*1 22(e). guilt. Specifically, after a determination of trial court the court of 77-18-l(2)(a) §§ and 77-18- properly Code Ann. “illegal Utah failed construe an sen- l(10)(a)(i). necessary It therefore not is tence” to include constitutional violations. monitoring impose additional incremental for Courts must consider constitutional as well probation. defendants sentenced to statutory jurisdictional challenges 22(e). sentences rule under But we do not Finally, recognize poten- while probation find that Utah’s statute violates judge arbitrarily impose tial a trial process rationally due because the statute is absurdly period long probation compared to legitimate related to the state interest committed, severity of the crime these restitution, among other interests. Accord- present in concerns are not Candedo’s ease. ingly, challenge Candedo’s constitutional was authorized to sentence Cande- imposition nine-year probationary of his sentence, fifteen-year prison do to a but in- probation term under Utah’s statute fails. nine-year imposed probation stead sen- We therefore affirm the district court’s deci- tence and ordered restitution to the victims nine-year sion to order pro- restitution and a fraud, of his a far less severe sentence. We bationary term. can envision ease where defendant could successfully challenge probation sentence truly arbitrary discriminatory that is un- DURHAM, 26 Chief Justice Associate process prove der the due clause or that the DURRANT, Chief Justice Justice WILKINS unusual,
probation statute is cruel and but and Justice concur in NEHRING Justice such a case is not before us now. opinion. PARRISH’s
¶ 24 Under a rational basis standard review, a require statute will meet the process
ments of due “if it has ‘a reasonable proper legislative to a purpose,
relation ” arbitrary discriminatory.’ [is] neither nor Dist.,
Tindley
City
v. Salt Lake
Sch.
¶30, 29,
(quoting
UT
rin v. (Utah (alternation 1989)) original). None Utah, Petitioner, STATE of Plaintiff and potential arbitrary about concerns sen present tences are in this case because Can nine-year probation dedo’s term is shorter ROYBAL, Jose Baltarcar Defendant fifteen-year than prison sentence he Respondent. statutory could have received under the sen No. 20080776. tencing Additionally, scheme. there no judge evidence that the sentencing treated Supreme Court of Utah. differently Candedo from other defendants suspect on account of race or other classifica May against tions or any discriminated him in way. Finally Candedo does make the
argument that his sentence was cruel and Eighth
unusual in violation of the Amend
ment of the United States Constitution or I
article section 9 of the Utah Constitution. short, Candedo’s constitutional challenge
to his sentence fails.
CONCLUSION
¶25 We hold that the court of by refusing
erred to reach the merits of
Candedo’s constitutional claim rule *3 Shurtleff, Gen.,
Mark L. Att’y Ryan D. Gen., Tenney, Att’y Asst. City, Salt Lake for petitioner. Richards,
Randall W. Ogden, respon- for dent Ralphs,
Stewart P. City, Salt Lake Amicus.
WILKINS, Justice:
INTRODUCTION ¶ 1 Defendant Jose Baltarcar convicted of one count of under the trial, influence of alcohol. Before he moved suppress the admission of the evidence stop, obtained from a traffic arguing that the traffic constituted an unreasonable search rights and seizure in violation of his under the Fourth Amendment to the United Constitution, I, States as well as article sec- tion 14 of the Utah Constitution. The dis- trict court denied suppress, his motion to but the court granted reversed. We majori- certiorari on one issue—whether the ty panel of the of the court of erred reversing the district court’s determina- reasonable, tion that there was a articulable stop Roybal. We reverse.
BACKGROUND “¶ 2 legal analysis ‘The of search and highly dependent.’” seizure cases is fact Alverez, 61, ¶ 2, State v. 2006 UT Brake, right Sergeant ing onto 30th. Ledford testi- (quoting State v. 699). “Therefore, give a de fied that as turned the corner and Id. Ledford, recitation of the facts.” approached Sergeant tailed he drove “really, really speed slow.” The limit on 30th August police dispatcher 3 On per (mph), hour was 35 miles but Roy- call from Jose Baltarcar received Ledford estimated McCaine, Annalee re- girlfriend, bal’s live-in mph. Sergeant between 5 and 25 Ledford dispute in a be- questing police assistance stopped stop light at the at the intersec- upset the two. McCaine tween Harrison tion 30th and Boulevard. As person living that she wanted stated rear, Roybal approach watched him from asked her out house. appeared it assaulted, Ledford that she had been her whether *4 light about, hoping change was the red and would responded, yes.” “Just which McCaine however, clarified, Sergeant go through would the in- Later, dispatcher Ledford the However, Roybal you?” tersection before arrived. he hasn’t to which “And assaulted light change, replied, Roybal pulled the the did not dispatcher “No.” When and McCaine Roybal drinking, Sergeant light, in next if had been McCaine to Ledford at asked seconds, you might stopped both And for a few replied, “We have. then made anoth- right take She said that she [us].” have to both of er turn onto Harrison Boulevard. Ser- care, “just want[ed] him out.” geant Roybal did not she followed. to Ledford continued dispatcher to told McCaine “take a speed After drive limit below and made anoth- breaths,” deep couple of McCaine identified right-hand er turn onto Patterson Avenue. gave her and Roybal as roommate the dis- appeared Sergeant Roybal It that Ledford names, Roybal’s age, and last patcher first trying was to avoid him. Earlier, ethnicity. gave McCaine and ¶ observations, Sergeant 6 Based on his names, dispatcher her own first and last her suspected Roybal Ledford that was drunk. number, phone and her address. McCaine Sergeant through testified his Ledford that reported Roybal “out putting also training experience, he rec- has come to “leaving,” gave van” stuff his and was ognize driving a sign slow of intoxication description partial of and a a the van license drinking, because someone when has been Roybal pulled plate number. After out of thinking im- their fine motor skills are driveway, dispatcher McCaine told the paired, causing slowly. them to drive more Roybal road was on and the
which direction Sergeant Ledford asserted that in an effort heading. that he was The district court la- impaired police, to avoid will also drivers observed, listening a recording ter after stay slow down and vehicles. behind call, McCaine sounded intoxicated. Sergeant Roybal Ledford testified that had ¶4 call, dispatcher Based on the the 911 engaged in these exact behaviors. He also requesting police a bulletin sent out officer acknowledged Roybal violated had not Sergeant respond- Ledford assistance. Chad any traffic laws. ed. The informed Ledford that a verbally fighting, and a “[m]ale [were] female ¶ 7 Sergeant Ledford also testified that he weapons, very parties no both intoxicat- suspected Roybal vi- committing domestic ed.” also from the dispatch olence. He knew bul- gave the make and color of his vehicle and dispute letin had been a that there domestic travel, and stated his direction that he was prompted Department a 911 had call. “1055,” police meaning that driver code a policy required him both thus to interview may be intoxicated. addition, suspect. the victim and the Ser-
¶
geant
suspects
testified
will of-
Ledford
traveling
eastbound on 30th
While
residence,
initially
ten
the house
circle back
leave
but
Sergeant
toward
Street
McCaine’s
the scene if
do not
Roybal’s
return to
approaching
saw
van
on an
Ledford
slow,
street,
Roybal
driving
arrive.
a
adjoining
Although
Avenue.
Because
Brinker
traffic, Roybal
vicinity
in the
oncoming
no
at
circuitous route
of McCaine’s
there was
sat
house,
stop sign
Sergeant
for
Ledford’s concern increased.
a few seconds before turn-
pulled Roybal
support
suspicion
Ledford
over
insufficient
a reasonable
actually
where
approximately
blocks from McCaine’s because
had
vio-
twelve
any
laws,
could smell
as he
traffic
conduct
home. Because he
alcohol
lated
his
was not
car,
approached
“suggestive
criminality.”
and because
Id.
16. Final-
tests,
field-sobriety
ly,
a
Ser-
failed
number
court noted that
Ledford
geant Ledford arrested
a
suspicion
lacked
domestic
(DUI).
of alcohol
under the influence
merely
violence because the call indicated
“nonphysical confrontation” insufficient
subsequently
Roy-
charged
9 The State
stop.
justify a
Id. 17 n. 6.
influ-
bal with one count of
under the
alcohol,
degree felony,
a third
dissented,
ence of
Judge
concluding
Thorne
violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-502
call,
that based
did
(2005).1 Roybal
all
suppress
moved to
evi-
suspicion
Judge
have a reasonable
of DUI.
stop,
dence obtained as
result of his traffic
relationship
Thorne reasoned that McCaine’s
stop
arguing
unsupported
was insufficient to render
call
unreliable,
he had committed
provided,
and that the details she
crime.
the district court denied
coupled
apparently
with her
intoxicated
suppress, concluding
motion to
state, were sufficient to create a reasonable
justified by
dispatcher’s
¶¶
the 911
(Thorne, J.,
suspicion of DUI. Id.
19-22
*5
suspicion
Roybal
driving
reasonable
was
dissenting).
Judge Thorne,
According to
under the influence of alcohol. The court did
justified
Sergeant Ledford was therefore
in
specifically
address whether
making
stop.
independent
Ledford had an
reasonable sus-
Following
12
issuance
court of
picion
Roybal
driving
while intoxi-
appeals’ ruling,
petitioned
the State
for cer-
cated based on his own observations or a
review,
tiorari
which
granted.
The Utah
Roybal
suspicion
reasonable
had com-
Council, joined by
Domestic Violence
Following
mitted
violence.
domestic
Assault,
Against
Utah Coalition
Sexual
sub-
Roybal
ruling,
court’s
entered a conditional
jurisdiction
mitted an amicus brief. We have
guilty plea
count of
under
one
pursuant
to Utah Code section 78A-3-
influence,
degree felony, preserving
a third
102(3)(a) (2008).
right
Roybal
timely
his
appeal.
thereafter
appealed
appeals following
court of
to the
STANDARD OF REVIEW
sentencing.
certiorari,
13 “On
we review the
A
panel
10 divided
of the court of
of the court
decision
of
not that
286,
Roybal,
App
reversed. State v.
2008 UT
Alverez,
of the district court.”
v.
State
2006
¶ 1,
1021
reasonable,
suspicion
articulable
of traditional arrest.”
short
cles that fall
273,
Arvizu,
266,
the influence of alcohol.
534
v.
U.S.
United States
(2002) (quot
primarily
744,
L.Ed.2d 740
this conclusion
151
The court reached
Const,
IV). “However,
questionable
it is
to be of
ing
by considering
amend.
the call
U.S.
may detain
‘a
officer
Lake
reliability. Relying
City
on Salt
v.
settled law
when
Bench,
655,
individual
the officer
question
P.3d
App
177
2008 UT
reasonable,
suspicion
articulable
has
stated,
a citizen-informant has
“When
is,
been,
engaged
or is about
be
person has
involvement with the
personal
kind of
some
”
Markland,
activity.’
v.
State
in criminal
conveyed is
suspect, the information
consid-
¶ 10, 112
(quoting
State
P.3d
2005 UT
possibili-
a
there is
ered less reliable because
(Utah 1996)).
446, 450
Chapman,
v.
making allegations
ty that the
is
out
citizen
required
facts
specific and articulable
“The
person-
anger,
jealousy, or for other
out of
fre
most
support
App
2008 UT
v.
al reasons.” State
investigating
on an
officer’s
quently based
¶ 11,
822. This statement
is
”
inferences....
State
own observations
incorrect,
sug-
extent that Bench
and to the
(Utah
Case,
1274, 1276-77
Ct.
v.
otherwise,
clarify.
gests
we now
circum
“under certain
App.1994).
Bench,
rely
may
on other sources
officer
“Because
stances the
As stated
flyers
such as
or
“bulletins[ ]
volunteer[s]
of information”
citizen-informant
information out
law
community
other
enforcement
received
from
not for
of concern for
“
sources,”
long
benefit,
‘the
who issued
so
and because
informant
flyer
possessed
bulletin
exposed
pros
criminal and civil
possible
is
stop.’”2
Id. at
suspicion justifying
false,
if
is
from an
report
ecution
U.S.
Hensley,
(quoting
States
United
generally
con
identified citizen-informant
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
highly
sidered
reliable.”
(1985)).
appeals correctly
*6
(alteration
¶
As the court
15,
in original)
dent
close
has a
ty
veracity when a citizen-infor
the criminal
simply assume
observe
behavior
may
suspect
victim
incentive
provides information as a
or
have an
not to
mant
(alterations
report
suspect
family loyalty.
original)
due to
of crime.”
witness
McArthur,
(internal
See,
326,
e.g., Illinois v.
531 U.S.
omit
quotation
citations and
marks
331-32,
(2001)
946,
ted)).
contrast,
121 S.Ct.
838
148 L.Ed.2d
informants
considered
are
probable
(finding
tip
cause where wife’s was
they
anonymous,
are
Flor
less reliable when
personal
1375, based on
observation of criminal
J.L.,
266, 270,
ida v.
529 U.S.
Smith,
activity); United States v.
457
(2000),
they receive
¶21
¶
DURHAM,
suspicion
a reasonable
25
Justice
Once
Chief
Associate
originator
DURRANT,
informa
by
reached
the
Chief Justice
and Justice
case,
concur in
tion —in
the
re
Justice
this
PARRISH
WILKINS’
—the
rely
opinion.
sponding
officer is entitled
on
to
the information unless
officer’s
NEHRING, Justice, dissenting:
suspect
interaction with
observations or
¶
respectfully
26 I
dissent because I be-
present
contrary.
to the
That is
indications
under the
lieve that
the circum-
say,
suspect’s
to
if
actions
not incon
are
stances, Sergeant
not
Ledford did
have rea-
suspicion,
po
sistent with the reasonable
suspicion
stop
Roybal.
sonable
to
Mr.
stop
may pursue
suspect
lice officer
City
immediately.
Kaysville
¶
him or
See
27 In order to
stop,
make a lawful traffic
(Utah
Mulcahy,
Ct.App.
v.
P.2d
234
943
an officer must have reasonable articulable
1997) (“An
dispatched
receiving
officer
suspicion
subject
stop
that the
is in-
message may
it at face
act on
take
value and
Kohl,
criminal activity.
volved in
See State v.
(internal quotation
¶
it forthwith.”
marks omit
35, 11,
7.
majority
The
ted)).
correctly notes that
while
articulable
supporting
suspicion
facts
reasonable
¶22
Applying
standard
this
frequently
“most
based on
investigating
case,
determine
must
whether
inferences,”
own
officer’s
observations and
presented Sergeant
actions
Ledford
evi
circumstances,
may rely
some
an officer
contradicting
dispatcher’s
dence
reason
other sources of
stop,
information make a
suspicion. Sergeant
able
Ledford observed
including
dispatch reports
in-
based on
Roybal driving slowly
and in
carefully
tips.
supra
formant
See
though
manner
appeared
were
¶28 However, the fact that an officer re
trying
Although
to avoid the
car.
this
police dispatch
ceives information from
does
conclusive,
behavior in and
itself is not
it
necessarily
suspicion
end the reasonable
disprove
does not
or contradict the reason
Indeed,
inquiry.
investigation
where “the
suspicion
able
stop’s
legality
end[s]
arrest and the
[is]
influence,
and therefore did not diminish attacked,
the State must—-albeit after the
Sergeant
ability
rely
Ledford’s
on the
that adequate
fact —establish
articulable sus
dispatcher’s report
pursue
and to
detain
picion initially spurred
dispatch.” Kays
Roybal.
City
Mulcahy,
ville
v.
(Utah
(internal
Ct.App.1997)
quotation marks
omitted);
Bench,
City
see also Salt
Lake
CONCLUSION
(“To
Roy-
23 We conclude that the
evidence
adequate
suspicion
establish
articulable
bal’s
intoxication observed
Led-
broadcast,
spurred
dispatcher’s
pros
ford during
the traffic
properly
ecution must show that [the informant’s]
Roybal.
against
admitted
At the time of the
reliable.”).
stop, Sergeant
rely
Ledford was
entitled
29 We assess whether the
had
upon
dispatch report.
the 911
911 call
based on
content of
by Roybal’s girlfriend
adequate
was of
relia-
provided by
the information
the informant
bility
give
and detail
degree
reliability.
and its
See id.
suspicion Roybal’s
intoxication
White,
(citing
Alabama v.
496 U.S.
driving,
while
own
Ledford’s
(1990)).
L.Ed.2d
*9
Roybal’s
observations of
conduct
not con-
did
quantity
“Both
quality
and
factors —
—are
Thus,
tradict
suspicion.
that
Sergeant Led-
in
‘totality
considered
the
of the circum-
justified
ford
stopping
questioning
was
in
and
analysis.”
stances’
State v.
Roybal.
¶
White,
App
(quoting
pute activity hyper-cautious unlawful driv- Bench,
ing. court of noted: however,
Safe, driving, even ultra-cautious
if motivated a desire to avoid
contact, not, more, does without create rea- suspicion justify sufficient to
sonable stop. Simply put, a
traffic desire to avoid
an encounter with does not indicate person
that a while intoxicated engaged
or is otherwise criminal activi-
ty- ¶ 12, I
2008 UT P.3d 655. imprimatur
would bestow of our court on analysis Although
this from Bench. Ser-
geant Ledford had some information that may
Mr. have been under the
influence, quantity in- and detail of this reliability was sparse,
formation and its question
put into when Ledford’s
personal observations were inconsistent with Thus,
the information. based on the case,
of the circumstances in this I believe Ledford lacked the reasonable needed to Mr.
driving under the influence.
In the matter of the ADOPTION OF
T.B., person eighteen
years age.
T.M., Appellant, S.B., Appellees.
B.B. and
No. 20090074.
Supreme Court Utah.
May
