State v. RoyalState v. Royal
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 7, 2017
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Engel & Martin, LLC, and Joshua Adam Engel, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Neal Royal appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶2} Royal was indicted for two counts of felonious assault under
{¶3} At the sentencing hearing on August 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced Royal to consecutive seven-year prison terms, for an aggregate 14-year prison sentence. Upon hearing the sentence, Royal told the court that he wanted to withdraw his pleas because his attorney had told him that he would receive “four to six years.”
{¶4} The trial court asked defense counsel whether Royal‘s assertion was correct. Defense counsel responded:
I did not[.] * * * I told him the window of potential sentence was two to 16 years, your Honor; that it could be two years, it could be 16 years; that same and similar cases here in Hamilton County have had the range between two to six. I said that I think it would - - it would come in between a four and six year sentence is what I told him. But I said the judge had the decision between two and 16.
{¶5} After hearing from both Royal and defense counsel, the trial court stated:
I know at the time of the plea it‘s always been my practice to ask you whether there were any promises made to you. And I‘m free to
sentence within the range, but just so long as it‘s within the bounds of the law. Now, at this point I‘m denying your request to withdraw your plea, sir. If you wish, you may file the appropriate motion with the Court. But based on what I‘ve heard here, it‘s just that you‘re not happy with the sentence. So it‘s denied at this point.
If you want to retain counsel for appeal, you have 30 days to do so.
{¶6} Defense counsel informed the court that Royal was indigent and asked if the court would appoint counsel for appellate purposes and for any other motions. The court responded that it would. Royal now appeals.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Royal argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the plea stage. A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea on the ground that counsel was ineffective must show that counsel‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).
{¶8} Royal contends that counsel performed deficiently by misinforming him about the likely sentence he would receive. Defense counsel renders ineffective assistance where counsel inaccurately represents a promise of a sentence to the defendant. State v. Collins, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-970138, 1998 WL 57791, *7 (Feb. 13, 1998). However, we have recognized that there is a difference between defense counsel‘s inaccurate representation to his client that there is a promise or agreement as to the sentence and defense counsel‘s prediction of the sentence that his client will likely receive. State v. Testerman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010040, 2001 WL 930125, *3 (Aug. 17, 2001). Defense counsel‘s mere inaccurate prediction of a defendant‘s sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Vinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103329, 2016-Ohio-7604, ¶ 32; State v. Bryant, 2013-Ohio-5105, 1 N.E.3d 878, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). Consequently, even if defense counsel inaccurately predicted a lesser sentence, Royal has failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. See Bryant at ¶ 32; Vinson at ¶ 33-34. We overrule the first assignment of error.
{¶9} In his second assignment of error, Royal argues that the trial court erred by denying his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Under
{¶10} According to Royal, a manifest injustice occurred because his pleas were induced by counsel‘s statement that he would likely receive a sentence of four to six years, and therefore, were involuntary and unintelligent. “Manifest injustice may result from counsel‘s statements to a defendant regarding a promised sentence; however, ‘[m]anifest injustice does not ipso facto result’ from such statements.” State v. Alsip, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130699, 2014-Ohio-4180, ¶ 9, quoting Testerman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010400, 2001 WL 930125.
{¶11} Contrary to Royal‘s assertion, manifest injustice did not result from counsel‘s erroneous sentence prediction. See State v. Blatnik, 17 Ohio App.3d 201, 203, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (6th Dist.1984). The mere inaccurate prediction of the sentence did not invalidate Royal‘s pleas. At the plea hearing, the trial court complied with
{¶12} The trial court properly denied Royal‘s
{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Royal argues that the trial court erred by denying him a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a postsentence
{¶14} In this case, Royal‘s only “motion” was an oral request at his sentencing hearing that was never later supported with an affidavit or sworn testimony. Despite the trial court‘s indication that Royal could file an appropriate motion with the court and that it would appoint counsel if Royal wanted to file such a motion, Royal did not file a motion. The trial court gave fair consideration to Royal‘s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and was entitled to find defense counsel‘s statements to be credible.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.