will ordinarily be unable to challenge admissibility on appeal. See Utah R. Evid. 103(a). Moreover, as defendant stated at oral argument, this appeal does not present a disguised Ramirez challenge, but рresents a legitimate sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue.
121 Although it is neither uncommon nor inappropriate to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a post-trial motion, such a challenge should not be a prerequisite to challenge the same on appeal. We decline the State's invitation to establish such a rule. 3
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
122 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery. The court's " ' "power to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited."'" State v. Pearson,
We will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferencеs drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
State v. Heaps,
123 Defendant premises his argument on the show-up identification by Davis when defendant was detained in the hotel office. Defendant argues that because (1) within a short period after the robbery, Davis was only able to say that he was fifty percent sure that defendant was the same person who had robbed him at gunpoint; and (2) Davis had noted some discrepancies in defendant's appearance versus the robber's, his eyewitness testimony is insufficient tо establish defendant's identity.
4
- However, the fact that Davis was unwilling to say that the man in police custody was positively the same man who robbed the hotel because of the distinguishing characteristics goes to his credibility and the weight to be given his identification testimony, a . determination properly for the jury. See State v. Colwell,
CONCLUSION
124 We decline the State's invitation to establish a new rule requiring a eriminal defendant to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by making an objection or *197 filing a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at the trial court level. Further, although Davis refused to state that he was one hundred percent sure that the person in police custody was the same man who had robbed him earlier, his later positive identification together with the other evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
1] 25 Affirmed.
' 26 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Notes
. McCann testified as follows regarding defendant's appearance:
I could see a white color coming out from his sweater. I thоught it was a turtleneck.... He had on a gray sweater and then he had on blue pants. - And they didn't look like regular jeans. They weren't the color of regular jeans, the dark color. They were a brighter blue.
. Officer Fowler testified as follows regarding defendant's appearance:
At the time he was wearing a white t-shirt, his hair was, appeаred to be wet like he had just wet it down and dried it with a towel, kinda sticking up and kind of in a spiked look, wearing Levi's, had [two] eatrings.... I think he was wearing glasses. f
. The Rules of Civil Procedure require that a motion for a directed verdict be made before the trial court can entertain a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), see Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b), and the аppellate courts' scope of review of sufficiency claims has been similarly restricted. See Henderson v. Meyer,
The Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, have no corresponding requirement. Rule 17(0) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may dismiss any or all charges either at the close of the prosecution's case or "at the conclusion of all the evidence." Utah R.Crim. P. 17(0). A motion to arrest judgment under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or a Rule 24 motion for a new trial are not conditioned upon a prior motion challenging the sufficienсy of the evidence.
Because the trial court can reach a sufficiency claim at various stages of criminal proceedings without preconditions, it follows that the appellate court may conduct a similar review.
. Defendant does not argue that Davis's eyewitness identification was constitutionally unreliable, and therefore inadmissible. See State v. Nelson,